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This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: how are intellect, intuition, and 
revelation related to one another in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s (1904-1981) view? To answer the 
question, we need to consider the definitions and properties of each of the three notions, and 
ultimately, consider ‘Allāma’s view of the relation among them. ‘Allāma was a prominent, 
influential Iranian Shiite scholar in the twentieth century who wrote many books and essays 
concerning Islamic philosophy, Qur’anic exegesis, theology (kalām), sociology, and so on. 
Deploying an analytic method, the dissertation considers and analyzes all relevant principles 
and theories of ‘Allāma. It takes almost all relevant work by ‘Allāma into account, including 
al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-





Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī (1903 – 1981), known as ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, was one 
of the most influential Islamic traditional reformists and also one of the most distinguished 
Iranian Shīʿa scholars in the 20th century. He had great competence in all common fields of 
Islamic sciences during his time, such as in exegesis of the Qur’ān, Islamic philosophy, 
mysticism, fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and principles of fiqh, theology, history etc. in a way 
that he can be called a “perfect Islamologist”.  He dedicated his entire life to learning, writing 
about different fields of Islamic Studies and educating many prominent students for the Shīʿa 
scientific society.  
‘Allāma wrote many books and essays concerning Islamic philosophy, theology (kalām), 
mysticism (‘Irfān), Qur’anic exegesis, hadith, sociology, principles of fiqh and so on. In 
philosophy, he is a follower of the Transcendent Wisdom, founded by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn 
Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (1571-1640), and has contributed novel ideas to philosophy and other 
disciplines. Given the specific political, social, and intellectual circumstances of his lifetime, 
particularly during the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, as well as 
his frequent scholarly encounters with rightist and leftist intellectual movements of his time, a 
consideration of his fundamental theories can remarkably help us to achieve a better 
understanding of the intellectual grounds of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. 
The research is significant in that ‘Allāma’s account of the relation among intellect, intuition, 
and revelation Should be regarded as his most fundamental theoretical principles permeating 
almost all of his writings. In fact, without a proper understanding of his account of this relation, 
we cannot grasp his methodology and theories. There are two possible impediments for this 
research: (1) the relevance of a variety of theoretical principles from different disciplines, such 
as epistemology, ontology, theology, and the philosophy of mind, to the consideration of the 
relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation, and (2) the complication and profundity of 
‘Allāma’s definitions, characterizations, and account of the relation among the three—indeed, 
his account of this problem might be considered as one of the most complicated and intricate 
issues discussed by ‘Allāma. Notwithstanding this, the research is facilitated by two facts: (1) 
‘Allāma’s caution in observing the boundaries of different disciplines and avoidance of 
confusion in the tools and methods of philosophy, mysticism, theology, and Qur’anic exegesis, 
and (2) ‘Allāma’s educational concerns as a consequence of which he presented many of his 
writings at different levels of comprehensibility. In other words, since the audience level of his 
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books and essays is known in advance, the researcher can easily determine the work in which 
‘Allāma provides outlines and majority views and the work in which he seeks to provide the 
precise details of his own theoretical principles. 
Although ‘Allāma passed away less than a century ago, there has been much scholarship on his 
theories—in the section on ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s work, I have provided a brief report on such 
scholarship. In particular, books and papers were published concerning the definition and 
characteristics of intellect, intuition, and revelation, as well as the relation among the three. 
Moreover, there are works in which the relation between intellect and intuition is, for instance, 
considered under the relation between philosophy and mysticism. Of all these works, I could 
not identify one in which ‘Allāma’s account of the relation among all the three—intellect, 
intuition, and revelation—is elaborated and analyzed; not among the Persian and Arabic 
literature on ‘Allāma, nor in English sources. And this research seems necessary and 
unprecedented given that an answer to the main question of this dissertation is key to a precise 
understanding of many of his theoretical principles. As to a biography of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
and an account of the particular political and social context in which he lived, detailed research 
has been carried out in Persian, Arabic, and English, including Hamid Dabashi’s Theology of 
the Discontent, a chapter of which is devoted to an introduction of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and the 
challenges and opportunities he faced. What distinguishes ‘Allāma’s biography in this 
dissertation from that in other relevant English work is not so much its statistical information 
as its approach. On this approach, in addition to historical accounts, I have provided a picture 
of different intellectual trends as conceived by ‘Allāma and his close students so as to have a 
more clear understanding of the reason behind his scholarly and socio-political actions and 
reactions as well as his projects for the publication of the Shiite doctrines and for pushing the 
Muslim-majority society in Iran toward an ideal Islamic community.  
Deploying an analytic method, the dissertation considers and analyzes all relevant principles 
and theories of ‘Allāma. It takes almost all relevant work by ‘Allāma into account, including 
al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-
i Ri’ālīsm, his collected essays, and “Risālat al-Wilāya”. The dissertation is structured into 6 
chapters: the first chapter provides a short biographical account of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī as well 
as his contemporary socio-political context and schools of thoughts with which he was 
theoretically engaged. Chapter two—the longest and the most intellectually challenging 
chapter of the dissertation—deals with a definition of intellect and its types and degrees. In this 
chapter, ‘Allāma’s views as well as his disagreements with his predecessors, including Ṣadr al-
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Muta’allihīn, are considered. Chapters three and four deal, respectively, with definitions and 
considerations of intuition and revelation. Chapter five undertakes to answer the main question 
of the dissertation; that is, the relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation. In the final 
chapter, I provide a conclusion and summary of the whole dissertation.  
There are two major issues involved in each of the three problems of reason, intuition, and 
revelation: types of knowledge (namely, knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition) 
and different realms of existence. To preclude repetition, I discuss these in the chapter on 
reason, without reiterating them in the chapters on intuition and revelation. As a result, the 
volume of the chapter on reason is greater than the other two chapters of the dissertation. I 
discuss these issues in the chapter on reason in compliance with ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī since he 
has discussed these issues under his discussion of reason and epistemology, utilizing its 
conclusions in his discussion of the nature of intuition and revelation. 
Finally, what is cited from the work of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and others in this dissertation is my 
translation of the original Arabic or Persian texts into English, and when a published translation 




1. Contextualising ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and his Intellectual Movement  
Iranian society during the lifetime of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī faced social, political and cultural 
changes which significantly influenced his scientific life, research and educational planning. 
In 1926, he went to Iraq to study religious sciences. After learning seminary sciences in the 
seminary of Najaf, he returned to Qum with a wide array of plans and ideas for the seminary 
of Qum and Iranian Shīʿa society; which he shared upon his arrival.1  
His scientific services led to the emergence of a comprehensive intellectual movement which 
had fundamental differences especially with other religious intellectual movements. The 
influence of this new intellectual movement in different social levels helped a lot in preparing 
the intellectual and social grounds for the uprising of Iranian people under the leadership of 
Sayyid Rūhullāh Mūsavī Khumeinī (1902-1989). 2  Hamid Dabashi writes: "Although the 
unintended consequences of an otherwise deeply scholastic mind, aspects of Allamah 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s voluminous writings were instrumental in making possible 'the Islamic Ideology' 
and with it the Islamic Revolution."3   
Three Primary Questions: 
In order to comprehend the contribution made by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī to this religious, 
intellectual movement this introduction will focus on three questions, which are set out below:  
1. In what atmosphere of intellectual, cultural and political thought did ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī live in and what intellectual movements did he encounter? 
2. What is the nature of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s religious intellectualism, and what is its 
relationship with other types of intellectualism, especially western intellectualism? 
3. What objectives did he have from scientific and educational activities? 
Answer to the first Question:  
During the 20th century, Iran became a terminal for the traffic and stations of different 
intellectual movements. A brief explanation on the most prominent and influential movements 
 
1 See pages 28-30 for information on his plan for Shi'a seminaries in Iran.  
2 See Ḥusayn Ḥaqqānī Zanjānī, 1982, Darshā'ī az Maktab-i Islam: Number 10, Naqsh-i ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī dar 
Zībanāy-i Inqilab-i Islamī", Qum, Mu'assisiy-i Imam Ṣādiq. 
3 Ḥamīd Dabāshī, 1951, Theology of Discontent; The Ideological Foundation of The Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
New York University Press, p. 276. 
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with which ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī encountered with will be mentioned in the following 
discussions.4  
1.1. Prominent and influential intellectual movements in Iran during the 20th century  
All intellectual movements in 20th century Iran have tried to answer questions they faced in 
encountering the western intellectual schools or culture and civilization; questions such as: The 
nature of western culture, nature and functions of modern philosophies, nature of Islam, 
relation between science and religion, relation between reason and faith, position and role of 
the human being in the world from the viewpoint of Islam and the west and the method of 
interaction with the west and western culture, etc. Therefore, religious and non-religious 
intellectual movements which did not seriously try to answer these questions or considered 
religion and modernism totally opposite to each other will not be mentioned in this 
categorization. 
It is important to note that the word “west” was a concept, in the written and spoken literature 
of Iranians in 20th century, usually considered equal with modernity and did not usually refer 
to a certain country in Europe or America, while actually the more developed countries were 
rather meant. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī engaged scientifically with the above-mentioned questions 
and many other questions of a similar nature directly or indirectly; but, in most cases, he 
avoided mentioning the names of those who gave differing opinions to these questions in Iran 
and only mentioned his own opinion based on intellectual principles and revelation. 
Three points about our classification of influential intellectual trends in twentieth-century Iran 
are in order: 
1. A variety of classifications might be made in terms of different criteria such as the extent of 
influence, intellectual foundations, temporal order, and region, and such classifications might 
well be accurate. In order to show what movements ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī targeted in his writings, 
or alternatively how he understood such intellectual trends, I have to talk about the most 
outstanding aspects of such movements according to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and others so that we 
might obtain a more obvious picture of the grounds of his scholarly practices. Such an approach 
to the classification of intellectual trends in twentieth-century Iran faces challenges the most 
important of which is the intellectual milieu and the scholarly literature of the audience of this 
dissertation in English-speaking countries as well as the intellectual milieu and the scholarly 
 
4 Please note that what comes in the following section is a brief explanation on the main intellectual movements 
with which ‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī’ encountered and the reality was much more complex than what is presented here.  
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literature particularly in twentieth-century Iran, which might cause confusions concerning 
aspects of intellectual movements in twentieth-century Iran. 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote a major book in Islamic philosophy titled Principles of Philosophy 
and the Method of Realism, which consists of 14 articles. In particular, the first four articles of 
the book are devoted to critiques and rejections of theories to which ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī refers 
as philosophical principles of idealism, claiming that they were influential on his contemporary 
intellectual movements. The fact of the matter is that ‘idealism’ as discussed by ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī was a common term in the academic or intellectual language of his time, which was 
fundamentally close to skepticism, and is in fact not much relevant to what is commonly 
understood by the term in Western philosophy. In the academic literature and heated social 
debates of the time in Iran, particularly in Tabriz, idealism was deemed a rationalist intellectual 
movement which rejected divine revelation, ridiculed atheists, and accused them of intellectual 
dogmatism. With these explanations at hand, it is obvious that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī should not 
be included among critics of idealism in the sense in which it is used in Western philosophy, 
and his objections to intellectual trends inspired by idealism in the sense prevalent in twentieth-
century Iran might be regarded as objections to the Western school of idealism and its 
associated trends in Iran. 
2. Given the above remarks concerning the focus on ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s identification of 
twentieth-century intellectual movements for purposes of this dissertation, I need to explain 
certain common terms of the time and their differences as reflected in the classification 
provided here. In this dissertation, I classify the relevant intellectual trends into three general 
groups: Modern Islamic Reformism, Traditional Islamic Reformism, and Non-Islamic 
Reformism. There is no doubt that all the three trends were influenced by two movements in 
Iran known as Leftist and Rightist.5 These two movements (i.e. Leftist and Rightist movements) 
 
5 The terms “Rightist” and “Leftist” have assumed different meanings throughout the political history of Iran. 
Today, in the present discourse in Iran, they have a different meaning. In the political literature of the world, 
particularly in the twentieth century, the terms assumed many different and even contradictory meanings, and 
there is more confusion about these two terms in twentieth-century Iran. As to the archeology of the notions 
throughout political activities of different political parties, traces of ideologies and Leftist or Rightist parties can 
be found in the “Constitutional Movement” of Iran. “The Democratic Party” of Iran, most of whose members 
were well-educated intellectuals who lived in the West, were thought to promote leftist ideas, and the “Moderate 
Party” of Iran, consisting of clergymen and noblemen, advocated rightist ideas. In the Pahlavi era, as influenced 
by the discourse governing the cold war and the division of the power blocs into Eastern and Western, respectively, 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the USA, the title was attuned to this division. For this reason, In the 
Pahlavi era, it was common to refer to communists and the Tudeh Party as Leftist and to liberals and pro-monarchy 
conservatives—because of their association with the West—as Rightist. (See Mahdī Muṭahharniyā, Chap va Rāst, 
az vazhigān tā vāqi‘īyyat-i siyāsī.Zamāne Journal, No. 78) 
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were respectively supported by intellectual and philosophical backgrounds of Marxism and 
liberalism, and had overshadowed the intellectual, political, social, cultural, and economic 
milieu of Iran. In the face of these two imported intellectual movements in Iran, at least three 
general fronts were formed, which I address in this dissertation as three groups of intellectual 
trends in twentieth-century Iran. In addition to these three trends, there were others as well: (1) 
the traditional Islamic trend which resisted any response or modification against Rightist and 
Leftist movements. They did not feel any serious need for change; instead, they adamantly 
resisted any such change, as exemplified by problems posed by certain scholars in the Islamic 
Seminary of Qum for ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī as an icon of Traditional Islamic Reformism; (2) the 
nationalist movement, which was divided in turn into Islamic, liberal, and Marxist. It did not 
have its own school of thought or ideology, mainly emphasizing patriotism and resistance 
toward foreigners, although there were differences within the nationalist movement, for 
example, over their approach to monarchy and Islam. What distinguished the movement was 
its political-social activism as motivated by freedom from injustices and social problems, 
attainment of social freedom and justice, and promotion of the place of Iran and its 
independence. It was not much motivated by religious incentives, even in its Islamic branches.6 
No nationalist movement particularly attracted the attention of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī as a 
Traditional Islamic Reformist, and he wrote nothing beyond a few lines concerning the love 
for one’s homeland and its advantages as the main doctrine of nationalists. For this reason, and 
because of our discussion of liberalist and Marxist movements in this dissertation, I do not 
address the nationalist movement as an intellectual trend alongside the three trends taken 
seriously and resisted by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. 
 
The relation of leftists and rightists with the East and the West is prominently reflected in the well-known motto 
by Sayyed Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “Neither East, Nor West; the Islamic 
Republic.” In his explanation of the motto, Ruḥollāh Ramaḍānī says in the chapter “idealistic encounter” of his 
book Chahārchūb-i taḥlīlī barāyi barrasī-yi siyāsat-i khārijī-yi jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Irān (An analytic framework 
for a study of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran): Ayatollah Khomeini sought to emphasize that in 
devising the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we should not immaturely follow the model of Eastern 
socialism or Western capitalism. He believed, instead, that Islamic democracy is superior to Eastern and Western 
democracies. In critique of those who interpreted the motto as impermissibility of having relations with these 
countries, he says, “by the motto ‘Neither East, Nor West; the Islamic Republic,’ Imam [Khomeini] did not suggest 
that Iran should not have relations with the Soviet government or America or other governments that have close 
ties to the superpowers; instead, what he really meant by the motto ‘Neither East, Nor West’ was the rejection of 
the dominion of foreigners, rather than severing ties with them, since negation of political relations with other 
countries is negation of those countries.” 
6 See Āyat Muẓaffarī, 2017, Jaryān-shināsī-yi siyāsī-yi Iran-i mu‘āṣir, Qum: Zamzam-i Hidāyat, pp. 179-198; 
‘Alī Dārābī, 2011, Jaryān-shināsī-yi siyāsī dar Iran, Tehran: Islamic Culture and Thought Research Institute, 
Chapter: Mellīgarā yā Nāsyụnālīsm. 
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The criterion for distinguishing the three trends (discussed in this dissertation) is their approach 
to theories arising from Marxist and liberalist schools as well as intellectual foundations of 
those trends. Atheists7 among these tried to carry out their intended political, social, cultural, 
and other reforms in Iran in line with intellectual foundations of Marxism or liberalism, to 
which I refer in this dissertation as Non-Islamic Reformists. Some Muslims, to whom I refer 
in this dissertation as Modern Islamic Reformists, tried to create the greatest harmony between 
Islamic doctrines and modernity (or intellectual principles of Marxism or liberalism) in Iranian 
society, even to the expense of opposition to appearances of Quranic verses and hadiths, and 
deviation from the traditional textualist reading of religion. They actually imposed on the 
Qur’an what they accepted as philosophical and intellectual findings, which were contrary to 
Islamic teachings. In other words, in the conflict between reason and revelation, they favored 
reason, trying to strip Quranic verses of their apparent meanings, interpreting them away in 
terms of their own intellectual and philosophical principles.  
There were Traditional Islamic Reformists, the most influential among whom was ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, who tried to find answers to questions arising as a consequence of the encounter 
with modernity and Marxist and liberalist philosophies without giving up traditional Islamic 
principles and without interpreting Quranic verses away in terms of philosophical or scientific 
theories. For instance, while ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was a prominent Islamic philosopher in the 
twentieth century, in the preface to his Quranic exegesis al-Mīzān he takes issue with those 
who interpret the Qur’an in terms of their own philosophical or mystical or scientific beliefs, 
holding that when the Qur’an characterizes itself as a light, it makes no sense to take anything 
else as a light with which to illuminate the Qur’an, since a light does not need anything else for 
illumination. Accordingly, he adopted the method of interpreting the Qur’an with the Qur’an. 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and some other scholars, mostly his own students, tried to deploy the 
advantages of modernity, as can be seen in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s discussion of freedom of 
speech, women’s rights and place in Islam, social justice, etc. This is why we see the strongest 
advocacy of, and the strongest opposition to, theories of modernity in his work—he insistently 
defends a theory of modernity when he finds it in conformity with Islamic doctrines, trying to 
elaborate it from an Islamic point of view, even if that was disfavored by his contemporary 
 
7 Although some Muslims were also involved in this movement, it should be noted that their reformist activities 
did not arise from their religious beliefs or their motivations for the promotion of Islam in the society and the 
pursuit of the ideal Islamic society. This is what distinguishes them from Modern Islamic Reformists and 




scholars; and he unyieldingly criticizes a theory of modernity when he finds it against Islamic 
doctrines, noting its downsides from philosophical, exegetical, and other perspectives. This is 
what made him an Islamic freethinker.  
From the above remarks it is obvious that the eclectic approach can apply only to Modern 
Islamic Reformism, and Traditional Islamic Reformism eschews eclecticism concerning 
Islamic and non-Islamic principles through ignorance or exotic interpretations of Quranic 
verses and hadiths. Traditional Islamic Reformism seeks to discover the Islamic view of 
modern issues or questions raised by modernity and liberalist or Marxist schools. In this trend, 
such research is done without relinquishing Islamic principles and by reliance on outer and 
inner meanings of the Qur’an (which, according to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view, cannot be in 
conflict with one another)8 and appeals are made to hadiths from Prophet Muḥammad and his 
household as teachers of the Qur’an. 
What should be noted about ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is that his career must not be limited to what 
pertains to Traditional Islamic Reformism. Much of his scholarly career was devoted to the 
revival of Islamic sciences 9  in light of the philosophical and mystical principles of 
Transcendent philosophy, which was founded by Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (1572-1640). In fact, 
what I refer to as ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s practices within Traditional Islamic Reformism is a 
byproduct of the revival of Islamic sciences as undertaken by him and other scholars. 
3. Under each of the far-reaching trends in twentieth-century Iran, reference is made to 
influential figures. What should be noted about these figures is that reference to these 
individuals as prominent figures of the relevant trends does not mean that they were superior 
in terms of knowledge and ideology to their fellows within those trends. The criterion for this 
was just the extent to which they influenced the intellectual milieu of the society, and hence, 
the attention they received by those who wrote about such trends. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī often 
ignored their publicity and focused instead on their intellectual principles which appeared in 
their speeches, statements, articles, and books. Finally, since this dissertation is focused on the 
relation between reason, intuition, and revelation and because of its limited scopes, I cannot 
address all influential figures in these intellectual trends and consider their theories. 
 
8 See Sayyid Muḥamamd Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1985, Qur’ān dar Islām, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, pp. 44-50. 
9 By ‘revival of Islamic sciences’ I mean the majority of Islamic sciences except Islamic jurisprudence and its 




This categorization is as follows: 
1.1.1. Modern Islamic Reformism 
Intellectuals in this group tried to present a reformed version of Islam and make it compatible 
with modernism. They were either reluctant to use the traditional approaches or advocates of 
anti-traditional approaches for presenting new understandings of Islamic teachings, which are 
in conformity or less conflict with modernism. Some of these intellectual movements received 
support from the Pahlavī regime and others were considered, less or more, as antagonists of 
the regime. 
To René Guénon (1886-1951), in many cases, an eclectic approach toward religion and 
modernity has led to simplification of religion and “religion is replaced by ‘religiosity’, that is 
to say by a vague sentimentality having no real significance; it is this that is acclaimed as 
‘progress’”10 and this is an experience the west acquired due to setting Christianity apart from 
major social and political fields. He wrote, “The most typical example is that of Protestantism, 
in which simplification takes the form both of an almost complete suppression of rites, together 
with an attribution of predominance to morality over doctrine; and the doctrine itself becomes 
more and more simplified and diminished so that it is reduced to almost nothing, or at most to 
a few rudimentary formulas that anyone can interpret in any way that suits him.” 11 
A similar approach can be found with individuals such as Mīrzā Fatḥ‘alī Ākhūndzāda (1812 – 
1878) who was among the pioneers of Iranian nationalism. Although, he did not believe in 
religion12, he said, “Abandoning the religion of ancestors is not necessary. We should walk 
along with our fellow religious adherents in a brotherly manner, but in the heart, we follow the 
path of truth.” 13  He defined Protestantism as, “a school in which the rights of God and 
obligations of all servants of God are all cancelled and only the rights of people remain.”14 
Āyatullāh Murtażā Muṭahharī (1919-1979) was among important personalities (in the 20th 
century) who tried to pose serious intellectual and cultural opposition against the eclectic 
approach, mentioned above, and according to Rasūl Jaʿfariyān, “[he tried to] wipe the dust off 
 
10 René Guénon, 2004, The Reign of Quantity and The Signs of the Times, Translated by Lord Northbourne, Sophia 
Pereniss, page 78. 
11 Ibid., p.77. 
12 Ḥamīd Pārsānīyā, 2000, Ḥadīth-i piymānih: Pazhūhishī Dar Inqilāb-i Islāmī, Intishārāt-i Maʿārif, Qum, p. 213. 
13 Friydūn Ādamīyyat, 1970, Andīshihāy-i Mīrzā Fathʿalī Akhūnzādih, Tehran, Nashr-i Khārazmī, p. 22. 
14 Mīrza Fathʿalī Akhūnzādih, 1978, Alifbāy-i Jadīd wa Maktūbāt, Compiled by Ḥamīd Muḥammadzādih, p. 112. 
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eclecticism in Iran.”15 In his different works, he seriously fought this issue.16 About the eclectic 
approach toward religion and modernity, he said,  
Every Islamic cultural movement which is to become the backbone of our social 
movement needs to be originated and nourished from the root of our old culture, not 
from other cultures. It is not sufficient for guiding our movement in the Islamic path 
that we eclectically choose parts of other cultures such as Marxism, Existentialism and 
the like and put an Islamic cover over them.17 
Some of the influential/famous personalities of this group were Sharīʿat Sanglājī and Ali 
Sharīʿatī, who are discussed below: 
1.1.1.1. Muḥammad Hasan Sharīʿat Sanglājī (1891 – 1944): Sanglājī was among famous 
figures of this group. He was among the first seminarians who preached religious renewal in 
Iran and the peak of his activities was at the time of Riżā Shāh.18 Riżā Shāh hated seminarians 
and took many measures to damage the seminary and cleric society and "the decisions about 
culture were the sole prerogative of the monarch."19 There was a great suppression at his time 
and no seminarian could object these decisions. He only permitted two houses to have activities: 
House of Sanglājī and his followers and the house of Kasravī and his adherents (about whom, 
there will be a discussion in the section regarding secularism). Sanglājī and Kasravī were the 
continuation of Islamic Protestantism )20.)پروتستانتیسم اسالمی In the introduction of his book titled 
as Kilīd-i fahm-i Qur’ān which was published in 1943, Sanglājī wrote, “It was the first time 14 
years ago (1927 – 1928), when I became aware that true Islam was left undiscovered. And this 
Islam which seminarians talk about and is in the minds of common people is other than the 
Islam the Prophet (a) brought”21 In Kashf al-Asrār, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Āyatullāh Sayyid Rūhullāh Khumeinī addressed Sharīʿat Sanglājī and his group and wrote,  
 
15 Rasūl Jaʿfariyān, 1989, Murūrī bar zamīnih-hā-yi fikrī-yi Iltiqāt-i jadīd dar Iran, p. 15. 
16 See: The second section of Muṭaḥḥarī: pāyiguzār-i nahzat-i novīnī dar bazshināsī-yi Islām-i Asīl, written by 
ʿAbulḥusayn Ḥakīmīyān, published by Sāzmān-i Mujahidīn-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī, 1982.  
17 Murṭażā Muṭaḥḥarī, 1998, Majmūʿih-yi Āthār, vol. 24, "Nihzat-hā-yi Islāmī dar sad sālih-yi akhīr", Ṣadrā 
publication, p. 75. 
18 Rasūl Jaʿfarīyān, 1989, Murūrī bar zamīnih-hā-yi fīkrī-yi iltiqāṭ-i jadīd dar Iran, Sāzmān-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī, 
p. 45. 
19  Mark Juergensmeyer & Mansoor, Moaddel, 2006, M. Shi'a Islamic Societies. In the Oxford Handbook of 
Global Religions.: Oxford University Press p. 452. 
20 ʿAlī Abulhasanī (Munzir), 1983, Shahīd Muṭaḥḥarī, Ifshāgar-i tuti’ih, Islamic Publication Office and Society 
of Seminary Teachers of Qum, p. 170. 
21 Muḥammad Hasan Sharīʿat Sanglājī, 1943, Kilīd-i fahm-i Qur’ān, Intishārāt-i Dānīsh. P. 11. 
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Are all this fever and frenzy of yours and agitation because people did not obey the 
order of Imam (a) saying that the grave should be four joined fingers above the 
ground?!22 Well, then if you are such a pure religious Muslim who becomes upset for 
just one order of Imam (a), why do not you say even one word about all the sins being 
committed in Tehran which is the center of Shīʿā? It would be good if you wrote one 
word about the humiliating removal of hijab, dance gatherings, swimming pools with 
mixed young girls and boys, drinking intoxicants, usurious transactions of the banks 
and companies; and the like about which both hadiths and the Qur’ān itself have rulings. 
So, it becomes clear that there is another purpose involved.23  
In Tafsīr al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī has comprehensive discussions about the reality of the 
return of the Imams (a) and some Prophets (a) and a number of pious believers after the 
reappearance of Imam al-Mahdi (a), about some prophets (a) such as Jesus (a) and Khiḍr (a) 
being alive and the merit of visiting the dwellers of graves and the possibility that some of the 
dead intercede for nearness of the visitors [of their graves] to God. These were the issues 
Sanglājī had criticized in some of his books such as Islam and Rajʿat and Tawhīd-i ʿibādat; 
yiktāparastī and rejected them. 
1.1.1.2. ‘Alī Sharīʿatī: Sharīʿatī was a revolutionary Muslim intellectual and a writer and a 
powerful speaker who had an eclectic approach toward Islam and modernity, sought evolution 
of human society, especially Islamic society and pursued this evolution in returning to true 
Islam24 and moving toward realization of freedom and social justice. "Sharīʿatī can, perhaps, 
best be described as a sociologist of religion."25 He saw Islam as an ideology26, not as a 
collection of Islamic sciences including fiqh, kalam and philosophy and regarded actualization 
of this ideology in the society as his goal.27 He was a critic of the traditional interpretations of 
Islam and considered Protestantism in the west an experienced and almost successful model/ 
movement in developing a social movement toward development.28 Therefore, he evaluated the 
 
22 According to some narrations from some of the Imams, like the hadith narrated from Imam al-Bāqir (a) in 
Wasā'l al-Shī'a, the height of a grave is recommended not be higher than the width of four joined fingers of one's 
hand over the ground. Āyatullāh Sayyid Rūhullāh Khumeinī criticized the reformation in Islam which Sanglājī 
called for as being about such not significant matters and ignoring intentionally the primary changes needed for 
the Iranian Islamic society of that time.   
23 Sayyid Rūhullāh Khumeinī, 1944, Kashf al-Asrār, Kitābfurūshī-yi Islamī-ye Tehran, p. 65. 
24 See Pārsānīyā Hamīd, 2000, Ḥadīth-i piymānih: Pazhūhishī Dar Inqilāb-i Islāmī, Intishārāt-i Maʿārif, Qum, p. 
349. 
25 Mihrzād Burūjirdī, 1996, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism, Syracuse 
University Press, New York, p.106. 
26 See ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, Majmū’ih-yi Āthār, vol. 2, p. 37. 
27 See Ibid., vol. 2, p. 173 & for his definition of ideology see: Ibid., vol. 11. P.147. 
28 Ibid., vol. 20, p. 294. 
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traditional approach of the seminary toward the mentioned movement as an invitation to 
inactivity, silence and contentedness.29 He was also a critic of western modernity and did not 
consider the movement of modernity in the west as flawless;30 while, he regarded the religious 
teaching of monotheism not only an undeniable truth and justifying the existence of the world 
of creatures, but rather, saw it as the foundation of humans’ unity and in the ideology of the 
unity of all the creation.31 
Sharīʿatī was influenced by socialism and considered the establishment of justice, human 
equality and basing the rights of the oppressed upon the implementation of an egalitarian model, 
i.e. he rejected private ownership of the means of production and regarded it as the fastest way 
of removing exploitation, poverty and deprivation of the oppressed.32 He did not believe in all 
intellectual and philosophical principles of socialism and was a critic of non-religious socialism. 
He criticized it in the introduction of an article he wrote in 1355 (1977) titled as Maktab-i 
wāsita (Intermediate School of Islam),  
Between the two schools of Materialism and Idealism, Islam has its own approach and 
it can be called realism. The social and economic systems of Islam are the practical 
Socialism based on theism and is the middle way between the two corrupted regimes 
of Capitalism and Communism.33 
Ali Sharīʿatī began a movement which in many ways ran alongside the revolutionary 
movement led by Āyatullāh Khumaynī, Āyatullāh Muṭahharī and others in fighting the Pahlavī 
regime, but Sharīʿatī’s eclectic views toward Islam and modernity and lack of expertise in 
Islamic fields resulted in a large degree of criticism of his written work and lectures by 
traditional scholars of the seminary. People such as Āyatullāh Sayyid Muḥammad Bihishtī 
(1928 – 1981) wanted to reduce tensions for reasons such as preserving unity and alignment in 
the fight against the Pahlavī regime,34 but some people such as Āyatullāh Murtażā  Muṭahharī 
insisted that there should not be any compromise regarding intellectual principles of the 
revolution and different outlooks should be divided from the beginning.  
 
29 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 42. 
30 See ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, Chi Bāyad Kard?, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Kāmil, p. 30. 
31 See ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, Tawhīd wa Shirk, part 2. 
32 See ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, 2001, Mazhab ʿAlayhi Mazhab, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Chāpakhsh, p21. 
33 ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, 2010, Tārikh-I Takāmul-i Falsafih, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Chāpakhsh, p. 9.  
34 See Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Bihishtī, 2012, Dr. Sharīʿatī: Justijūgarī dar Masīr-i Shodan, Tehran: Bunyād-
i Nashr-i Āthār-i Shahīd Dr. Bihishtī. 
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Dr. Sharīʿatī’s lack of acquisition and expertise in the fields referred to as Islamic sciences in 
the seminary35 made many traditional scholars of the seminary make serious criticisms about 
his understanding of Islamic teachings and historical analyses of the events in early Islam.36 
Some of them expressed very harsh opinions about him and even excommunicated him37 and 
some others such as ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī held a more lenient opinion of him and merely sufficed 
to express their opinions about incorrectness of his thought and work. For example, when 
‘Allāma was asked in a question in a letter, “did you approve the ideas of Dr. ʿAlī Sharīʿatī?” 
He answered, “I never approved the written work of Dr. Sharīʿatī regarding Islamology. The 
majority of his ideas are wrong and not approvable according to Islamic documents.”38 In 
another letter he writes about Sharīʿatī's works: "There is no animosity between Dr. Sharīʿatī 
and us. The point is that there are some ideas in his works that cannot be justified by Islamic 
standards (criteria)."39  
Another factor which made people like Āyatullāh Murtażā Muṭahharī take a position against 
the thought of Sharīʿatī was due to the latter comparing the political power of the scholars of 
the church in Middle Ages equal to that of Shīʿā scholars. This eclectic view of Sharīʿatī toward 
modernity and Islam and his many related lectures in universities and public gatherings, 
according to Āyatullāh Muṭahharī, “made unrecoverable damage to the harmony of 
seminarians and the class of educated people and made them very much distrustful toward each 
other and provoked the feelings of a group of unaware youths toward seminarians.”40 
Ḥamīd Dabashī (b. 1951) in his book Theology of Discontent, after criticizing some of the 
writers for their highly hyperbolic ideas about the contributions of ‘Alī Sharīʿatī to the 
formation of the ideology of the Islamic revolution in Iran, writes "Muṭahharī was infinitely 
more erudite in matters of Islamics than Sharīʿatī could have ever been. Sharīʿatī's ideological 
contribution to the making of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ought to be measured and 
balanced in relation to other prominent figures in this category."41 
 
35 For Sharīʿatī's educational background, see ʿAlī Rahnemā, 1994, Pioneers of Islamic Revival, London and New 
Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, pp. 208-218. 
36 See Murtażā Motahharī's criticism of Sharīʿatī's idea about Imam Ḥusayn (as) in the following source:  
Murtażā Mutaḥḥarī, Yaddashthay-i Ustād Muṭaḥḥarī, Ṣadrā Publication, vol. 3, pp. 218-221. 
37 Muḥammad Yazdī, 2002, Khātīrāt, Compiled and published by Makaz-i Asnād-i Inqilābe Islāmī, p. 481. 
38 Sayyid Hamīd Ruhānī, 2011, Nihżat-i Imām Khumeinī, Tehran: Chāp-u Nashr-i ʿUrūj, p. 375. 
39 Riżā Ṣanʿatī, 2011, Guftimān-i Miṣbāh, Tehran: Markaz-i Asnād-i Inqilābe Islāmī, p. 223. 
40 Murtażā Muṭaḥḥarī, ʿ Ālim-i Jāwdān Ustād Shahīd Muṭaḥḥarī,Tehran: Markaz-i Barrasī Asnād-i Tārikhī, p. 444. 
41 Ḥamīd Dabāshī, 1951, Theology of Discontent; The Ideological Foundation of The Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
New York University Press, p. 108. 
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‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī did not have a direct debate or encounter with Sharīʿatī and the only 
sentences quoted from ‘Allāma about ‘Alī Sharīʿatī and his works are the ones mentioned 
above, and there is no other mention of him in the works of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. 
From the above remarks it becomes evident that this intellectual trend promoted by very 
influential figures such as ‘Alī Sharīʿatī firmly believed in the necessity of reforms in Iran as 
well as the capacity of Islam for fitting into the values and ideals of modernity. In the course 
of such reform, they were ready to relinquish or interpret away the appearances of Quranic 
verses and hadiths. Given that some leaders of this intellectual movement, such as ‘Alī 
Sharīʿatī, were not profoundly educated in Islamic seminaries, their theories concerning Islamic 
doctrines were seriously criticized by Traditional Islamic Reformists. 
1.1.2. Traditional Islamic Reformism  
Before discussing the attributes of this group, an explanation about the special intellectualism 
of this group is necessary. The two terms of enlightenment and intellectuality42 entered Iran 
from the west. In Iran, two equivalents of the original Arabic (munawwar al-fikrī) and Persian 
(rushangarī) were introduced for “enlightenment” and “intellectualism”.43 In his analysis of 
munawwar al-fikrī, Ḥamīd Parsānīyā (b. 1958) writes, “In fact, the first term munawwar al-
fikrī refers to a kind of thought, a model of thinking, or even a social and epistemological 
movement that emerged four centuries ago in the west and its social and cultural reflection 
were brought to Iran at the time of Persian Constitutional Revolution.” In analysis of the term 
rushanfikrī, he says, “this word referred to another kind of thought and even social movement. 
It was formed in the social history of the west, in another period, since the second half of 19th 
century and was given its specific title in the beginning of the 20th century. Since 1320s [of 
solar calendar] (1945), after World War II, its historical consequences emerged in Iran.”44 The 
traditional religious intellectual movement had special epistemological principles toward the 
world and human beings and had a particular approach toward the intellect, (revelational and 
 
42 ‘Aqlāniyyat (rationality or intellectuality) and its cognates, such as ‘aql (reason), ‘uqalā’ī (rational), and ma‘qūl 
(reasonable), are concepts over the definition and types of which there is serious disagreement, although they were 
considered and praised by many intellectual trends (See Ḥasan Rezā’ī, 2012, Pazhụhi, Pazhụheshkadiy-i Bāqir al-
‘Ulụm). In the Islamic thought, rationality is deployed as a method for discovering the truth and divine commands 
and considerations, and reason is deployed as a tool for having a profound understanding, although such 
deployments have been controversial among Muslims—particularly textualists and Akhbārīs, on the one hand, 
and many Shiite scholars, on the other. Moreover, rationalism was adopted as a method in contrast to the method 
of revelatory sciences in periods of Iranian history, particularly the years before and after the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran, and was used as a tool for criticizing and rejecting religious beliefs by atheist intellectuals some of whom 
are mentioned in this dissertation. 




non-revelational) intuition and tradition; however, an accurate look at them disapproves using 
the terms “Munawwar al-fikrī”, “Rushangarī” and “Rushanfikrī” for their intellectual 
movement. Therefore, instead of using equivalent terms for “enlightenment” and 
“intellectualism”, some writers such as ʿAbdulḥusayn Khusrupanāh used expressions such as 
“Religious/Islamic intellectualism” (ʿAqlānīyyat-i Dīnī) for the aforementioned movement and 
said, “an intellectualism acceptable with regards to this movement is an intellectualism which 
approves of revelation, not the modern intellectualism which is against revelation.”45 
This movement, as its name implies, emphasizes maintaining tradition and benefiting from it. 
Tradition in this understanding can refer to two issues: 1. Preserving scientific heritage of 
scholars of Islam and Shi’s Islam in all Islamic fields especially fiqh, ethics, philosophy and 
mysticism 2. Emphasis on the authenticity of (revelational and non-revelational) intuition 
beside intellect as the means of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, in this intellectual movement, 
all jurisprudential works of Islamic scholars from early Islam up to now as well as all the works 
of personalities such as Al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Khwājih Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, Suhrawardī and 
Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrazī in philosophy and theology as well as prominent figures of mystical works 
such as Ibn ʿArabī would be included in the tradition.46 For example, in his introduction to 
Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm, Āyatullāh Murtażā  Muṭahharī wrote about benefitting from 
scientific heritage in Islamic philosophy, “this book benefited from one thousand-years of 
research (which has been carried on by Islamic philosophers) and also, (for writing this book) 
the views and studies of great scholars of Europe have been fully reviewed.”47 
Another attribute of this movement, thanks to the philosophical school Mullā Ṣadrā founded 
and called Transcendental Philosophy, brings mysticism, theology and philosophy together. 
This philosophical school made great efforts to draw a tight relationship between revelation, 
mystical intuition and intellect and create harmony, synergy and convergence between 
scientific products of philosophy, mysticism and theology. The influence of this philosophical 
school in the aforementioned intellectual movement is so much that some writers such as Dr. 
ʿImād Afrūgh (b. 1956) considered the Islamic Revolution indebted to Mullā Ṣadrā and 
introduced it an expansion of Ṣadrā’s thought.48 
 
45 Abdulḥusayn Khusrupanāh, 2010, Jaryān-shenāsī-yi fikrī-yi Iran-i muʿāsir, Daftar-i Nashr-i Ma‘ārif, p. 41. 
46 Ibid., p. 37. 
47 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabātabā’ī, Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm, Tehran: Sherkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīyī 
ʿĀm), vol. 1, Introduction of the book, p. 12. 
48 See Imād Afrūgh, 2008, Inqilāb-i Islāmī va mabānī-yi bāztulīd-i ān, Tehran: Sūriy-i Mihr. 
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Another distinguishing attribute of this group was the belief in epistemological realism. 
According to this view, the world beyond the mind exists, and it can be learned and taught. 
One of its implications is that mentally posited entities and facts in the world can be 
distinguished from each other. Islamic philosophy is basically founded based on this 
philosophy and as it can be learned from the definition of realism by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, any 
discussion which is not based on this view is not included in his understanding of philosophy. 
In the first article of Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm, he wrote about the nature of 
philosophical discussions, “a philosophical discussion is that which deals with proving the 
existence and non-existence of things. Now, if it assumed that a person cannot benefit from 
philosophical discussion (i.e. he cannot acquire any definite knowledge about things), he would 
be called sophistic (idealism) and is considered the opposite of a philosopher.” 49 The last 
attributes of this group which are not the least in the present study are 1. Ijtihād-based look at 
Islamic sciences, 2. Believing in comprehensiveness of Islam which has plans for all aspects 
of material and spiritual lives of all members of society and considers politics an inseparable 
part of religion and 3. Believing that all or most of Islam’s teachings have social aspects.  
Ijtihād-based look at religious issues is the fruit of having competence in ijtihād which may be 
acquired by a person through many years of scientific efforts, study and research about Islamic 
sources which are the Qur’ān, hadiths and the conduct of the Prophet (a) and Imams (a), as well 
as through learning the views of previous scholars. This competence in its current meaning is 
not only used in fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), but in early Islam, it was used in all Islamic 
sciences (in primary and secondary principles and ethics)50 and the group under discussion 
emphasizes this level of competence in all Islamic sciences. The evident difference in having 
competence in ijtihād in all common Islamic sciences among the scholars of this group and the 
scholars of other movements was an important feature that this movement had over other 
traditional Islamic movements. Of course, it should be noted that there were other movements 
as well the scholars who gained the level of ijtihād, but their ijtihād was limited in fiqh or other 
limited issues and the scientific competence in this group toward all Islamic sciences common 
at that time was not seen in other groups. One of those scholars was Āyatullāh Sayyid 
Muḥammad Kāẓim Sharīʿatmadārī (1906-1989) and Sayyid Shahāb al-Dīn Marʿashī Najafī 51 
 
49 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabātabā’ī, Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i 
ʿĀm), First article, p. 35. 
50 A group of writers, 2018, Baḥthī darbārih-yi marjaʿīyyat, Qum: Intishārāt-i Ṣadrā. p. 202. 




whose ijtihād in fiqh was beyond question but they did not have the same level of competence 
in other Islamic sciences such as Islamic Philosophy or sociology. Some explanations about 
the second attribute (comprehensiveness of Islam) and third attribute (believing in social nature 
of all Islamic rules) will be given in other parts of this thesis.52 
Some of the most influential personalities of this movement were Āyatullāh Sayyid Rūhullāh 
Khumeinī, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Āyatullāh Murtażā Muṭahharī. Some explanations about the 
nature of this movement and some of these persons’ thoughts, will be given in next parts of the 
thesis. 
From the preceding remarks it follows that Traditional Islamic Reformism was born from the 
Islamic Seminary of Qum in Iran which, in addition to the necessity of reforms in the society, 
emphasized the authentic Islamic tradition and never gave up Islamic rulings in order to adapt 
them to the values of modernity. In addition to Islamic reformist movements, there was a Non-
Islamic Reformist movement as well. 
 
1.1.3. Non-Islamic Reformism  
This group includes different intellectual, social and political movements and they can be 
divided to irreligious and anti-religious ones. It seems that one of the common intellectual 
aspects of all these movements is the issue of the division of politics from religion; an issue 
which none of the thinkers of the Traditional Islamic Reformism agreed upon and seriously 
criticized it. The major difference of this group with the first group is that these people had no 
interest in changing, simplifying or reducing religion for making it compatible with modernity. 
They basically considered religion a superstition and an obstacle for modernity and 
development; or they just had problems with political Islam and did not have any special 
problem with spirituality and religious ethics.53 The approach the thinkers encountered with 
Traditional Islamic Reformism was different with that of this group. Some personalities such 
as Āyatullāh Khumeinī advocated the jurisprudential support of the principle of wilayat al-
faqīh which was based on the objectivity of politics and religiosity to fight intellectually, 
socially and politically with this group. Some others such as ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī rather 
criticized principles of secularism with historical, ethical, philosophical and sociological 
approaches, and rarely became involved in the discussion of wilāyat al-faqih. In other parts of 
 
52 See page 29.  
53 See: Abdulḥusayn Khusrupanāh, and Ḥusayn, Latīfī, 2008, "Darāmadī bar Jaryān-hā-yi fikri-yi muʿāsir-i Iran", 
Mishkāt Journal, Qum. 
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this thesis, some brief explanations about ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view regarding the issue of 
wilāyat al-faqīh will be given. 
For the sake of concision, only one of the famous personalities of this group will be studied 
here.  
1.1.3.1. Aḥmad Kasravī (1890 – 1946): He was an Iranian linguist, nationalist, historian and 
reformist who was first a Muslim and seminarian and later left the seminary and then, according 
to some research,54 he abandoned Islam and claimed to be a prophet who brought a new religion 
called Pākdīnī. It seems that he only invented a new creed rather than a new religion and in 
Pursish va Pāsukh, he answered those who objected to him and regarded bringing a religion 
equal to prophethood, “if the claim of prophethood is this, then what is its problem?”55 Based 
on the way he answered the aforementioned question and also the ideas he raised in his writings, 
it seems that his Pākdīnī was more a call for extreme reformation in Islam and should not be 
considered as a new religion nor did he promote himself as a prophet in the sense of how 
religion and prophets are defined in Islam. 
Kasravī was born in Tabriz, where he studied traditional Islamic studies, and was frocked with 
clerical clothes, delivered speeches on the same minbar (a kind of pulpit in Muslim mosques) 
on which his ancestors preached.56 After the siege and occupation of Tabriz by Russians, a 
person called Ṣamad Khān was appointed as the ruler of Tabriz. He was an old enemy of the 
Constitutional Movement, and put a lot of pressure on Constitutionalists, including Kasravī. 
Kasravī was excommunicated by anti-Constitutionalist clergies, lost his audience, and then 
decided to remove his clerical clothes. For a number of years, he stayed at home and took an 
interest in modern European sciences such as physics and chemistry. This was evident from 
his passion for watching Halley’s Comet for which he went on the roof every night.57 His 
interest in the wonders of nature led him to study scientific journals and rationality. It seems 
that all these led him to certain anti-religious ideas.   
 
54 See: ʿAlī Riżā Mullāʾī Tavānī, 2014, "Kasravī az Naqd-i Dīnhā tā Dāʿīyiy-i Piyāmbarī", Muṭāliʿāt-i Tārīkh-i 
Farhangī Journal, Number 19, Tehran. 
Also see: Dāwūd Amīnī, 2002, Jamʿīyyat-i Fadāʿīyān-i Islam, Tehran: Markaz-i Asnād-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī. pp. 58-
59. 
55 Aḥmad Kasravī, 1941, Mā chi mīkhāhīm, Tehran, Pāydār publication, p 6. 
56 See Ahmad Kasravi, 1944, Zindigānī-yi Man, Tehran: Tārīkh-i Mā, pp. 8-48 
57 See Lloyd Ridgeon, 2006, Sufi Castigator Ahmad Kasravi and the Iranian Mystical Tradition, Routledge, pp 5-
6; also see Sayyid Muḥammad Mahdī Husaynī, 2000, Khāṭirāt-i Muḥammad Mahdī ‘Abdkhudāyī, Tehran: Markazi 
Asnādi Inqilāb-i Islāmī, p. 27 and pp. 71-79. 
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However, the anti-Shīʿā activities of Kasravī were so much that every year, he organized a 
book-burning ceremony at the beginning of Dey (December 22) and threw some Shīʿā books 
of supplication such as Mafātīḥ al-Janān.58 Before introducing Pākdīnī, he criticized religions 
and believed that after Islam, establishing any new religion is vain and a sign of ignorance; 
because, Islam promoted theology to such a high level, no higher level would be possible.59 
But later on, in his criticism of Islamic schools (not the original Islam in which he believed), 
he reached the conclusion that Islamic schools should be obliterated one after another, because 
making efforts in reviving Islam is a fruitless action condemned to defeat; since, what is left of 
Islam is all harm.60  
From this it follows that Non-Islamic Reformism was a reformist movement in Iran which was 
not concerned with Islam and with guiding society toward Islamic standards, and it even 
displayed anti-religious beliefs and activities, unlike Modern Islamic Reformism and 
Traditional Islamic Reformism which were mainly concerned with Islam and the Islamic 
society. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī often encountered the intellectual principles of this movement, as 
will be elaborated in what follows. 
1.2. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī's plan for encountering the intellectual movements of his time 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and some of his students such as Murtazā Muṭahharī encountered many of 
these intellectual movements directly or indirectly. Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī challenged them in some 
of his works such as Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm (Principles of philosophy and the 
method of realism) which was critical of the major ideologies and schools. Meanwhile, his 
students mostly discussed other intellectual movements which branched from key intellectual 
movements. The decision to distribute the two tasks, namely confronting major and minor 
intellectual movements, made it possible to criticize every minor or new movement which 
opposed ‘Allāma’s intellectual principles. It made the task straight forward for ‘Allāma’s 
students and made the scope of their criticism and discussion broader. 
The most principal intellectual movements ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī encountered before the Islamic 
revolution were the communist movement, known as the Leftist movement, and the Rightist 
movement which was under the influence of liberalism.  
Since, the materialist view was the dominant spirit over Marxist philosophy and many other 
philosophies in the west and the east in the 20th century (and still is), in his criticism of 
 
58 See: Jalāl Āli Aḥmad, 2019, Dar khidmat va khīyānat bi rushanfikrān, p. 223. 
59 Aḥmad Kasravī, 2003, Piymān (First year), Tehran, Firdus publications, pp. 268 – 269. 
60 Aḥmad Kasravī, 1941, Mā chi mīkhāhīm, Tehran, Pāydār publication, p. 193. 
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contemporary intellectual movements, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī focuses his scientific efforts on 
assessing and criticizing the materialist view. For example, ‘Allāma knew that by using rational 
arguments, if he could prove that even one immaterial being exists in the world the way for 
many Islamic philosophical issues would be paved and the doors for the influence of materialist 
philosophies such as Marxism would be closed. Therefore, in the third article61 of Usūl-i 
falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī tried to prove the immateriality of human 
knowledge and brought different rational arguments for his claim, and in later articles,62 he 
raised other philosophical issues which were previously not designable or provable for 
materialist readers and using this very principle of immateriality of human knowledge, he 
provided arguments against them and proved his claims about them. 
1.3. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī encounter with the philosophical and sociological principles of the 
Leftist Movement   
Before the Islamic revolution, the Soviet Union which was based on socialist and communist 
theories and had great influence on neighboring Iran, so that the Tudeh Party which was mostly 
the pioneer of the communist movement in Iran could establish a party and political 
organization. During his exile in France in 1978, Āyatullāh Khumeinī agreed that members of 
the Tudeh Party could pursue their intellectual, social and political activities and could 
officially issue their demands in Iran provided that they did not plot against the system.63 But, 
four years after Imam Khumeinī gave his conditional permission for their activities, their 
spying for the Soviet Union was proved in court and their activities were banned.64  
The communist movement in Iran was not merely political, but it also preached the principles 
of Marxist philosophy and proposed theories on social issues such as freedom, women, justice, 
etc. as well. Criticizing this movement, ‘Allāma does not limit himself to scientific encounters 
with the materialist view, but rather he separately criticizes philosophical and sociological 
principles of the Leftist movement.  
For example, in Tafsīr al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī discusses the social school of Socialism 
and some other materialists and comprehensively criticized their views about lack of fixed 
moral values. He considered one of the important problems with the followers of this theory, a 
 
61 See "Knowledge and perception" of the book Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm by ‘Allāma S.M.H. Ṭabātabā’ī. 
62 See "The occurrence of Multiplicity in perception" and "Conventional Perceptions and Concepts" and "God of 
the Universe and the Universe" of the book Usūl-i falsafih va ravish-i reālīsm by ‘Allāma S.M.H. Ṭabātabā’ī. 





sophistry they have made which mixes conceptual ascription meaning generality with 
existential ascription meaning continuation of existence.65 
Another example given by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī in the sixth article of his Principles of 
Philosophy and the Method of Realism considers human nature and the human natural need for 
social life and reliance on other people’s services, as well as the natural human need for mutual 
service in order to define the notion of social justice from a philosophical perspective. In this 
light, he criticizes the economic system arising from Marxist philosophy, which led to 
oppression of the capitalist class. In his view, such an economic model results in violations of 
natural laws governing human existence which demands social justice. 
1.4. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī encounter with philosophical and sociological principles of the 
Rightist Movement   
This encounter itself took place in two fields: Social issues and philosophical issues. 
A. Social issues: in the field of social issues, most efforts of ‘Allāma can be seen in two general 
categories: 1. In Tafsīr al-Mīzān he criticizes and studies the views of different western 
intellectual schools in the discussions, which includes: discussions about freedom and social 
justice, women’s rights, the status of intellect and intellectualism in Islamic teachings, the 
relationship between empirical sciences and religious sciences as well as different sociological 
discussions such as the truth of society and social structures, collective thought, social identity, 
etc. 2. Writing articles and answering different letters and publishing many of them in journals 
such as Maktab-i Islam. At that time, in order to answer social questions of people who 
encountered new issues raised from the confrontation of Muslims with modernity, ‘Allāma 
wrote articles many of which were compiled by one of his students, Āyatullāh Sayyid Hādī 
Khusrushāhī (1938-2020). They were published in two volumes with the title of Barrasī-hā-yi 
Islāmī. In the introduction of this work, Khusrushāhī wrote, 
Of course, some of these discussions (articles brought in Barrasī-hā-yi Islāmī) have 
been published in previous years, firstly in journals such as: Memorial of Mullā Ṣadrā, 
Muḥammad: the Seal of the Prophets (a), Maktab-i Islam, the Journal of the Department 
of Literature, The quarterly of Maktab-i Tashayyu’, Rāhnamā-yi Kitāb journal, etc. But, 
some others have not been published anywhere and were handed over to me by ‘Allāma 
himself. They were published for the first time with the title of Majmūʿih maqālāt-i 
 
65 See Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabātabā’ī, 1996, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī 
Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 1, pp. 563-574. 
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Ustād. I chose the title Barrasī-hā-yi Islāmī as the most comprehensive title which 
could be chosen for this collection, since this collection contains all different studies in 
different fields of Islamic discussions.66 
Two important points which should be noticed are that firstly, the volume of these articles are 
not comparable to ‘‘Allāma’s written works in Tafsir (exegesis of Qur’ān), Islamic theology 
and philosophy; and secondly, they were mostly made when ‘Allāma could not yet form a 
group of his students who later took these responsibilities; but, after he formed such a group, 
he assigned most of such tasks to his students such as Āyatullāh Murtażā  Muṭahharī. 
B. Philosophical issues: ‘Allāma also had some considerable scientific efforts in encountering 
philosophical schools (other than communism about which some points were previously 
mentioned).    
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s criticisms regarding western philosophies were not limited to ontological 
and epistemological questions and offered different theories regarding applied philosophies 
such as social, sociological, political and moral philosophies, more explanations will be given 
in the section regarding ‘‘Allāma’s works. Briefly said, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī tried to discuss the 
major principles of his contemporary intellectual movements so that his students would be able 
to deal with intellectual movements of minor importance and theories based on their teacher’s 
theories. For instance, although the political system accepted by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī for the 
period of the occultation of Imam al-Mahdī is, in respect of people’s role in the election of 
rulers, very similar to the model known as democracy, he writes the following about the 
similarity of laws in an Islamic society with those in a democratic society: 
An Islamic society is not dissimilar to democratic societies in that it has two types of 
regulations: invariable and variable. There are two types of regulations in democratic 
societies: an invariable kind of regulation, which consists in the articles of the 
constitution the change of which is outside the qualifications of the consultative 
assembly or the senate, and only the nation can revoke and repeal an article or a number 
of articles in the constitution either directly by public votes or by setting an assembly 
of their representatives. The other type includes particular laws and regulations which 
are enacted and enforced in the consultative assembly and the senate and in different 
 
66 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Barrasī-hāyi Islāmī, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 11. 
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centers, and these count as temporary interpretations of the articles of the constitution. 
The altter are generally subject to changes.67 
It should not be thought, however, that for ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī the method of Islam is 
democratic or communist. He writes: 
The Islamic method is neither democratic, nor communist. In its two types of 
regulations it is clearly different from the above social and socialist methods, since 
invariable regulations of Islam are enacted by God (may His name be glorified), 
whereas invariable regulations of other social methods are produced by the nation’s 
collective enacted opinions. Moreover, their variable regulations are fundamentally 
based on the will of the majority of people, and freedom, or in other words, the 
understanding and will of the minority (half-minus-one of people) is sacrificed for the 
will and preference of the majority (half-plus-one of people), regardless of whether 
their wills are right or not. However, variable regulations in an Islamic society are 
mainly based on what is right, although they are results of councils of people, and are 
not based on the will of the majority. They are based on realism, rather than desires and 
emotions. 
In an Islamic society, the right and the real interest of Islam and Muslims should be 
carried out, regardless of whether or not it is in accordance with the majority. However, 
in a society of knowledge and piety trained by Islam, the majority never prefers its 
impulsive wishes to the right and the truth.68 
 
Answer to the second question:  
Since the beginning of the 20th century until today, different Islamic intellectual movements 
have emerged in Iran, but none of them were comparable with the Traditional Religious 
Intellectual Movement in rational competence, the extent of scientific theorization and 
commitment to the Islamic tradition.  
Regarding principles, this intellectual movement considered three important criteria for Shīʿa 
school: intellectuality, spirituality and justice. The difference between the intellectual 
movement, ‘Allāma led with other intellectual movements in Iran, can be considered in the 
 
67 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Barrasī-hāyi Islāmī, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, vol. 1, pp. 165-6. 
68 Ibid., p. 166. 
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focus of the movement under discussion in the three following views: 1. Social nature of the 
whole Islamic instructions and teachings, 2. The power of Islam in answering daily questions 
and demands, 3. Comprehensiveness of Islam which embraced all political, social, economic, 
cultural and other arenas and was completely against the separation of religion from politics. 
In a way, it may be said that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī had a concern regarding religion and about 
western intellectualism and modernity and thus he can neither be considered a total critic of 
the western intellectual movement69 and modernity, nor completely supportive of them; but 
accordingly, it is very important that even though the intellectual model of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
and the western intellectual model were not vastly different considering the significance they 
regarded for intellectuality in general and also the issues they discussed; but, regarding the 
principles, theories and sometimes, the approaches toward different issues, there are 
considerable differences between these two types of intellectualism.  
‘Allāma Tabtataba’i cannot be considered a so called Revolutionary Islamic Scholar from 
perspectives namely political opposition and direct scholarly opposition to the Pahlavī regime 
in his writings, but the ideal Islamic society and the requirements of its political system that he 
depicted in his works, were in great contradiction and opposition to the social and political 
system of his time.  
All the efforts of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī for establishing and promoting this model of 
intellectualism, except for few cases, focuses on scientific-research and educational fields. The 
fruits of his word were the subsequent volumes of written works and the education of students 
including Āyatullāh Murtażā Muṭahharī, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muḥammad Beheshtī (1928-1981), 
Āyatullāh Nāsir Makārim Shīrāzī (b. 1924), Āyatullāh Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāh Yazdī (1935-
2021) and Āyatullāh Abdullāh Javādī Āmulī (b. 1933) and even the current leader of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Āyatullāh Sayyid Ali Khāmineʾī (b. 1939), who are among the major theorists 
of the Islamic republic or political-intellectual fighters of Pahlavī monarchy.  
 
69 Western intellectual movement is a literal translation from nomenclature in Persian intellectual discourses and 
what is often meant by this is a general intellectual movement resting upon materialistic philosophical principles, 
based in many Western countries such as Germany, the UK, and the USA. It is believed to have produced schools 
of thoughts such as Marxism and liberalism and influenced certain Asian countries, including Iran. For this reason, 
the term as it is used in Persian does not refer to any particular philosophical school resting on materialism. In 
other words, the term ‘western intellectual movement’ is used to refer to all materialistic philosophical schools 




‘Allāma considered Islam, a comprehensive religion, which has plans for all aspects of 
individual and collective lives and their worldly and heavenly felicity. For example, in volume 
six of al-Mizan, an Exegesis of the Holy Qur’ān, he wrote, 
Undoubtedly, Islam is a religion that discusses all aspects of human life and explains 
their rules. It is a religion every part of which is in harmony and concomitant with others; 
meaning that a unique integrity and unity exists in all its rules and they are interrelated 
so that if a weakness occurs in one of them, or one of them is lost, its consequence is 
seen all around the religion, exactly like human body, that when each of its organs has 
sickness, it has effects on other organs; and when in the body, one organ becomes 
corrupt or ill, other organs should not be disregarded and the body should not be left 
with illness, rather, it should be kept healthy and should try to cure its illness. Also, if 
people’s morality is inclined toward materiality, God would not disregard His other 
rulings.70 
In order to understand the features and characteristics of the ideal Islamic society from the 
perspective of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, we need to know his definitions and ideas about the nature 
and perfection of a society. He believes that the social movement and development of the ideal 
Islamic society begins with an individuals' spiritual self-building which starts from knowledge 
and develops by action based on that knowledge. He does not consider the human community 
an abstract collection such as some apples put in a box, but rather, he believes that society is 
the product of a true combination of people, which is similar to the combination of soil, water, 
seed and light that bears new effects which are growth and bearing fruits. Therefore, he 
considers a society a true, not conventional constitution, which has a new identity, awareness, 
authority, power, rights and relations with other creatures. 
When it comes to explaining the concepts which are related to governing a society, he considers 
many concepts in political philosophy such as government and ownership among Abstract 
Conventional Concepts (Mafāhīm-i Iʿtibārī) which have true objectives and effects. To explain 
these types of concepts, he says that instead of saying “Ali came like a lion”, one uses the 
metaphor and says “the lion came”, he actually has claimed that Ali is an example of a lion and 
this convention and abstraction he has adopted is not real in the outside world; but, he has an 
intention out of this metaphor which is to excite his audience, and this is a rational purpose and 
true effect resulted by that abstract convention and metaphor. Likewise, when it comes to 
 
70 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabātabā’ī, 1996, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 6, p. 211. 
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proving the superiority of a group of people over others in terms of making decisions and 
legislating laws and etc. on behalf of them, that particular group claims that they have 
superiority over people to do certain actions, while this claim is not real in the external world 
and it is only a matter of convention. What is important here is that there are some goals behind 
this mental convention and they have true (not conventional) effects in the society. He uses the 
same argument for some other concepts such as ownership. Therefore, he consideres concepts 
such as government and ownership of the type of human conventions which people commonly 
use, for rational purposes and they bear true effects. But, the whole story is centered on the 
question of who should make these conventions? Do spiritually self-built and faithful people 
adopt such conventions for the purpose of public and societal interest, or do self-interested 
people who prioritize their own interests over society use these conventions to suit their own 
aims? 
In conclusion, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī considers Islamic teachings firstly and essentially intended 
for true human development and mentions them as the goal of prophets as well and believes 
that only spiritually self-built people can move human society toward an Islamic ideal society. 
Therefore, he focused his activities on the revival of Islamic sciences under the shadow of 
theoretical and practical philosophy, so that people’s knowledge toward what exists and what 
does not exist as well as their knowledge about musts and must-nots grows. This acquired 
knowledge can enable people to act upon what they have learnt about the existing realities and 
must-do actions and pass through different stages of spiritual self-building. 
Answer to the Third Question:  
Briefly said, the main goal of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was the revival of Islamic teachings, 
development and social movement toward the ideal Islamic society. To create this scientific 
and social change, he faced two major challenges: 1. Two inaccurate and harmful views which 
were fossilized in the seminary: A) maximum focus of Islamic teachings and research on fiqh 
and the principles of fiqh and disregarding other fields of Islamic sciences, B) the negative 
opinion of rational and mystical approaches and sciences as held by the majority of the 
seminary’s scholars and thus, their students. 2. Broad and increasing scientific and cultural 
activities of the Leftist and the Rightist intellectual movements in society which was only 
countered by an apparent silence and inability of seminarians to answer the views and questions 
of these movements. 
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1.5.‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī's plan for Islamic Studies in the seminary of Qum 
Āyatullāh Miṣbāh Yazdī, who is among famous Shīʿā philosophers in Iran and has been a 
distinguished student of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī for many years, quoted from ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 
“When I came to Qum, I made a study about the educational situation of the 
seminary and the needs of the Islamic society. I did not find much correspondence 
between those needs and what was available. As an Islamic society, our society 
needed to know the Qur’ān correctly and benefit from the knowledge treasures of 
this great divine book. But, there was not even an official class for interpretation 
of the Qur’ān in all the seminaries. In order that our society could present its beliefs 
against others’ and defend them, it needed the power of intellectual reasoning. 
There was a need for classes in the seminary to raise the power of reasoning among 
students; while, there was no such classes at that time. As the people who were in 
charge of spiritual leadership of people, clergies should be adorned with moral 
virtues and familiar with spiritual methods; but, even spiritual and moral education 
for such issues did not exist, and only rare private education for very few people 
were available.” 
“However, in seminaries, there was only fiqh and principles of fiqh which discussed 
only a part of the conduct of the Prophet (a) and Imams (a). There was no news of 
philosophy and rational sciences, or of interpretation of the Qur’ān and other parts 
of the Book and the Tradition. I found myself obliged to run a class in philosophy, 
a class in interpreting the Qur’ān and a class in ethics.”71 
 This short statement shows how deeply saddened Ṭabāṭabā’ī was about the status of the 
seminary of Qum and about its silence, weakness and passivity regarding new questions and 
issues which were quickly being spread by some schools of thought such as Marxism and 
Materialism.  
However, this was one of his motivations for applying such changes to the seminary. The idea 
that the majority of his scientific contributions were in response to the contemporary scientific 
challenges and questions of his time, which mostly originated from Communism and 
Liberalism, is not a precise idea nor able to depict a true image of his contributions and 
objectives for writing many books and articles about Islamic teachings. Even a glance at all his 
 
71 A group of writers, First cultural conference in the death anniversary of late ‘Allāma Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Tabātabā’ī, 1982, Memorial of ‘Allāma Ṭabātabā’ī, the Iran Research Institute of Philosophy, pp. 196 – 197. 
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published works, can reveal the fact that he had at least two main objectives other than 
confronting the contemporary schools of thought.  
His first object was to explain and teach different and deeper aspects of Islamic teachings by 
using special interpretive and intellectual methods and approaches, which shall be explained in 
the second chapter of this paper. To achieve this objective, he needed to, firstly make the 
traditional seminary of Qum recognize the intellectual and philosophical approaches as 
religiously authentic means for interpreting and studying Islamic teachings. He also had to 
show the true relation between intellect, revelation and intuition which he believed to be the 
three sources for knowledge. According to him they do not contradict each other, rather they 
are in complete conformity and can help one to understand different aspects of Islam and deeper 
layers of the truth. He writes in this regard in Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān: 
 The conclusion of our discussion is that the method of discussion regarding truths 
and discovering them is limited to three ways: discovered either through religious 
apparent texts (revelation and hadiths), through rational discussions or purification 
of the soul (intuition).72 
About those who differentiated between the rational way (philosophical), jurisprudential and 
intuitive (mystical), who considered them in contradiction with each other and tried to interpret 
the Qur’ān based on their own preferred way, he says,  
Each branch of Muslims has passed through one of these [philosophical, 
jurisprudential and mystical] ways. Their approaches are like three angles of a 
triangle; the more you open one angle, the other two become tight and the more 
you open two angles, the third becomes closed, and the difference between the 
three [schools] will definitely have influence on the quality of the interpretation of 
the Qur’ān. The interpretation conducted by a religious person following apparent 
rules of religion has considerable differences with an interpretation made by a 
philosopher or a Sufi; as, we clearly see such differences in interpretations and we 
feel that every exegete has imposed his own school of thought upon the Qur’ān and 
has not [truly] wanted to know what the Qur’ān says; rather, they wanted to say 
that the Qur’ān says the same thing they say. Of course, this cannot be generalized 
to all exegetes. There are few exegetes free from such an error.  
 
72 S. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā’ī, 1996, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, Vol. 5, p. 282.  
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You noticed that the divine book – the precious Qur’ān – has approved what is 
right in these three approaches and rejected the wrong among them and never has 
there been any truth in the three approaches the Qur’ān has not accepted; and never 
has there been any truth in the Qur’ān’s appearance or in its esoteric meaning that 
the intellect has rejected nor proven to be contrary to the Qur’ān.73  
He categorized the efforts made for reconciling the three approaches into four groups: 
1. Despite their disagreements in their thought, some scholars tried to make a kind of 
reconciliation between religious appearances and mystical issues based on their scientific 
capacities; such as Muḥy al-Dīn b. Arabī, ʿ Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, Ibn Fahd, Shahīd Thānī 
and Fayż Kāshānī. 
2. Some others try to make a reconciliation between philosophy and mysticism; such as Abī 
Nasr Al-Fārābī, Shaykh Suhravardī and Shaykh Sāʾin al-Dīn Muḥammad Turkah. 
3. Some others tried to make a reconciliation between 'religious appearances' and 
‘philosophy’ such as Qāḍi Saʿīd (Qumī) and others. 
4. Some others tried to reconcile between the three approaches and schools, such as Avicenna; 
as seen in his commentaries and other books and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā) 
in his books and treatises and some others after him.”74 
After mentioning this categorization, he speaks about the success of these efforts and finally 
he says that none of them could remove these disagreements from the minds of scholars and 
people in the society.  
With all that, the disagreements between these three (philosophical, 
theological/jurisprudential, mystical) approaches are so deep that these great 
personalities could not do anything for removing them either; and the more they 
tried to remove the root of disagreement, the root went deeper and the more they 
tried to settle the dispute, the more they provoked and expanded it. 
And now, you dear reader clearly see that any expert in any of these methods calls 
the experts in other methods ignorant or foolish and you see ordinary people call 
the three methods, deviant. 
 
73 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
74 Ibid., p. 283. 
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All these complex issues and difficulties befell Muslims the day they did not call 
the writers to think together, to establish a group for learning religious truths and 
teachings; and anyone took his own way; while the glorious Qur’ān had said, ‘Hold 
fast, all together, to Allah’s cord, and do not be divided [into sects].’ (3:103) But, 
it was only one of the causes of Muslims’ disunity as it has other causes as well.75 
 Therefore, showing the true relation between intellectual, theological and mystical approaches 
was the most challenging work he had to accomplish, due to the historical antagonism between 
rational and traditional branches of the Islamic discourses in the seminary. The philosophical 
school of thought to which he belonged is called al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿālīyah and he made lots 
of contributions to its development. This thesis will demonstrate that not being aware of the 
relation between intuition, revelation, intellect from the viewpoint of this school of thought will 
prevent the understanding of the main characteristic of his plan for Islamic societies in general 
and Islamic seminaries in particular.  
His second primary objective for his scientific and educational contributions was to envisage a 
comprehensive image of the ideal Islamic society, based on his philosophical principles and 
rational interpretation and understandings of Islamic canon, namely Qur’ān, Hadith and 
conduct of Prophet Muḥammad and his Household.  
These reasons, namely the inability of the seminary of Qum to answer questions from different 
schools of thought and ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s objectives for unveiling different aspects of 
Islamic teachings and delineating a comprehensive image of Islamic ideal society, made him 
seriously review the principles and views regarding traditional religious intellectualism and 
strengthen its pillars. 
As is evident from the preceding remarks, the bulk of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s activities in line 
with the revival of Islamic sciences and the encounter with other intellectual schools and 
movements consisted in his numerous diverse works, most of which he wrote after his 
immigration to Qum. A brief introduction to his works can provide us with a better and more 
precise portrayal of the scope and domain of his scholarly activities and help contextualize his 
project. Thus, in the next chapter, we will briefly review his books and essays, most of which 






2. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Works  
As pointed out before, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was, along his teaching career, a dedicated author 
who also coaxed his students to writing. He wrote many works in both Arabic and Persian, 
most of which have been printed and published, although a few—including his commentaries 
on the book, Nihāyat al-Dirāya—are in preparation for publication. His works might in general 
be divided into three categories in terms of their intended audience: (1) introductory texts for 
teenagers and youths, (2) introductory texts for students of seminary schools, and (3) research 
texts. ‘Allāma’s work was explored by many authors in the Islamic world who write about 
Islamic doctrines. Moreover, since ‘Allāma deals with a wide range of social, cultural, political, 
economic, moral, philosophical, mystical, educational, historical, exegetical, and other issues 
in his work, many researchers have directly or indirectly considered and criticized his theories 
in their work. For instance, in this dissertation which is focused on ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s 
theories, his account of the relation between reason, intuition, and revelation is presented for 
the first time. Of course, his view of each of these was previously considered by different 
researchers76, but there has been no research in Persian, Arabic, and English with regard to his 
account of the relation among them and the fundamental impact of understanding this relation 
on our understanding and construal of Islamic teachings from the perspective of the Qur’an 
and hadiths, particularly what pertains to the human self-knowledge as well as knowledge of 
different realms of existence and divine names and attributes. 
‘Allāma published some of his writings as books. He also wrote essays, most of which were 
published either individually or collectively. Sometimes one article or essay is published in 
several collections of his essays. In order to show the exact number of ‘Allāma’s works in this 
dissertation, I refer to those written as books under “books” and to the rest as “essays,” 
regardless of the collection of essays in which they are published. The classification of 
‘Allāma’s work that I have in mind in this dissertation is thematic in terms of five disciplines: 
(1) Quranic and hadith-based works, (2) philosophical and mystical works, (3) works in 
theology and kalām, (4) social and political works, and (5) works in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
and its principles (uṣūl al-fiqh). Of course, the classification can be extended to include 
categories such as history, ethics, and education, but since such issues are discussed under one 
 
76 See Ramaḍān Fīrūzjā’ī, 2004, “‘Aqlānīyyat Dar Nazar-i ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī”, Zihn, no. 17; Muḥammad Ali 
Ardestānī, 2008, “Waḥy-Shināsī Dar Andīshey-i Tafsīrī ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī”, Qabasāt, no. 47; Muḥammad Javād 




of the five headings above, I rest content to these categories.77 It should be noted that there are 
other ways to classify ‘Allāma’s work as well; for example, those concerned with explanation 
and examination of the Islamic tradition and those written in response to modernity. The trouble 
with such classifications is that there are few works that might distinctively be characterized in 
these ways.78 Therefore, they may not serve as criteria for classification of ‘Allāma’s work. 
As a scholar of Islamic sciences, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was immensely committed to boundaries 
and distinctive methods of sciences in his consideration of problems. This can be clearly seen 
in all of his works. Moreover, his texts are characterized by extreme brevity that has made it 
very difficult, and in some cases even impossible, to summarize his work while preserving the 
structure of his discussions. The number of works written by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī during his 
residence in Najaf (1925-1935) is smaller than the number of works he wrote after his return 
to Iran in 1935, where he stayed in a village near Tabriz (for 10 years) and then in Qum (for 35 
years). 
Some of his works were translated into Arabic, English, French, and other languages. English 
translators of his work include Seyyed Hossein Nasr, William Chittick, ‘Alī Qulī Qarā’ī, and 
Dāwūd Sudāgar. More about this is in my introduction of each of ‘Allāma’s works below. 
2.1. Quranic and Hadith-Based Work 
The Arabic word, tafsīr, has been translated by different English translators as “interpretation” 
or “exegesis.” As an Islamic terminology, tafsīr is used to refer to exegesis of the Qur’an, 
although in a broader usage, it applies to all words transmitted from Prophet Muḥammad and 
Shiite Imams as well. Henceforth, by “exegesis” I mean tafsīr. In this section of my dissertation 
(that is, ‘Allāma’s exegetical work), I use “exegesis” in its broader sense, which includes 
‘Allāma’s exegeses of both the Qur’an and hadiths. 
2.1.1. Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (The Balance in the Exegesis of the Qur’an):  
Al-Mīzān is ‘Allāma’s largest and best-known book as well as one of his most important books 
(if not the most important). It was written and published in Arabic within 20 volumes—8041 
pages overall—from 1954 through 1971. Subject-matters tackled by ‘Allama in this work are 
 
77 ‘Allāma wrote a few works that do not fit any of the above categories. Of these, only has been published: Nasab-
Nāmi-yi Khāndān-i Ṭabāṭabā’ī: Awlād-i Amīr Sirāj al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (Genealogy of the Ṭabāṭabā’ī Family: 
Children of Amīr Sirāj al-Din ‘Abd al-Wahhāb). This work was published in 2012 in Qum by Buūstān-i Kitāb. 
78 For instance, books such as The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism and the essay, “Woman’s 
Place and Position in Islam” might be characterized as being wholly concerned with critique or scholarly treatment 
of contemporary intellectual currents and modernity in Iran. 
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so multifarious that some people refer to it as the Great Islamic Encyclopedia. 79  Some 
researchers wrote books in which topics in al-Mīzān are classified and topic indexes are 
provided for it. In 2014, Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences published a software 
under Thematic Dictionary of Tafsīr al-Mīzān, in which 40,000 topics and 131,000 combined 
indexes are introduced for al-Mīzān. 
In his introduction to al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma provides the following definition of Quranic exegesis: 
“it is the articulation of the meanings of Quranic verses and the discovery of their intentions 
and meanings.” In the introduction, he briefly surveys the history of Quranic exegesis from 
early Islam until today (his time). Moreover, he points to various factors that incited so serious 
disagreements in Quranic exegesis that “led to disputes over everything except the phrase, 
‘there is no god except Allah and Muḥammad is God’s messenger.” ‘Allāma enumerates five 
well-known approaches to Quranic exegesis: (1) the method of Ṣaḥāba (Prophet Muḥammad’s 
companions) and Tābi‘ūn (the successors of Ṣaḥāba): in the first two centuries after the 
emergence of Islam, Quranic exegesis was at first restricted to expositions of the meanings of 
Quranic verses and their “occasions of revelation” (sha’n al-nuzūl) and was later extended to 
citation of Ṣaḥāba’s words (except Imam ‘Ali (a.)). After Islamic conquests when Muslims 
encountered different religions and denominations, they became concerned with new 
theological problems which reshaped their exegetical method, (2) the method of hadith scholars: 
in order to understand Quranic verses, they rested content to the words of Ṣaḥāba and Tābi‘ūn 
in exegesis of the Qur’an, remaining silent about Quranic verses on which no words were 
transmitted from Ṣaḥāba and Tābi‘ūn, (3) the method of theologians: disputes among 
theologians over their denominations led them to offer theory-laden exegeses and 
interpretations of Quranic verses; that is, they interpreted such verses in ways that were 
compatible with their own theories. They provided esoteric interpretations (ta’wīl) of verses 
contradicting their theories, while ensuring that the interpretations remained compatible with 
the rest of their theological views, (4) the method of Peripatetic and Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) 
philosophers as well as Sufis, and (5) Quranic exegesis in terms of contemporary (twentieth 
century) natural and social sciences. 
‘Allāma scrutinizes and criticizes each of these methods. His main objection to all these 
methods (except that of Ṣaḥāba which was very limited) is as follows: they did not consider 
 
79 Muhsin Fasā’ī, May 1992, "Majmu‘a Athār ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī", Āyini-yi Pazhuhish, no. 13-14, p. 94  and 
Hamid Algar , "Allamah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabataba’i: Philosopher, Exegete and Gnostic", Journal of Islamic 
Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, Oxford University Press. p. 11. 
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the Qur’an as a scale or measure for achieving guidance. Instead of measuring their religious, 
theological, philosophical, and all other kinds of views in terms of the Qur’an, they provided 
esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an in terms of their own beliefs. He criticizes this approach 
as follows: 
The Transcendent God has characterized the Noble Qur’an as guidance, light, and 
clarification for everything. Now how is it possible for a light to be enlightened by 
something else [that is, the sayings of Ṣaḥāba and Tābi‘ūn]? How is it conceivable for 
a guidance to be in need of something else to guide it? And how can a clarification for 
everything be in need of something else in order to be clarified?80 
‘Allāma’s exegetical method in al-Mīzān is the “exegesis of the Qur’an with the Qur’an” or 
“Qur’an-based exegesis” (tafsīr al-Qur’ān bi-l-Qur’ān). Broadly speaking, the method is not 
his invention—it was, indeed, deployed by many exegetes before him in their interpretations 
of various Quranic verses. 81  The main point made by ‘Allāma—not made by his 
predecessors—is that, in exegesis of a Quranic verse, the primary source consists in other 
Quranic verses in light of which the meaning of the verse in question might be clarified. 
Rational and other transmitted sources are only secondary in the clarification of its meaning. 
In Āl-i ‘Imrān: 7, the Qur’an makes it explicit that certain Quranic verses are “ambiguous” 
(mutashābih) and some are “precise” (muḥkam), and the former are clarified by recourse to the 
latter. ‘Allāma does not restrict his method to “ambiguous” verses; rather he believes that, with 
respect to all Quranic verses, the Qur’an is its own primary exegete. He notes that he derived 
the method from Shiite Imams’ (a.) method of Quranic exegesis.82 
Hamid Algar says the following about al-Mīzān’s exegetical method: 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s careful examination of the wording of each verse, taken in conjunction 
with all other verses pertinent to its subject matter, regularly yields fresh and convincing 
results. The result is that the Qur’an – if the expression be permissible – is enabled to 
speak for itself, without the concepts. 
 
80 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā’ī, 1996, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 1, p. 6. 
81 See ‘Alī Ramadan Usī, 2002, Ravish-i ‘Allāmih dar Tafsīr-i al-Mīzān (‘Allāma’s Method in al-Mīzān Exegesis), 
Tehran: Sāzmān-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī, p. 74. 
82 Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, 1993, “Ravish-i ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī dar Tafsīr-i Qur’ān bih Qur’ān”, Pasdar-
i Islam, no. 393 and 394, p. 15. 
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It should be noted that ‘Allāma does not restrict the method of Quranic exegesis to his Qur’an-
based method. This method should be comprehended only as “primary” in the sense that we 
should try to clarify the Qur’an with the Qur’an itself as far as possible. Obviously enough, the 
method does not work in the case of all Quranic verses—some of them cannot be clarified with 
this method. 
‘Allāma’s exegesis of each verse proceeds as follows: (1) etymology, meanings, and uses of 
the words occurring in the verse, (2) exegesis of the verse by an appeal to other Quranic verses, 
(3) consideration of exegetical hadiths concerning the verse in question, (4) philosophical, 
theological, mystical, social, and other discussions of the verse. The first two stages can be 
seen in his exegesis of almost all Quranic verses. The third can also be found in most Quranic 
verses, since there are exegetical hadiths about many of verses. The fourth stage mainly appears 
in the first four volumes of al-Mīzān, although there are scattered discussions of these sorts in 
other volumes as well. Moreover, fundamental discussions mostly appear in the first four 
volumes.83 
Al-Mīzān has been translated to languages such as Persian and Urdu. Moreover, over half of 
the book has been translated into English by Sa‘id Akhtar Rizvi and Muḥammad Akhtar Rizvi, 
which is published by WOFIS and Tawus Raja. 
2.1.2. Qur’ān dar Islām (The Qur’an in Islam) 
‘Allāma wrote this book during his residence in Qum. It was first published in 1974. In a 
preface to the book, Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī says that the book was intended as an 
introduction of Shiism to the West. In his own introduction to the book, ‘Allāma says the 
following about the main theme of the book: 
The book before the reader talks about the most original source of the holy religion of 
Islam, and the issue discussed in the book is the place of the “honored Qur’an” in the 
Islamic world: What is the Qur’an? And what value does it have among Muslims?84 
In this book, he is concerned with the Qur’an’s value among Muslims, its features, the relation 
between the Qur’an and different sciences, the order of the revelation of Quranic verses, and 
its circulation among people. The book was translated into English by Assadullah al-Dhakir 
 
83 For more about ‘Allāma’s method of Quranic exegesis see: ‘Abdullāh, Javādī Āmulī, Shams al-Waḥy al-Tabrizī, 
’Isrā Publication. 
84 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2009, Qur’ān dar Islām, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, p. 21. 
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Yate under The Qur’an in Islam: Its Impact and Influence on the Life of Muslims with a preface 
by Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. 
2.1.3. Risāli-’ī dar I‘jāz (An Essay Concerning Miracle) 
This brief essay deals with the definition of miracle and its features, ways of knowing a miracle, 
the relation between miracles and the law of causation, the way in which miracles signify 
prophethood, and the like. ‘Allāma wrote the essay in Persian during his stay in Qum. The 
essay was published in different collections of essay, including the book, I‘jāz-i Qur’ān (The 
Miracle of the Qur’an), which was first published by ‘Allama Ṭabāṭabā’ī Scholarly and 
Intellectual Foundation. 
2.1.4. Risāli-yi Vaḥy (An Essay on Revelation) or Shu‘ūr-i Marmūz (The Arcane Sense) 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote the essay in Qum and in Persian. In it, he defines revelation (waḥy) 
and discusses its relation with reason and social sense, the ground of our need to revelation in 
the society, and the like. The book was first published with a preface and footnotes by Āyatullāh 
Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī in 1981. 
2.1.5. Sunan al-Nabiyy (The Prophet’s Practices) 
The book consists of approximately 410 hadiths concerning Prophet Muḥammad’s (s.) 
appearance and conducts. It was written in Arabic during ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s stay in Najaf 
in 1932. Five hundred more hadiths were later added by one of his students to the book, which 
appear in some of its editions as addenda.85 In this book, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī cites hadiths from 
Shiite sources only. The book was translated by Tahir Ridha Jaffer into English and was 
published by Islamic Publishing House in 2006. 
2.1.6. Commentaries on Biḥār al-Anwār (Seas of the Lights): ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s critiques 
of ‘Allāma Majlisī 
Biḥār al-Anwār al-Jāmi‘a li-Durar Akhbār al-A’imma al-Aṭhār (Seas of the Lights Containing 
Pearls of Hadiths from the Pure Imams) is the largest Shiite source of hadiths in Arabic 
compiled, classified, and commented by ‘Allāma Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (1627-1699). 
The book was published during the author’s life in 25 volumes in the folio format, but its 
modern reprint is published in 110 volumes. It contains nearly 85000 hadiths from Prophet 
Muḥammad (s.) and his Household (a.). ‘Allāma Majlisī lived during the Safavid reign in Iran 
when Akhbarism was prevalent. He added his analyses and exegeses of some of the hadiths in 
 
85 See Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī’s preface to Sunan al-Nabiyy, p. 15: he quotes this from Sayyid ‘Abd al-Bāqī 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, ‘Allāma’s son. 
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the book. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī regards ‘Allāma Majlisī as the reviver of the work and hadiths 
of Shiite Imams (a.), although he does not see him as an expert in profound philosophical 
issues.86 
After ten years of teaching Biḥār al-Anwār,87 ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī began writing commentaries 
on the book, in which he criticized some analyses and interpretations by ‘Allāma Majlisī in his 
comments on some of the hadiths. The commentaries were published as footnotes to Biḥār al-
Anwār’s reprint by Dar al-Kutub al-Islāmīyya Publication. Faced with widespread oppositions 
by Akhbari scholars in Qum and Najaf, ‘Allāma had to quit writing the commentaries.88 In 
these commentaries, he writes the following about ‘Allāma Majlisī’s views about philosophical 
issues: “it is more cautious for a person who is not familiar with profound intellectual problems 
to make recourse to apparent meanings of the Qur’an and nearly frequently transmitted 
(mustafīḍa) hadiths, leaving the grasp of their truths to God. Such a person should avoid any 
positive or negative engagement in profound intellectual issues.” 89  The bulk of ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentaries on this book is concerned with ‘Allāma Majlisī’s comments on 
intellectual problems, rather than the hadiths themselves. 
2.1.7. Commentaries on Uṣūl al-Kāfī (Principles of the Sufficient) 
Uṣūl al-Kāfī is the first among the three parts of the major Shiite collection of hadiths, al-Kāfī. 
Uṣūl al-Kāfī contains hadiths concerning Shiite beliefs, the life of Shiite Imams, and some 
hadiths about how a Muslim should behave. Al-Kāfī is one of the most important and the most 
credible Shiite sources of hadiths collected by Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb, known as 
al-Kulaynī (869-941). 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote commentaries on al-Kulayni’s comments in the book in the style of 
his commentaries on Biḥār al-Anwār. His commentaries began to be published in al-Kāfī’s 
reprint, but again he quit writing the commentaries because of objections by some Akhbari 
scholars. 
 
86 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Ṭihrānī, 2005, Mihr-i Tābān, Mashhad: Nūr-i Tābān-i Qur'an, p. 55-56. 
87 A group of writers, 2002, Marzbān-i Vaḥy va Khirad: Yādnāmi-yi Marḥūm-i ‘Allāmih Sayyid Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Qum: Buūstān-i Kitāb, p. 670. 
88 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā’ī, 2008, Majmū‘a Rasā’il ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, prefaced by Sayyid Hādī 
Khusrushāhī, vol. 3, p. 9. 
89 Ibid. p. 62. 
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2.2. Philosophical and Mystical Books 
2.2.1. Bidāyat al-Ḥikma (The Beginning of the Wisdom)  
This is a one-volume introductory text concerning Islamic philosophy. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
wrote it at the age of 67.90 The book was published by Publications of Jāmi‘i-yi Mudarrisīn 
(Society of Seminary Teachers of Qum), which publishes the main texts of Shiite seminaries. 
This sent a strong message to opponents of philosophy in Iran. The bulk of the book is written 
in the style of the philosophical school of Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya), 
but in some cases, it contains ‘Allāma’s novel theories or the more popular ideas as well. The 
book was written for people who want to learn Islamic philosophy, but it seems to be 
approachable only by a seminary student; in fact, it is not intended as an introduction to Islamic 
philosophy. The book was translated into English by ‘Ali Qulī Qara’ī and was published as The 
Elements of Islamic Metaphysics (Bidayat al-Hikmah) in 2019. 
2.2.2. Nihāyat al-Ḥikma (The Ultimate Wisdom)  
This is another introductory book about Islamic philosophy, written by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and 
published in three volumes. It is more sophisticated and more elaborate than Bidāyat al-Ḥikma. 
Presently, seminary students in Iran are taught Bidāyat al-Ḥikma at first and then Nihāyat al-
Ḥikma as their main textbooks in philosophy. The book has not yet been translated into English. 
2.2.3. Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālism (Principles of Philosophy and the Method of 
Realism)  
This is one of the most important works by ‘Allāma, written in response to materialistic 
philosophy, in general, and dialectical materialism, in particular. These philosophies were 
promoted in Iran at the time. The book, written in Persian, contains 14 articles: the first article 
concerns the subject-matter of Islamic philosophy, articles 2-6 are concerned with realistic 
epistemology, articles 7-13 are about ontology (e.g. existence, unity, motion, and causation), 
and the last article is about God, His relation with creatures, and the creatures’ relation with 
Him. The book establishes the foundations of Islamic epistemology. His theory of constructed 
concepts (al-mafāhīm al-i‘tibāriyya) is one of his philosophical innovations. The book was first 
published in 1995 as annotated by Āyatullāh Murtażā Muṭahharī’s comments and discussions. 
Āyatullāh Javādī Āmulī, a student of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, says the following about Muṭahharī’s 
commentaries on the book: “these commentaries were indeed formulations and revisions of 
lectures given by late ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī when he taught the text.” In his preface to the book, 
 
90 See ‘Alī Shīrvānī’s preface to his Translation and Exhibition of Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, vol. 1, p. 15. 
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written in 1945, Murtażā Muṭahharī writes the following about one purpose of writing the book 
as well as how it was written: 
Since a few years ago, [‘Allāma] began to establish a circle of philosophical discussions 
and critiques—participated by a number of scholars—and since two and a half years 
ago, His Excellency was supposed to prepare materials during the week, which were 
read out in the circle’s assemblies—which met two nights a week—and then everyone 
commented on those writings. I had the honor of attending these assemblies until one 
and a half years ago when [those assemblies] met in Qum. These assemblies still 
continue.91 
Āyatullāh Javādī Āmulī (1933- ) traces the Iranian society’s serious encounter with the 
elements of Western thought to nearly one century ago, making the following comments on 
this book’s significance: “the book, Principles of Philosophy, was a consequence of the first 
encounter between Islamic philosophy and philosophies imported to the written culture of the 
Iranian society from the Western world.”92 He says that, when the book was written, people 
whose views were criticized in the book passed over the critiques in striking silence. They 
never wanted to, or could, open the doors of dialogues.93 The book has not yet been translated 
into English. 
2.2.4. Commentaries on al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-‘Aqliyyat al-Arba‘a (The 
Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys) 
Al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya is the most important book written by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Mullā 
Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, the founder of the philosophical school of Transcendent Wisdom. It greatly 
reshaped Islamic philosophy because of its novel theories and its attempts at reconciling the 
findings of reason, revelation, and mystical intuition. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was a follower of this 
philosophical school, although he was dubbed the founder of a new philosophical school, called 
“neo-Sadraean,” given his remarkable philosophical innovations. ‘Allāma wrote numerous 
commentaries in exposition, and sometimes in critique, of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s views. They 
were first published in 1959 as footnotes to the 9 volumes of al-Asfār. He refused to write 
commentaries on some parts of the book, such as its discussion of resurrection, because of his 
 
91 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1985, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālism, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit 
(Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), vol. 1, p. 13. 
92 'Abullāah Javādī Āmulī, 2008, Sharī‘at dar Āyini-yi Ma‘rifat (Sharia in the Mirror of Knowledge), Qum: ’Isrā’ 
Publication, pp. 18-19. 
93 See: Ibid, pp. 18-20.  
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fundamental disagreements with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn. 94  No English translation for these 
commentaries was found. 
 
2.2.5. Risāli-yi ‘Ali ‘Alayh al-Salām va Falsafi-yi Ilāhī (Essay on ‘Ali (a.) and Divine 
Philosophy)  
The essay provides a general account of the purpose of philosophy; in particular, it accounts 
for the purpose and subject-matter of Islamic philosophy and its relation with Islam. In this 
essay, he tries to reconcile philosophy and religion—to make a harmony and agreement 
between the two. He offers philosophical arguments to show that there is no contradiction or 
conflict between religion and philosophy; instead, they have common goals. ‘Allāma cites 
Imam ‘Alī’s (a.) words, from which he derives a number of philosophical points, accounting 
for their relation with Islam.95 Early in the essay, ‘Allāma says: “it is, indeed, a great injustice 
to divide the divine religion and the divine philosophy.” No English translation was found for 
the essay. 
2.2.6. Al-Rasā’il al-Sab‘a (Seven Essays)  
Six of these essays were written by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī during his stay in Tabriz, and “Risālat 
al-Quwwa wa-l-Fi‘l” was written in Qum. Here are the essays: 1. “Risālat al-Burhān” (Essay 
on Proof), 2. “Risālat al-Mughālaṭa” (Essay on Fallacy), 3. “Risālat al-Tarkīb” (Essay on 
Composition), 4. “Risālat al-Taḥlīl” (Essay on Analysis), 5. “Risālat al-I‘tibārāt” (Essay on 
Constructs), 6. “Risālat al-Manāmāt wa-l-Nubuwwāt” (Essay on Dreams and Prophecies), and 
7. “Risālat al-Quwwa wa-l-Fi‘l” (Essay on Potentiality and Actuality). Generally speaking, the 
first four essays are concerned with logic, and the most important among these is “Risālat al-
Burhān,” because it discusses philosophy of knowledge and the criterion of certainty. “Risālat 
al-I‘tibārāt” involves a philosophical discussion, and the sixth essay is based on the problem of 
constructs. The last essay deals with potentiality and actuality as well as motion. In fact, this 
collection of essays is an interdisciplinary study of philosophy and logic directed at a shared 
subject-matter between the two. What connects these issues, in ‘Allāma’s view, seems to be 
the problem of constructs. In the four logical essays, ‘Allāma talks about constructs, and in the 
essay on constructs, he elaborates on the issue. The essay on dreams is based on the conclusions 
 
94 See: A group of writers, 2002, Marzbān-i Vaḥy va Khirad: Yādnāmi-yi Marḥūm-i ‘Allāmih Sayyid Muḥammad 
Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Qum: Buūstān-i Kitāb, p. 106-107. 
95 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā’ī, 2009,  “‘Alī (a.) va Falsafi-yi Ilāhī,” Qum: ‘Intishārāt-i Jāmi‘i-yi 
Mudarrisīn, p. 8. 
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of the essay on constructs. Prima facie, the essay on potentiality and actuality seems to be 
irrelevant to the problem of constructs, but given ‘Allāma’s account of the role of constructs in 
human actions and the human motion toward perfection, the relevance becomes obvious. Thus, 
all these essays are more or less related to the issue of constructs. These essays were first 
published in 1983 by ‘Allāma Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī Scholarly and 
Intellectual Foundation. They were later edited and reprinted together with some other essays 
by ‘Allāma under Majmū‘a Rasā’il al-‘Allāmat al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī (Collection of ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Essays). No English translation for these essays was found. 
2.2.7. Risālat al-Wilāya  
Given the definitions of philosophy, mysticism, and theology (kalām), which will be elaborated 
later, this seems to be ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s only essay concerning theoretical mysticism. 
Theoretical mysticism has two essential pillars: (1) personal unity (al-waḥdat al-shakhṣiyya) 
of existence, and (2) perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil).96 In this work, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is 
mostly concerned with the second pillar, and in other works, such as al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya 
(Essays on Monotheism), he talks about unity of existence. 97  Āyatullāh ‘Abdullāh Javādī 
Āmulī published an exposition for this essay under Shams al-Vaḥy-i Tabrīzī (The Sun of 
Revelation from Tabriz), which is indeed a compilation of his own lectures on the essay. One 
of ‘Allāma’s students asked him to give him permission for translating the essay into Persian, 
‘Allāma replied: “do not do this; the book is not intended for the public, so some people might 
not accurately understand it and get deviated.”98 
The essay has been translated into different languages. M. Dasht Bozorgi and F. Asadi Amjad 
have translated it as The Return to Being: A Translation of Risalat al-Walayah. 
2.2.8. Risāla Lubb al-Lubāb fī Sayr wa Sulūk Uli-l-Albāb (The Kernels of Kernels in Wayfaring 
and Journeying of the People of Intellect) 
This essay consists of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s ethical and mystical lectures in 1970-1971, written 
and edited by Āyatullāh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥusaynī Ṭihrānī. It has been translated into 
English by ‘Ali Quli Qara’i as “Lub al-Lubab (the Kernels of Kernels), A Short Treatise on 
Wayfaring.” 
 
96 See: Ḥasan Ramażānī, 2013, Compiled by Javān, Vahīd Vāhīd, ‘Irfān-i ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī dar Bayān-i Ustād 
Ḥasan Ramażānī, Qum: Sībṭ al-Nabīyy, p. 119. 
97 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tabātabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’ssisa al-Nu‘mān, p. 
5-7; also see Barrasī-hāyi Islāmī, vol. 2, p. 14. 
98 Sayyid ‘Alī Tihrānī, 2010, Zi Mihr Afrūkhtih (Blazed by Sun), Tehran: 'Intishārāt-i Surūsh, p. 95. 
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2.3. Works in Theology and Kalām 
2.3.1. Shi‘ih dar Islām (Shī‘ā in Islam)  
This was part of a project to introduce Shiism to the West by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and some of 
his students.99 In this book, he surveys the history of development of Shiism and its sects. It 
provides an account of the characteristics of Shiism as well as the Shiite perspective on 
principles of Islamic belief. It was translated into English by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and was 
published with his introduction in 1975. 
2.3.2. Shi‘ih: Majmū‘ih Muẕākirāt bā Prufusur Hānrī Kurban (Shī‘ā: Dialogues with Professor 
Henry Corbin) 
This is a collection of dialogues and correspondences between Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Professor Henry Corbin in 1959. It was first published under Maktab-i 
Tashayyu‘ (The School of Shiism). In these correspondence and dialogues, ‘Allāma deals with 
issues concerning how Shiism emerged and problems faced by Shī‘ās after the demise of 
Prophet Muḥammad (s.). In one part of the book, Corbin’s questions and ‘Allāma’s answers to 
them are cited. Corbin’s questions can be summarized as follows: 
1. What is the spiritual and internal comprehension of the Qur’an in the inner truth of the 
Shiite denomination? 
2. How does this spiritual and internal comprehension imply knowledge of the Imam? 
3. Why did Islamic philosophical ideas find a new life only in Iran, rather than other parts 
of the Islamic world? 
Henry Corbin was a French philosopher and a professor of Shiite studies in Sorbonne 
University. He met ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and had dialogues with him since 1959—their 
interactions lasted for twenty years. 100  He believes that the only living and authentic 
denomination in the world is Shiism, because it believes in a living Imam as a foundation of 
its beliefs. “Shiism is always alive in virtue of its reliance on Imam al-Mahdī (a.) who is 
alive.”101 Dialogues between ‘Allāma and Corbin have been translated into five languages: 
Persian, Arabic, French, Italian, and English. 
 
99 See Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s introduction to the book.  
100 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Ṭihrānī, 2005, Mihr-i Tābān (The Shining Sun), Mashhad: Nūr-i Tābān-i Qur'an, 
pp. 75-76. 
101 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
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2.3.3. Risālat-i Tashayyu‘ dar Dunyā-yi Imrūz (The Mission of Shiism in the World Today) 
This book consists of more dialogues between ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Henry Corbin in 1961. 
In fact, it counts as a second volume for Shī‘ā: Dialogues with Professor Henry Corbin. It deals 
with the condition of the Shī‘ā in the world today, considers certain Christian doctrines such 
as Immanence, and explores Shiite doctrines in spiritual and mystical terms. It seems that the 
book has not been translated from Persian into English. 
2.3.4. Gulchīnī az Ma‘ārif-i Tashayyu‘ (An Anthology of Shiite Doctrines) or Gulchīn-i Adabī-
yi Shi‘ih (A Literary Anthology of the Shī‘ā)  
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote this book in Arabic. It contains excerpts from supplications and 
spiritual words of Shiite Imams, short biographies of Shiite Imams, and the text of Imam ‘Alī’s 
Letter to Mālik al-Ashtar. A Literary Anthology of the Shī‘ā is the third and the last book in the 
series of books written by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī as introductions of Shiism to people in Europe 
and the USA: it was preceded by The Qur’an in Islam and Shī‘ā in Islam.102 This book has been 
translated by William C. Chittick from Persian into English as A Shi‘ite Anthology and was 
published with an introduction by Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr in 1981.  
2.3.5. Ta‘ālīm-i Islām (The Teachings of Islam) 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote the book in 1963 as a textbook of Islamic doctrines for teenagers 
(students of primary 5 and 6) in ‘Alavī School. In the first year, 10,000 copies of the book were 
published and distributed free of charge by some philanthropists—the book was received well 
by people.103 It is written in Persian and has been published under different headings, such as 
Āmūzish-i ‘Aqā’id va Dastūrāt-i Dīnī (Teaching the Beliefs and Religious Commands), 
Khulāṣi-yi Ta‘ālīm-i Islāmī (A Summary of Islamic Teachings), and Āmūzish-i Dīn (Teaching 
the Religion). It consists of four essays concerning beliefs, ethics, rulings, and social 
relationships. Āyatullāh Javādī Āmulī wrote an introduction to a version of the book published 
by Jānbāzān Publications in 1991. In this introduction, he says: “although the contents of the 
book are formulated in simple words, it is not easy to comprehend its depth. Of course, it is not 
difficult to have an acquired understanding of the book.”104 There are two English translations 
 
102Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, A Shi‘ite Anthology, Introduction by Sayyid Hossein Nasr, The 
Great Britain: Muḥammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
103 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2008,  Ta‘ālīm-i Islām, introduction by Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī, 
Qum: Buūstān-i Kitāb, pp. 19-20. 
104 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1991, Āmūzish-i ‘Aqā’id va Dastūr-hāyi Dīnī, Tehran: Mustaz‘afān 
va Jānbāzān Publication, p. 12. 
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of the book: one under Islamic Teachings in Brief and the other under Islamic Teachings: An 
Overview. The latter was translated by R. Campbell in 2015. 
2.3.6. Al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya (Essays on Monotheism)  
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote this book in Arabic based on his own favored account of theological 
method. It was posthumously published in 1995. As to its contents, the book can be divided 
into two sections: the first section includes four essays on the principle of monotheism, and the 
second includes three essays about the human being before this world, in this world, and after 
this world. In these latter essays, ‘Allāma deals with different issues concerning the human 
development from the beginning to the end. It should be noted that the essay, “al-Insān ba‘d 
al-Dunyā” (The Human After This World), is the only work by ‘Allāma exclusively devoted 
to resurrection. 
In the first section of the book, ‘Allāma draws on many Quranic verses and hadiths to articulate 
several fundamental issues concerning the principle of monotheism. He presents different 
philosophical arguments to support his own interpretation of the transmitted evidence. In line 
with his favored theological method, ‘Allāma tackles some mystical issues based on Quranic 
verses and hadiths. Although ‘Allāma discusses monotheism more or less in almost all of his 
work, some issues addressed in this book cannot be found in any other works of his. This book 
has not been translated into English. 
2.4. Social and Political Work 
2.4.1. Barrasī-hāyi Islāmī (Islamic Investigations)  
This book is a collection of articles as well as questions and answers by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī—
the articles were written on different occasions and the correspondences were made during 
years. The book was edited and published in two volumes by Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī—who 
was ‘Allāma’s student from a young age and made extensive efforts to compile and publish 
‘Allāma’s work in Persian. As Khusroshāhī says in his introduction to the book, “some 
materials of the book were previously published in journals such as Yādnāmi-yi Mullā Ṣadrā 
(Mullā Ṣadra’s Memorandum), Muḥammad Khātam-i Payāmbarān (Muḥammad the Last 
Prophet), Maktab-i Islam (The School of Islam), Majalli-yi Dānishkadi-yi Adabiyyāt (The 
Journal of the College of Literature), Faṣlnāmi-yi Maktab-i Tashayyu‘ (The School of Shiism 
Quarterly), Rāhnamā-yi Kitāb (The Book Guide), and the like. Some other materials were not 
50 
 
previously published and the master himself [i.e. ‘Allāma] handed them to me—these are 
published in this volume for the first time.”105 
The book encompasses various philosophical and social issues. I have classified the book as a 
work concerning social and political studies, because some of ‘Allāma’s views concerning 
political and social issues, particularly the place of woman in Islam, are exclusively discussed 
in this book. Some chapters of the book were translated into Persian under Islām va Insān-i 
Mu‘āṣir (Islam and the Contemporary Man). Dawud Sodagar has translated the book into 
English under Islam and the Contemporary Man in 2010. 
2.4.2. Ravābiṭ-i Ijtimā‘ī dar Islām (Social Relationships in Islam) 
This is, indeed, a Persian translation of some of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s lectures of Quranic 
exegesis (in Arabic), written down and edited by Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī and Muḥammad 
Javād Ḥujjatī Kirmānī. Part of the book—the discussion of tafwīḍ (God’s delegation of actions 
to people) from a Quranic perspective (as well as some other Quranic issues), which were 
reviewed and endorsed by ‘Allāma himself. The book is derived from Ashī‘āt al-Qur’ān (The 
Rays of the Qur’an), which is not completely published yet.106 The book talks about different 
issues concerning the nature of society, relations between individuals in a society, and Islamic 
consideration of social problems. The book has not been translated into English. 
2.4.3. Risāli-yi Wilāyat va Zi‘āmat (Essay on Guardianship and Rule) 
This is one of the most important social-political essays by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. The issue of 
Wilāya (guardianship) in the society in general and  al-faqīh (guardianship of the jurist) in 
particular are explored in this essay from an Islamic social philosophical (rather than a 
jurisprudential) perspective.107 The essay was written when Grand Āyatullāh Burūjirdī—the 
undisputed authority of Shī‘ās in Iran—had passed away, the Shiite society had become upset 
and troubled, and controversies had broken out about “Marja‘iyya” (Shiite authority) and its 
role in the society. Some Muslim scholars and intellectuals began to co-author a book under 
Baḥsī darbāri-yi Marja‘īyyat va Rūḥāniyyat (A Discussion of Authority and Clergymen). The 
book contains 9 articles by different people some of whom—including ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and 
Murtażā Muṭahharī—authored more than one article in the book. The book was first published 
by Shirkat-i Sahāmī-yi Intishār in December 1962, and was later reprinted. Finally, its 
 
105 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2009, Barrasī-hāyi Islāmī, Qum: Buūstān-i Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 11. 
106 See Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī’s introduction to this book, p. 9-19 and Muḥammad Javād Ḥujjatī Kirmānī’s 
introduction to the chapter on Predestination (jabr) and Delegation, p. 147-148. 
107 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2018, “Wilāyat va Zi‘āmat,” Baḥsī darbāri-yi Marja‘iyyat va 
Rūḥāniyyat, Qum: Ṣadrā, p. 162. 
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copyright was transferred to Sadra Publications. To my best knowledge, there is no English 
translation of the essay. 
2.4.4. Ijtihād va Taqlīd dar Islām va Shī‘ih (Ijtihad and Emulation in Islam and Shiism) 
This is another essay written by ‘Allāma in the book, Baḥsī darbāri-yi Marja‘iyyat va 
Rūḥāniyyat. In this essay, ‘Allāma restricts emulation (taqlīd) to practical rulings and 
commands of Islam. He investigates the religious validity of emulation and ijtihad, maintaining 
that the most important reason for permissibility of emulation for a person who is ignorant of 
practical rulings is the continuous practice of Muslims from early Islam until today—they have 
always practiced in this way. Moreover, he considers the issue of emulation in the background 
of social relationships: he takes the necessity of emulation as an innate idea built in humans, 
exercised by people as a way of meeting their needs. No English translation for this essay was 
found. 
2.5. Works in Jurisprudence and Its Principles 
Two points about ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s work in jurisprudence and its principles are in order: 
1. ‘Allāma wrote commentaries on Nihāyat al-Dirāya (The Ultimate Cognizance) by 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Gharawī Iṣfahānī108 (1879-1942), which are not published yet. 
2. ‘Allāma has no published work concerning jurisprudential issues, but in his Quranic exegesis, 
al-Mīzān, he seriously discussed verses concerning jurisprudential issues, elaborating upon his 
views. 
2.5.1. Ḥāshiyat al-Kifāya (Commentaries on al-Kifāya) 
‘Allāma wrote commentaries on Kifāyat al-Uṣūl (The Sufficiency in the Principles)—one of 
the most important Shiite work in Principles of Jurisprudence—by Muḥammad Kāẓim 
Khurāsānī109 (1839-1911) during his residence in Najaf, but these commentaries have not been 
published yet. He wrote other commentaries on this book during his residence in Qum. These 
latter commentaries were published under Ḥāshiyat al-Kifāya in Arabic in two volumes. 
‘Allāma wrote the commentaries in 1948-1949, but the date of their publication is not precisely 
known. This is not translated into English. 
 
108 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Gharawī Iṣfahānī, known as Kumpānī, was a well-known Shiite philosopher and scholar 
of jurisprudence and its principles in 19th and 20th centuries. He was one of the most important teachers of ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī in Najaf in Principles of Jurisprudence. 
109 Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī, known as Ākhūnd Khurāsānī, was a Shiite jurist, philosopher, and politician. 




Of the work mentioned above, Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism is the major 
and most-cited philosophical work by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī dealing with philosophical schools 
that have been influential on intellectual movements referred to in the preceding chapter. The 
first five volumes of al-Mīzān contain many discussions of the political and social system of 
Islam as well as profound discussions of Islamic sociology which crucially contributed to the 
portrayal of the ideal Islamic society in Iran in the twentieth and the present centuries. The 
book Philosophical Investigations contains many of the so-called intellectual views of ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī. In this book, while he insists on Islamic regulations, he takes issue with traditional 
ideas and customs that are not in fact originated in Islam, but in the culture of Muslims, coming 
closer to certain human values in modernity, including the freedom of speech and women’s 
civil rights. What is relevant to the main subject-matter of this dissertation appears in ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s philosophical books, including Bidāyat al-ḥikma, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, Principles of 
Philosophy and the Method of Realism, as well as some of his theological books, including Al-
rasā’il al-tawḥīdiyya and his Quranic exegesis al-Mīẓan. Since the issue plays a fundamental 
role in the study of Islamic doctrines, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī offers elaborate discussions of the 






The aim of this section is to consider and analyze ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s definition of reason and his 
view of its palce and order so as to arrive at an understanding of its relation with intuition and 
revelation. Although the word ‘aql (reason or intellect) is not used as a noun in the Qur’an, its 
verbal form frequently occurs in the Qur’an. In his al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī explains the 
meaning of the word as follows: “‘aql is an infinitive form of the verbs ‘aqal, ya‘qil: 
comprehension and full understanding of something.”110 He believes that it is lax to refer to 
reason as a faculty, since reason is identical to the human “perceptive soul.” 111  ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī is among the scholars who are committed to a sharp demarcation of sciences, which 
is why he considers and defines reason once in the Quranic literature, and once again he deploys 
philosophical arguments to examine the nature and features of reason. In his philosophical 
articulation, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī offers a definition of reason similar to the one he offers in the 
Quranic literature. He considers what serves as objects of cognition to prove different realms 
of existence, and then he presents a philosophical argument to show the extent to which the 
realm of reason can be extended and the entities which it might know, and how it might know 
them. 
 
3.2. Definition and Types of Intellect in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s View 
In this section, I deal with the definition and degrees of intellect or reason (‘aql) as well as 
types of intellectual perceptibles (al-mudrakāt al-‘aqlīyya) in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view.112 
3.3. Intellect in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Philosophy of Mind 
According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, the human existence consists of two closely connected 
dimensions: material and immaterial (mujarrad).113 It is their connection that guarantees the 
human continued life and evolution in this world. In his view, the human being is analogous to 
a sea that has both shallow and deep areas. Just as the shallow area of a sea involves less water, 
the material dimension of human beings enjoys a lower degree of existence, and just as the 
deep area of the sea involves more water, the immaterial dimension of human beings enjoys a 
higher degree of existence. In line with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes in gradation 
 
110 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 1, p. 404. 
111 “And it is the human cognitive soul, rather than a faculty which is a branch of the soul such as the faculties of 
memory, vision, and the like” (see Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 1, 
p. 404; vol. 2, p. 251). 
112 As a prelude to this discussion, it should be noted that some issues discussed in this part of the dissertation are 
prerequisites of “intuition and its types” and “revelation and its types.” I have followed ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s 
approach to issues of intellect, intuition, and revelation in discussion of preliminary ontological issues in his 
discussion of intellect. Thus, the section on “intellect and its types” is more elaborate than the other two. 
113  See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, third article, Tehran: 
Shirkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm). Also see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, 11th 
stage, chapter 1, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn Publishers. 
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(tashkīk) of existence in the sense that it has weak and strong degrees: it is stronger in certain 
entities and weaker in others. Even the same human individual has existential strength and 
weakness at the same time, their material dimension having a weaker existence and their 
immaterial dimension having a stronger existence.114 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī divides the whole world of existence into four, and the whole created world 
into three, layers: material, imaginal (mithāl) or imaginational (khayāl), and intellectual. As to 
existential strength, the imaginal world is above the material world, and the intellectual world 
is above the imaginal world. In addition to these created worlds, he believes in a world 
pertaining to God, to which he refers as the world of divine names and attributes.115 On his 
account, all human and non-human animals live in material and imaginal realms, their existence 
partaking that of the two realms. Put alternatively, the human or animal existence involves both 
material and imaginal immaterial dimensions. 
The intellectual world shares the immateriality of the imaginal world—as to existential strength, 
the former is above the latter; it is “pure actuality,” so to speak, and is attainable only by some 
human beings. As I shall elaborate below, ‘Allāma maintains that, unlike non-human animals, 
human beings have a faculty to which ‘Allāma refers as the rational faculty.116 If it goes from 
potentiality to actuality, then the person can be admitted to the rational world and apprehend 
the truths of this world to the extent of the actualization of their faculty. For the sake of clarity, 
in this dissertation, I will refer to this particularly human faculty as “peculiar intellectual faculty” 
so as to distinguish it from other rational faculties.117 
According to ‘Allāma, the strongest existential dimension of a human being is their intellect, 
which governs other degrees of their existence. The most remarkable capacity of this supreme 
degree of human existence is its power to understand and to develop its existence through 
knowledge and truths that it obtains, whereby it comes to possess higher existential existence. 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī refers to the human capacity for understanding the truths as “intellect,” 
regardless of whether it can acquire knowledge of the truths of material and imaginal worlds 
 
114 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1994, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, 
pp. 14-17, and Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn, pp. 
17-20. 
115 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, “Risālat al-Wasa’iṭ,” Beirut: 
Mu’assisat al-Nu‘man, pp. 101-104. 
116 In some of his works, ‘Allāma refers to this faculty as “al-Quwwat al-Nāṭiqat al-Qudsiyya”; see Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, 
vol. 2, p. 148. 
117 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 11, pp. 271-272. 
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(shared by human and non-human animals) or it can have knowledge of all three worlds: 
material, imaginal, and intellectual. His use of the same term for reference to all these different 
kinds of understanding has posed a challenge to scholars seeking to arrive at an accurate 
analysis of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s definition of intellect and the distinction between human 
beings and other animals. I will point to some of these challenges in what follows. 
The reason why ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī refuses to use different terms for different intellectual 
dimensions, using instead the same word, “intellect,” to refer to them all, seems to be that, 
firstly, he applies “intellect” to the degree of human existence that has the capacity to 
understand the truths; in fact, this existential degree is a matter of knowledge, flourishing only 
through acquisition of knowledge, and secondly, he wants to note the fact that the human 
existence is a unified reality with distinct existential degrees. The unity exists more perfectly 
in higher degrees of intellect. The reason why unity is stronger and more perfect in higher 
degrees of intellect is that, according to Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and ‘Allāma, existence is 
coextensive (musāwiq) with unity, and the stronger the existential degree is, the stronger will 
be the unity. 
3.4. Definition of Intellect 
The word, ‘aql (intellect or reason), is one of the most complex and complicated notions 
appearing in the literature on religion and Islamic philosophy. The word is predicated of so 
many different things that some people, such as Mullā Ṣadrā, believe that it is a homonym, 
rather than a word with one and the same meaning with different extensions. The meaning of 
the word is not exhausted by the human perceptive faculty. In Islamic sources, the word is also 
used to refer to a variety of immaterial entities, such as the Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl) 
and intellect (as the first creature). Moreover, there is a world of existence called the intellectual 
world. In his work, ‘Allāma uses ‘aql in most of its various meanings, but in this dissertation, 
I mainly focus on the intellect, its degrees, and its objects in order to be in a position to consider 
its relation with intuition and revelation. 
56 
 
‘Allāma provides a general definition of intellect as a perceptive faculty118, referring to every 
being that has a capacity to perceive as an “intellector” (‘āqil).119 In line with this general 
definition, he believes that both humans and animals share intellect as a perceptive faculty, 
although the former possesses a peculiar intellectual faculty that can be actualized and attain 
transcendent truths—which he calls the truths of the intellectual world.120 In some of his works, 
he refers to the shared intellect between humans and animals as “intelligence,” suggesting that 
humans are typically more intelligent than other animals except that humans have a peculiar 
intellectual faculty as well. 121  In its natural state, this peculiar intellectual faculty is a 
 
118 Note that by “faculty” here we do not mean a state accidental to the human soul, such as the visual faculty—
that is, a state without which the soul can still exist. To the contrary, by “faculty” here we mean a stage of the 
human soul that is capable of perception. See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr 
al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 1, p. 405. 
In the 11th stage of his Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, he extends the domain of intellect beyond its terminological sense (i.e. 
perception of universals). 
119 Whenever the word, “intellect,” is used in this dissertation, I mean the general notion articulated by ‘Allāma 
in his general definition of intellect, unless otherwise specified. 
120 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, “Risāla fī Af‘āl Allah” (An Essay on 
God’s Actions), Lebanon: Mu’assisat al-Nu‘man, p. 71. 
121 In the article concerning causes and effects in his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
takes humans, and even all sentient animals, to be able to perceive the law of causation, suggesting that they have 
such perception in virtue of their intelligence. From this it follows that, on the one hand, both humans and other 
animals have a degree of intellect as sentient living creatures—it is to this degree of intellect that ‘Allāma refers 
as “intelligence,” and on the other hand, it is in virtue of their intelligence that they are capable of perceiving 
universal intellectual concepts. The quote from Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm seeks to demonstrate that 
both humans and other animals enjoy intelligence. As to their difference in degrees of intelligence, however, 
‘Allāma provides a detailed discussion in his exegesis of verse 70 of Sura al-Isra’. The verse alludes to two 
advantages of humans over many other creatures in the material world—the advantage is articulated in terms of 
“honor” and “preference”: 
Certainly We have honored the Children of Adam, and carried them over land and sea, and provided 
them with all the good things, and preferred them with a complete preference over many of those We 
have created. 
In his interpretation of the difference between “honoring” and “preferring,” ‘Allāma points to two features that 
distinguish humans from many other creatures, including non-human animals. Note that the following quote from 
‘Allāma does not include the peculiar intellectual faculty of human beings, because it exists in the form of a 
potentiality, which has such a small share of existence that cannot count as an advantage of “Children of Adam” 
over other creatures. ‘Allāma writes: 
Either of the two terms, “honoring,” and “preferring,” refers to a class of divine endowments to human 
beings—the honoring consists in bestowing human beings with intellect, which has not been given to 
any other creature. It is in virtue of intellect that the human being can discriminate the good from the evil 
and the useful from the harmful and the right from the wrong. Other endowments, such as dominance 
over, deployment, and control of other creatures in order to achieve goals, as well as language, writing, 
and the like can be obtained only via intellect. 
The preference of humans over other creatures consists in giving the former more of what is given to the 
latter. Thus, although animals eat food, their food is very simple—meat or fruits and vegetables—humans 
share this power in addition to its power to take these nutritious materials and make a variety of cooked 
or raw foods in an infinite range of tastes and pleasures. The same is true of drinking, clothing, satisfying 
the sexual instincts, accommodation, and social behavior in animals and humans. 
If the two pieces of writings from Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm and al-Mīzān are juxtaposed with fragments 
in which ‘Allāma takes humans as kinds of animals, it can be obviously concluded that ‘Allāma takes humans as 
animals that are more intelligent than other animals. This is one distinguishing feature of humans from other 
animals, and the other is the intellectual faculty that potentially exists in humans: whenever it is actualized, the 
human being can be admitted to the intellectual world. More on this below. 
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disposition in need of actualization. ‘Allāma suggests that it can be actualized through servitude 
of God. Thus, humans are the most intelligible animals that can actualize their peculiar 
intellectual faculties and be admitted to the human realm. In a variety of his works, ‘Allāma 
talks about the difference between humans and animals. In some cases, he proceeds in line with 
majority views, without noting that he is committed to them. This leads to troubles in 
understanding ‘Allāma’s own position. 
In his view, humans and other animals only differ in certain stages of their intellects. In order 
to be in a position to understand ‘Allāma’s view of intellect, we need to know the definition of 
the intellect shared between humans and other animals, on the one hand, and on the other, we 
need to see the degree of intellect, and the perceptibles, considered by ‘Allāma as exclusive to 
humans. Below are the principles required for an accurate understanding of ‘Allāma’s view of 
the difference between humans and other animals: 
1. Both human and non-human animals perceive universal concepts. Nevertheless, humans are 
capable of perceiving much more complicated concepts and attaining more complex kinds of 
knowledge. This was rejected by ‘Allāma’s student, Ayatullah Muṭahharī, who regards non-
human animals as incapable of perceiving universal concepts, such as unity and causation,122 
accounting for all their activities in terms of their animal instincts. On the contrary, ‘Allāma 
believes that non-human animals would not be able to do anything had they lacked such 
knowledge. For if animals failed to understand the law of causation, they would not embark on 
any action, because in this case they would not know whether the food can be ground by 
chewing, whether food can be obtained by hunting, or whether it can see by opening its eyes.123 
2. According to ‘Allāma, both humans and other animals have free will, rejecting the view that 
free will is distinctive of human individuals. Notwithstanding this, he believes that the animal 
free will is weaker than the human free will. His reason for this seems to be that free will is a 
result or effect of perceptive faculties, or the extent of knowledge, and since humans enjoy 
much more intellection and knowledge, they have more free will. This has also been called into 
question by Ayatullah Muṭahharī: he takes all animal actions to be instinctive.124 ‘Allāma’s 
 
122 In a footnote to Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Ayatullah Muṭahharī presents a detailed discussion of 
animal knowledge and instinctive animal actions, considering and criticizing a variety of theories in this respect. 
For more, see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i 
Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), Ayatullah Muṭahharī’s footnotes, vol. 2, pp. 168-194. 
123  Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit 
(Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), article 9, pp. 492-493. 
124 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 168-194. 
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position seems more accurate, because regardless of whether we call it an instinct or whatever 
else, what really matters is that, for one thing, experience shows that humans make choices, 
and this cannot be deterministic, since determinism is essentially at odds with free choice, and 
for another, free will is a consequence of knowledge: every entity has free will to the extent of 
its knowledge. Thus, if there are two different pieces of meat before a cat, and it can only pick 
one, it will certainly choose one of the two pieces. The choice will be based on its discernment 
of which piece is more useful for it. In fact, to choose is to give priority to one option among a 
host of options. One might object, however, that angels do have knowledge, although they do 
not have free will, and according to the Qur’an, they never commit sins. The answer is that 
angels do have free will, but as noted by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, jurisprudential duties are limited 
to this world where people live in communities: God has established (or constructed) the 
religion primarily and essentially for communities, while in the immaterial world where angels 
live, there is no social life as there is in this world. This is why they are not subject to types of 
laws and obligations that apply to this world. Instead, they have existential (takwīnī) obligations 
that they never violate, because they are well aware of the consequences of such violation and 
the advantages of compliance with existential commands. On this account, ‘Allāma believes 
that angels have free will because they are subject to duties, and one can be subject to duties 
only if they have free will—otherwise, “having duty” would make no sense. This is why the 
Qur’an says: “angels … do not disobey Allah in what He commands them but do what they are 
commanded,”125 and obviously, one can be commanded and obligated only if they have free 
will.126 
3. As pointed out before, ‘Allāma believes that human and animal existences have varying 
stages distinct from one another in their existential weakness and strength, with intellect (in the 
general sense of perceptive faculty) being at the highest stages of human/animal existence. The 
defining feature of humans and other animals is their intellect and its products, such as free 
will. That being so, when we talk about human souls and animal souls, we need to note that the 
difference between them lies just in the extent of their intellect (or intelligence)—in addition 
to the difference in their intellects, there is no particular difference between animal and human 
souls. 127  In fact, the difference between the human rational soul and the animal soul is 
 
125 Al-Taḥrīm: 6. 
126 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī 
Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 19, pp. 334-335. 
127 See: Ibid., vol. 1, p. 413. 
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exhausted by that between the human intellect and the animal intellect, and the latter difference 
lies in the degree of their understanding and their power of analysis. 
From the three premises above, we can draw the following conclusion: when ‘Allāma says in 
his al-Mīzān that the difference between humans and other animals lies in “intellect and the 
rational soul,” what he means is that the main difference between them is in intellect—the 
human rational soul is distinct from the animal soul in virtue of enjoying the degree of intellect 
it does. The analysis rests upon the assumption that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī uses “human,” 
“intellect,” and the “rational soul” in their dominant sense. However, if he uses them in 
accordance to his own principles, the above remark will amount to saying that human beings 
are distinct from other animals in virtue of having a peculiar intellectual faculty. A human 
becomes human when they actualize this potentiality. Such a human being has a soul distinct 
from the animal soul in virtue of having an intellect (a peculiar intellectual faculty that is 
actualized), because intellect is a degree of the soul, and the highest degree, for that matter. 
Such a human being will, therefore, be distinct from other animals in virtue of both the intellect 
and the soul, although the difference in soul is grounded in the difference in intellect. Nothing 
hinges on stating the difference between human and animal souls, because the main difference 
between them boils down to their intellect. The reason why ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī does not rest 
content to intellect as the distinguishing feature of humans and other animals in the above 
fragment of his al-Mīzān—alluding to the rational soul as what distinguishes humans from 
animals aside from intellect—seems to be that he intends to note the relation between intellect 
and the soul in human and animal existence. For the human soul (in the narrow sense of the 
term) is dominated by intellect, and intellect is a degree of the soul’s existence, which is why 
the human soul is different from the animal soul. More on this in the discussion about the 
realms of the human existence below. 
3.5. Kinds of Intellects 
In a number of his books, including al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān [The Balance in Exegesis of 
the Qur’an], Bidāyat al-Ḥikma [The Beginning of the Wisdom], and Nihāyat al-Ḥikma [The 
Ultimate Wisdom], ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī offers different classifications of intellect from four 
points of view: (1) in terms of theory and practice, (2) in ontological terms, (3) in terms of 
intellectual perceptibles, and (4) in terms of intellect’s functions in different sciences. The most 
relevant to the present dissertation are the first three classifications. As to the last classification, 
I will rest content to the account provided by a student of ‘Allāma who has offered a similar 
classification to ‘Allāma’s. 
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3.5.1. Theoretical and Practical Intellects (al-‘Aql al-Naẓarī wa al-‘Aql al-‘Amalī) 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī rejects the established classification of intellect (or reason) into theoretical 
and practical. According to the established classification,128 theoretical intellect is deemed 
responsible for knowledge of what exists, distinguishing what exists from what does not exist, 
and practical intellect is deemed responsible for stating what ought to, and what ought not to, 
be done. Where the difference between this classification and his espoused classification does 
not undermine the main issue he considers, ‘Allāma deploys the distinction between theoretical 
and practical intellects. In some of his books, nevertheless, including the sixth article of his 
Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm [Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism], he 
elaborates his view of the distinction in detail. One reason why ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī rejects the 
distinction—although he has never made it explicit anywhere—seems to be that the type of 
intellect which has been divided into theoretical and practical is one that has to do with 
knowledge by certainty. In fact, knowledge that does not reach the point of certainty (that is, 
probabilistic opinion [al-ẓann al-iṭmīnānī]) falls outside the scope of the distinction. However, 
‘Allāma writes: “in addition to knowledge, what is central to human action is probabilistic 
opinion which is construed by humans as knowledge.”129 To put it the other way round, the 
distinction is problematic in that the kind of intellect identified as theoretical cannot be the 
same kind of intellect as what is identified as practical, because the scope of the former is 
limited to certainty-conferring knowledge. To elucidate the main reason why the classification 
of intellect into theoretical and practical is deemed wrong by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, we need to 
consider his espoused classification. 
He is not the first Muslim intellectual who rejects the distinction of intellect into theoretical 
and practical, but his proposed alternative for the old classification is innovative. He 
distinguishes human perceptions into three categories: real, constructed (i‘tibārī) in the general 
sense, and constructed in the specific sense. 130  Consequently, he divides intellect as the 
 
128 The division of reason into theoretical and practical in Islamic philosophy traces back to Fārābī. After him, 
many philosophers and intellectuals discussed the two types of reason, including Ibn Miskawayh, Avicenna, 
Ghazālī, Ibn Maytham Baḥrānī, and Mullā Ṣadrā, although they articulate the division in different ways. For 
instance, Avicenna talks about “a cognitive faculty and a moving agential faculty,” and ‘Ubayd Zākānī attributes 
epistemic (‘ilmiyya) and practical faculties to the human soul. (For more about the history of the issue, see 
Muḥammad Hidāyatī and Muḥammad Shumālī, “Justārī dar ‘aql-i naẓarī va ‘amalī”, Ma‘rifat-i Falsafī, vol. 3, 
2009). 
129  Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit 
(Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), article 6, pp. 326-327. 
130 Riżā Dāvarī Ardakānī believes that the term, “constructed” (i‘tibāriyyāt), has been used by ‘Allāma for the 
first time, but the core idea is not unprecedented in the Islamic world. In fact, Ibn Khaldūn has divided knowledge 
into intellectual (‘aqlī) and conventional (waḍ‘ī). ‘Allāma’s alternative classification, however, is different from 
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perceptive faculty into three categories: “perceptive of real knowledge,” “constructing 
constructed knowledge in the general sense,” and “constructing constructed knowledge in the 
specific sense.”131 
Instead of the term, “perceptive of real knowledge,” we might use the standard term, 
“theoretical intellect.” Following Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, ‘Allāma does not believe that 
knowledge is produced by intellect or senses. Instead, he thinks that senses are preparatory 
causes with the help of which intellect can receive knowledge from imaginal or intellectual 
entities in virtue of the soul’s attachment to material senses, as elaborated before. Theoretical 
intellect is, therefore, a receiver of knowledge, rather than a producer thereof, and all quiddity-
based concepts as well as logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles (al-ma‘qūlāt al-
thāniya) and all propositions concerning an existing relation between objects fall within the 
domain of theoretical intellect. 
Unlike theoretical intellect that is just a receiver of knowledge, practical intellect has a 
productive role in its knowledge of what ought and what ought not to be done. Instead of using 
the term, “practical reason,” ‘Allāma uses terms such as the “constructing faculty.” The faculty 
performs two tasks, given which ‘Allāma distinguishes it into two types: (1) constructing 
constructed knowledge in the general sense, and (2) constructing constructed knowledge in the 
specific sense. 
Constructed knowledge in the general sense is contrasted to quiddities. Thus, when our mind 
judges that there exists a relation between two things—e.g. by saying that “A is B”—the 
judgement (“is”) is a product of the mind. The concept of judgment is, therefore, one that the 
mind has derived from the relation it has held between the two things. 
Constructed concepts in the specific sense of the term—to which ‘Allāma refers as practical 
constructs as well—are those that the mind formulates to secure its natural needs. And these 
concepts are divided, in turn, into constant (pre-social constructs) and variable (post-social 
constructs) concepts. Concepts such as necessity, goodness and badness, ownership, headship, 
and subjugation fall under constructed concepts in the specific sense of the term. 
 
Ibn Khaldūn’s. See Dāvarī’s paper, 1984, Duvvumīn Yādnāmi-yi ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī [The Second Festschrift of 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī], Tehran: Publications of Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy, p. 137. 
131 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit 
(Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), article 6. Also see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2007, Majmū‘a Rasā’il al-‘Allāmat 
al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, “Risālat al-Wasa’iṭ,” Qum: Baqiyat Publishers, Risālat al-I‘tibāriyyāt. 
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3.5.2. Kinds of Intellect in terms of its Perceptibles 
Another classification of intellect made by ‘Allāma in some of his philosophical books, such 
as Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, is a distinction in degrees of intellect with respect to intelligibles that it 
is able to grasp. It should be noted, however, that he talks about the classification as follows: 
“intellect has been said to have four degrees.” One just needs to be familiar with ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s writing style to see that such phrasing implies his disagreement with the stated 
view. In such cases, he often presents the majority view. Here are the degrees ‘Allāma 
introduces as the majority view.132 
1. Material intellect or intellectus materialis (al-‘aql al-hayūlānī): this is the lowest degree of 
intellect which is a mere potentiality for all ideas and intelligibles. 
2. Dispositional intellect or intellectus in habitu (al-‘aql bi-l-malaka): this is a degree of 
intellect that perceives self-evident concepts (taṣawwur) and assents (taṣdīq). For instance, 
this degree of intellect is capable of perceiving self-evident concepts such as the general 
notion of “being” as well as “unity and multiplicity” and self-evident assents such as 
“existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive.” Intellect can in this degree acquire 
self-evident concepts and the disposition for moving from them to theoretical intelligibles 
will become habitual in the soul; hence the epithet intellectus in habitu.133 
3. Actual intellect or intellectus in actu (al-‘aql bi-l-fi‘l): intellect in this degree apprehends 
theoretical materials by means of self-evident knowledge. 
4. Acquired intellect or intellectus adquisitus (al-‘aql al-mustafād): in the last stage of its 
development, intellect arrives at a degree at which all self-evident and theoretical 
intelligibles, corresponding the external world, that it has acquired are present to it. The 
main difference between this and actual intellect is that, in the latter, although intellect has 
acquired a great deal of knowledge, the body of knowledge is not present to it—that is, all 
pieces of knowledge are not present in the soul at the same time in that the soul is not 
attentive to all of them. Instead, it has the power to summon any piece of knowledge 
whenever it wants to. Acquired intellect has all these pieces of knowledge actually present 
to it. In his Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī says the following about this degree of 
 
132 The most important advocate of the classification is Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. See: Muḥammad 
ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, 1989, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-‘Aqliyyat al-Arba‘a (with ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentaries), Qum: Maktabat al-Mustafawi, vol. 3, pp. 419-421. 
Explanations of the four degrees of intellect provided below are partly translations of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s words 
and partly elucidations thereof. 
133 In his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī provides a detailed account of how original 
self-evident conceptions and assents are formed, suggesting that they are obtained in early childhood. For more, 
see article 5 of this book. 
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intellect: if the human intellect (the human rational soul) arrives at the degree of full-
fledged immateriality—partly evidenced by his intellect not being engaged when 
administrating the body—all intellectual knowledge will actually be acquired by it and its 
intellect becomes acquired. 
‘Allāma believes that all these types of intelligibles can be acquired by intellect, although his 
espoused classification of intellect should be looked for in his accounts of different created 
worlds.134 ‘Allāma never takes issue with the above classification, but, given his philosophical 
principles, his possible objection to the classification can be articulated as follows: ‘Allāma’s 
point of disagreement with this classification—which is endorsed by Mullā Ṣadrā—is that in 
his view self-evident and theoretical perceptibles that fall within degrees of dispositional and 
actual intellects in terms of this classification are not indeed evidence of difference in degrees 
of intellect as suggested by Mullā Ṣadrā. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, in order for the soul to 
perceive these perceptibles, it is unified with different truths in imaginal and intellectual worlds. 
Indeed, intellect (or the soul) becomes existentially so expansive that it is unified with those 
truths. On ‘Allāma’s account, however, the soul (or intellect) need not be unified with these 
truths in order to apprehend the perceptibles in question. Instead, it comes to hold a particular 
unificational relation (a union of the same type as that between an attribute and the attributed) 
with those truths. The degrees ascribed by Mullā Ṣadrā to intellect in virtue of its apprehension 
of self-evident and theoretical perceptibles are not, in ‘Allāma’s view, evidenced by such 
perceptibles—the only thing that the soul’s ability to apprehend these entities indicates is the 
existence of imaginary and intellectual worlds. I will say more on this in my discussion of the 
unity of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected (ittiḥād al-‘aql wa-l-‘āqil wa-l-ma‘qūl).  
In the third classification below, ‘Allāma’s espoused view of the matter will be elaborated. 
3.5.3. Kinds of Intellect from an Ontological Viewpoint 
In his ontological consideration of intellect, he sometimes regards it as a degree of the human 
existence and discusses its features. Early in this chapter, I have provided an account of 
‘Allāma’s view of the matter. And sometimes, he sees intellect as a degree of the human 
existence, which is, or can be, in relation with other degrees of the world of being. In this 
second ontological view, he seeks to know the place of intellect in the world of being and its 
relation with the created world. To do so, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s account of the world of being 
needs to be studied. As pointed out before, ‘Allāma divides the created world into three worlds: 
 
134 More on his espoused view of different degrees of intellect in the chapter on “Intuition and its types.” 
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material, imaginal, and intellectual. Intellects of all people are in contact with the first two 
worlds, and they have the potentiality for reaching the intellectual world as well. Moreover, he 
believes that there is another world beyond these three, which he calls the world of Lāhūt or 
Divinity, which is a world of divine names and attributes. In his “Risālat al-Wasā’iṭ” (Essay on 
Intermediaries) from his al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥidiyya (Monotheistic Essays), ‘Allāma’s method in 
consideration of the relation between intellect and the three created worlds (material, imaginal, 
and intellectual) is not based on proving or presupposing the existence of these worlds and then 
assessing their relation with intellect. Instead, he considers different kinds of knowledge 
attainable by human beings and concludes that these kinds of knowledge pertain to three 
different worlds—the material world (senses), the imaginal world (imagination), and the 
intellectual world (full-fledged immateriality). He makes a case for the existence of the world 
of divine names and attributes through a different argument in another essay in the same 
collection called “Risālat al-Tawḥīd” (Essay on Monotheism). 
Here is how he conceives these four worlds:135 
There are four worlds in the realm of being, ordered in accordance to their varying degrees of 
existential strength,136 which correspond to one another: 
First: the world of divine names and attributes, called Lāhūt or Divinity. 
Second: the world of full-fledged immateriality called intellectual world, or the spiritual 
world, or Jabarūt or Almightiness. 
Third: the imaginal world, which is also called the world of imagination, suspended 
forms (al-muthul al-mu‘allaqa), intermediary or purgatory (barzakh), and Malakūt or 
Dominion. 
Fourth: the natural world, also called Nāsūt or the World of Mortals, among other thing. 
According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, one acquires knowledge when one’s intellect makes contact 
with imaginal or intellectual truths of beings. This is true both of knowledge of entities in the 
material world and of knowledge of entities in imaginal and intellectual worlds. Since the issue 
 
135  Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2007, Majmū‘a Rasā’il al-‘Allāmat al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, “Risālat al-
Wasā’iṭ,” Qum: Baqiyat Publishers, p. 141. 
136 To say that these worlds are ordered in accordance to degrees of existential strength is to say that the intellectual 
world is the cause of the imaginal world, and the imaginal world is, in turn, the cause of the material world. For 
more, see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1994, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn 
Publishers, p. 172. 
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is tightly intertwined with issues of the unity of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected, it 
is necessary to discuss the worlds of being and how they can be known in order to consider 
‘Allāma’s view of intellect and its degrees, because on his view our knowledge of different 
worlds of existence determines different degrees of our intellect. To have a better 
understanding of the issue, let me explicate how material entities are known. 
‘Allāma believes that every material entity has imaginal truth in the imaginal world; 137 
otherwise, knowledge by certainty would be impossible for human beings—which leads to 
skepticism. His elaborate argument for this claim consists of two sections: (1) knowledge is 
immaterial because an intrinsic property of the matter is its constant changeability and 
divisibility, whereas change and division are impossible in the case of knowledge (when you 
change your view, your previous knowledge does turn into new knowledge; new knowledge is 
added to you, which is the reason why you can still remember your previous knowledge.) The 
same is true when you divide an apple image in your mind, for instance. You do not, in fact, 
divide the apple image into two, but rather create a new image of two halves of an apple. This 
is why you can still present the undivided apple to your mind whenever you want to), and (2) 
what is transmitted to us via our bodily senses are mere impingements on the body in its 
encounters with different entities. There is no evidence for correspondence between images 
(pieces of knowledge) acquired in this way and external entities.138 
The two ideas above imply that since knowledge is immaterial, and immaterial entities have 
stronger existence than material entities, matter cannot cause the existence of an immaterial 
entity. For, according to a rational principle, a cause always has a stronger and higher existence 
than its effect, and since we know by certainty that at least part of our knowledge corresponds 
to facts (pace skeptics), our knowledge of, say, this horse should have been acquired through a 
relation (of unity) with an immaterial entity which is the existential cause of the horse. To put 
it the other way round, when we sensibly encounter a horse—e.g. by seeing or touching it—
our intellect identifies its immaterial truth (called the horse’s imaginal truth), establishes a 
 
137 It should be noted, however, that ‘Allāma does not believe that there is an entity in the imaginal world 
corresponding to every entity in the material world. Indeed, he suggests that there is an imaginal entity in the 
imaginal world in which the imaginal truth of all entities in the material world exists (in a simple unified way), 
and it is through contact with this entity that the human soul can acquire knowledge to the extent of its capacity. 
In other words, unlike Mullā Ṣadrā, Peripatetic philosophers, and Illuminationists, ‘Allāma does not endorse 
latitudinal multiplicity (al-kathrat al-‘arḍiyya) in the intellectual world, which is also conceived in terms of 
Platonic Forms, just as he rejects such multiplicity in the imaginal world. See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, pp. 250, 316, and 322-323. 
138 ‘Allāma offers a host of arguments for immateriality of knowledge, considering objections to them, and 
replying to the objections. For more, see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i 
Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), third article. 
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relation of unity with that truth, and as a consequence of such unity, our intellect finds the truth 
present to it. This presence is of a kind known as knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-ḥuḍūrī). 
Let me explicate knowledge by presence at this point. Following many other philosophers, 
such as Mullā Ṣadra,139 ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī classifies knowledge into knowledge by presence 
and knowledge by acquisition (al-‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī). Knowledge by presence consists in the 
presence of an immaterial entity to another immaterial entity.140 In this definition, the first 
immaterial entity refers to imaginal or intellectual truths, and the second refers to the human 
soul, or more precisely speaking, to the human intellect, which is immaterial in ‘Allāma’s view. 
When there is a relation of unity between the human intellect and (imaginal or intellectual) 
truths, the human soul finds the latter present to it, and from this presence, it gleans an epistemic 
form which is known as knowledge by acquisition. As a matter of fact, all quiddity-based 
concepts we have in our minds—such as apple, horse, human, etc.—are of this kind. We might 
be able to have a better understanding of the difference between knowledge by presence and 
knowledge by acquisition if we consider the example of love or hatred. We can introspect the 
existence of love inside us, where love is according to ‘Allāma’s philosophy an immaterial 
entity. Notwithstanding this, the existence of love inside us is one thing and the concept we 
have constructed for love in our minds is another. The former is present to our soul and the 
latter is gleaned by our minds from this entity (love). 
There is another issue that we need to discuss so as to shed more light on ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s 
account of how knowledge by presence is obtained: unity of knowledge, the knower, and the 
known, or unity of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected. The problem of such unity might 
arise only if all the above assumptions are endorsed. This is a problem over which ‘Allāma 
disagrees with Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: the disagreement is not limited to the 
claim itself; it extends to the philosophical argument for it as well. 
In order to be in a position to articulate the difference between ‘Allāma’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
views, we need to consider eight preliminaries. Among the many objections levelled by 
‘Allāma against Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles and views regarding unity of knowledge, the knower, 
and the known, two are more crucial than others. One is an objection to the principle of 
correlation (aṣl al-taḍāyuf), on which Mullā Ṣadrā draws to support his claim, and the other is 
 
139 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn al-Shīrāzī, 1989, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfar al-‘Aqliyyat 
al-Arba‘a (with ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentaries), Qum: Maktabat al-Mustafawi, vol. 8, p. 47. 




an objection to how knowledge is obtained by the soul. In the following preliminaries, I point 
to these two objections as well as ‘Allāma’s argument for unity of intellect, the intellector, and 
the intellected. I will summarize the points in the end. 
1. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, every entity in this world has three kinds of existence: in the 
material world, in the imaginal world, and in the intellectual world, although matter does not 
exist in the imaginal world and only material effects, such as colors and shapes, exist there, and 
in the intellectual world, we have archetypes or lords of species (arbāb al-anwā‘), such as the 
human type, the horse type, etc. In other words, we have both multiplicity of types and 
multiplicity of individuals under those types in the imaginal world, whereas we have only 
multiplicity of types in the intellectual world. 141  ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī rejects latitudinal 
multiplicity in imaginal and intellectual worlds.142 He believes in longitudinal multiplicity in 
the sense that every intellectual being is the cause of the existence of, and existentially higher 
than, another intellectual being. 
2. Whatever is the case in unity of knowledge, the knower, and the known is more or less true 
of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected as well, because according to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 
intellect is existentially unified with knowledge, as is the intellector with the knower and the 
intellected with the known. The only difference between them lies in relative respects in which 
they are true of something, which is immaterial to our present discussion. 
3. Unity is broader than identity. Identity amounts to self-sameness and existential oneness. 
Unity might mean identity (self-sameness) or a mode of existential relation which is regarded 
by ‘Allāma as illuminational. 143  ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes that there is identity (self-
sameness in existence) between knowledge and the known, while there is unity between the 
knower and the known.144 He sees the union between the knower and the known as that of an 
attribute and the attributed in the sense that the attribute becomes a degree of the existence of 
the attributed once it is attached to it; the knower and the known do not become one in all of 
 
141 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Shīrāzī, 1989, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfar al-‘Aqliyyat 
al-Arba‘a (with ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentaries), Qum: Maktabat al-Mustafawi, vol. 3, p. 506. 
142 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, 
pp. 315-321. 
143 See Kamal Haydari, 2010, Sharḥ Nihāyat al-Ḥikma: al-‘Aql wa-l-‘Āqil wa-l-Ma‘qūl, Qum: Dar Faraqud, p. 
126. 




their degrees. Therefore, he rejects unificational combination in the sense of intellect, the 
intellector, and the intellected being identical.145 
‘Allāma maintains that this type of unity results in a graded existence with a strong degree 
(reality or ḥaqīqa) and a diluted degree of existence (raqīqa). 
4. When ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī talks about the relation between the truths of the imaginal world 
and those of the intellectual world, he talks about two types of relations indeed: (A) an 
illuminational relation, where the human soul makes contact with an imaginal or intellectual 
truth, participating of the manifestations of that truth to the extent of its capacity. In this type 
of relation, knowledge is acquired, although it might not encompass all features and properties 
of the imaginal or intellectual entity. There is no relation of identity in this illuminational 
relation. There is, instead, a relation of unity in the sense that two entities are involved here—
one at a lower degree and the other at a higher degree—and they are in a relation with one 
another. More on this in 4 below. (B) When the human soul grows and begins to move in the 
so-called “arc of ascent” (qaws al-ṣu‘ūd), it can achieve full-fledged immateriality. This takes 
place when administration of physical aspects does not preclude its growth and does not distract 
it. In this case, the human soul can make contact with imaginal and intellectual truths. This 
unity is an instance of identity, because ‘Allāma endorses the principle that “from one, no more 
than one can issue forth” (al-wāḥid la yaṣdur ‘anhu illa-l-wāḥid)—that is, only one effect can 
be caused by a perfect cause—and there is no latitudinal multiplicity in longitudinal degrees of 
the existential hierarchy (except in the material world), because every degree is an effect of the 
higher degrees, and in each degree there is but one existing entity. Now when the human soul 
evolves and passes through the degrees of imaginal and intellectual worlds, it will be unified 
with the truths of the relevant degrees at each stage of its development, because only one entity 
might exist at each degree. 
5. This preliminary point is about knowledge of entities in the intellectual world. The 
intellectual world is the cause of the existence of the imaginal world, and the imaginal world 
is, in turn, the cause of the existence of the material world. Unity of intellect, the intellector, 
and the intellected is acquired by two groups of human beings, albeit in different ways. To 
illustrate, the human soul is immaterial in its essence and material in its action in the sense that 
it needs to deploy the body to perform its actions. According to ‘Allāma, for such a soul, unity 
 
145 See ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentary on al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-‘Aqliyyat al-Arba‘a, Qum: 
Maktabat al-Mustafawī, vol. 3, pp. 313 and 319. 
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of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected obtains only with respect to its knowledge of its 
own self. In order for it to know other intellectual immaterial entities, it has to actualize its 
peculiar intellectual faculty. The more it actualizes this faculty, the more it can have contact 
with intellectual immaterial entities in the intellectual world.146 The second group are those 
who have actualized the peculiar intellectual faculty and achieved the degree of full-fledged 
immateriality (in both essence and action). (This is the idea I have alluded to in 4.) In the case 
of these people, unity of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected is fully the case. In other 
words, they have condensed (ijmālī) knowledge of all intelligibles as a result of the unity of 
intellect, the intellector, and the intellected. This degree of intellect which can be acquired by 
an individual is that of the acquired intellect mentioned by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī as a view 
advocated by others.147 
6. According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, all epistemic forms acquired by the human being are either 
particular (of a sensory or imaginal kind) or intellectual (i.e. universal). The forms are derived 
from knowledge by presence acquired in virtue of the soul’s relation with immaterial entities. 
Particular forms are acquired by the human being in virtue of the soul’s relation with an 
imaginal entity in which the truth of all material entities lies, and intellectual (universal) forms 
are acquired in virtue of the soul’s relation with an intellectual entity in the intellectual world 
(or different intellectual entities in the intellectual world standing in longitudinal relations to 
one another). The intellectual entity—an intellectual immaterial substance—has the lowest 
existential degree in the hierarchy of the intellectual world. In other words, the closest entity in 
this world to the imaginal world, and consequently to the human soul, is this intellectual 
substance, referred to by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Mullā Ṣadrā, Illuminationists, and Peripatetic 
philosophers, as the Active Intellect. In the intellectual world, there are different intellectual 
entities standing in longitudinal relations to one another—some being higher than, and causes 
of, others—and the hierarchy begins from the First Emanation (al-Ṣādir al-Awwal), also known 
as the First Intellect,148 and ending in the Active Intellect, which is the lowest entity in the 
intellectual world. The main point of disagreement between Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī lies in how they account for the relation between the soul and this intellectual entity 
for purposes of gaining intellectual knowledge. Although they focus the debate on knowledge 
 
146 See: Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn al-Shīrāzī, 1989, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-
‘Aqliyyat al-Arba‘a (with ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s commentaries), Qum: Maktabat al-Mustafawi, vol. 3, p. 319. 
147 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘ah al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, p. 
216. 
148 Ibid., p. 316. 
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of entities in the intellectual world, it seems that a similar issue can arise, mutatis mutandis, as 
to how the soul is related with imaginal entities to gain particular pieces of knowledge. The 
disagreement can be summarized as follows: first, according to ‘Allāma, for the soul to gain 
knowledge from the Active Intellect, it suffices for it to be unified therewith, whereas Mullā 
Ṣadrā requires an identity between the soul and the Active Intellect for acquisition of 
intellectual knowledge, maintaining that unity is not sufficient. Second, according to ‘Allāma, 
in order for the soul to gain universal intellectual concepts, such as the human and the horse, it 
needs to make contact with an entity, whereas Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul makes contact 
with lords of species (or archetypes) existing in the intellectual world at the stage of the Active 
Intellect. 
7. One objection raised by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī against Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the soul’s unity 
with intelligibles can be articulated as follows: an intellectual immaterial entity is a substance, 
and a substance does not depend on anything else for its existence—it is self-subsisting indeed. 
Since intellectual entities perceive their own selves, they are both intellectors and intellected. 
Now if we say that the human soul—which, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, depends on something 
else for its existence (because of its relation with the body)—has a relation of unity with an 
intelligible which is an intellectual immaterial entity, it will follow that the intelligible as a self-
standing substance be identical with the soul as a dependent entity, which is impossible. For 
dependence on something else is essential to the soul, and essential properties of things never 
change. Therefore, the soul can never turn into a self-subsisting substance. 
8. Mullā Ṣadrā accounts for the identity in question in terms of correlation (taḍāyuf).149 In his 
view, although two correlated concepts, such as Father and Son, are distinct from one another, 
they can nevertheless be identical. Thus, when the human intellect is unified with the Active 
Intellect, the unity is, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, a matter of the unity of two correlated concepts. 
As a result of this unity, intellect, the intellector, and the intellected—all of which are 
presumably immaterial—will be identical with one another. For when intellect finds the 
intellected present to it, it means that it is unified with the intellected, and since intellect is the 
highest degree of the soul’s existence, and the soul (the intellector) is immaterial, intellect, the 
intlellector, and the intellected will be unified. The same is true of knowledge, the knower, and 
the known. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī raises an objection to this argument by Mullā Ṣadrā in his 
commentaries on al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-‘Aqliyyat al-Arba‘a: mutual 
 
149 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, 1981, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-Asfār al-‘Aqliyyat al-
Arba‘a, Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath, vol. 3, p. 315. 
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exclusiveness of two correlated entities is essential to them—it is impossible for them to be 
compatible. ‘Allāma’s argument for unity of intellect, the intellector, and the intellected in his 
Nihāyat al-Ḥikma is based on three principles: the principle that from one, only one can issue 
forth, the principle of gradation of existence, and the principle of unity of the attribute-giver 
and the attributed (ittiḥād al-nā‘it wa-l-man‘ūt). According to the principle of gradation, 
existence has different degrees of varying strength and weakness, where higher degrees are 
causes of lower degrees. When the human soul makes contact with an imaginal or intellectual 
truth of something, their relation will be in accordance with this causal principle, on which 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī draws in the principle of the attribute-giver and the attributed. The 
attribution framework is grounded in the fact that since the imaginal or intellectual truth has a 
stronger existence than the human soul, its relation of unity (or illuminational relation) with 
the human soul (or intellect) will be graded; that is, one (the attribute-giver) gives existence 
(that is, knowledge), and the other (the attributed) receives knowledge as an attribute—this 
piece of knowledge is accrued by the attribute-giver as a degree of its existence, rather than 
something accidental to the essence of the attribute-giver (that is, the soul).150 
‘Allāma’s objection to Mullā Ṣadrā seems plausible, firstly because even Mullā Ṣadrā himself 
implies in other parts of his al-Asfār that two correlated entities are essentially incompatible, 
and in his footnotes to those parts, ‘Allāma endorses Mullā Ṣadrā’s view,151 and secondly, 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is careful to take the difference between “identity” and “unity” into account. 
Identity is self-sameness—all existential degrees of an entity is just the same as all or some 
existential degrees of another entity such that it is not possible to talk about two things—in fact, 
only one thing exists. In unity, however, although there is an existential relation between the 
two things, their distinctness is still preserved in terms of gradation. In other words, when two 
things are unified, one of them will be a strong existence and the other a weak existence in 
continuity with the strong existence. In Islamic philosophical jargons, one becomes diluted 
(raqīqa) and the other becomes reality (ḥaqīqa) or thick (shadīda).152  This is, in fact, an 
objection to the theory of latitudinal multiplicity in intellectual and imaginal worlds, which is 
 
150 ‘Allāma believes that the existence of the attribute-giver is unified with that of the attributed; that is, the latter’s 
existence is not a degree of the former’s, regardless of whether the attribute-giver and the attributed are one and 
the same thing, such as the soul’s knowledge of itself, or they are distinct, albeit the attributed is present at the 
stage at which the attribute-giver exists, such as an effect’s knowledge of its cause, and vice versa. 
151 In a footnote in vol. 3, p. 355, ‘Allāma says that what Mullā Ṣadrā has said is true, making it explicit that in 
cases of correlation, the two terms are incompatible, whereas in his discussion of unity of intellect, the intellector, 
and the intellected, Mullā Ṣadrā’s words seem at odds with what he says here. 
152 See: Sayyid Muḥammad ḤusaynṬabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘ah al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, 
11th stage, chapter two. 
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endorsed by Mullā Ṣadrā and rejected by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Moreover, it involves 
philosophical impossibility of the soul’s transformation from a dependent existence to a self-
subsisting substance, as pointed out before. 
On this account, the human soul comes to have a relation of unification (or illumination) with 
different imaginal or intellectual entities in the course of its development, finding them present 
to it (the same kinds of presence as that of a cause to its effect). And from this knowledge by 
presence, it constructs particular, and then universal, mental images, which amounts to 
knowledge by acquisition. 
Most of what I have said in this section was concerned with knowledge acquired by the human 
being in virtue of its unification with the truths in imaginal and intellectual worlds. In particular, 
I did not talk about knowledge acquired by the human being in the intellectual world. To have 
a better understanding of ‘Allāma’s view of the matter, let us take note of a classification of 
the means for knowledge acquisition. In a general classification, ‘Allāma discusses two means 
for knowledge acquisition—or more precisely speaking, a means and a freedom from 
deploying the means: 
1. Knowledge acquired via the five senses: according to ‘Allāma, all knowledge acquired by 
human beings (except knowledge pertaining to the intellectual world) is acquired via direct or 
indirect involvement of senses, regardless of whether the knowledge in question is particular 
or involves universal concepts and regardless of whether the universal concepts count as logical 
secondary intelligibles (al-ma‘qūlāt al-thāniya), such as the concept of the human, the horse, 
and the apple, or philosophical secondary intelligibles, such as the concepts of existence, unity, 
cause, and effect, and regardless of whether they are real entities such as the animal and the 
tree or constructed entities such as ownership and headship. In ‘Allāma’s view, humans and 
animals are capable of perceiving such concepts, although the animal perception of some of 
these concepts are characteristically weaker than the human perception. 153  All knowledge 
people have concerning themselves as well as their surrounding objects and entities fall within 
this category. That is to say, all empirical and human sciences are included here. 
 
153 ‘Allāma seems to believe that animals are incapable of perceiving certain constructed concepts. He argues for 
this claim as follows: animals do not deploy one another in their social lives, their lives being simple and primitive 
in this respect. However, the human mind construes other human beings as metaphorical parts of its own existence 
and treats them as its active existential faculties with which it can meet its needs. This is the principle concerning 




2. Knowledge that can be acquired by intellect in virtue of its inattention, or low attention, to 
the weaker dimension of the human existence (that is, the human body and the imaginal degree 
of the human existence that is directed at the material world): this type of knowledge can be 
acquired by intellect in that the truths of the intellectual world can be acquired by human beings 
only if they have actualized their peculiar intellectual faculties and have access to the 
intellectual world. As a matter of fact, when this peculiar faculty begins to be actualized, the 
human soul is admitted to the intellectual world, and as this peculiar faculty develops more and 
more, the soul achieves higher degrees of the intellectual world. This is a world of pure 
immateriality, whereas the imaginal world is semi-immaterial—the multiplicity that exists in 
the imaginal world does not exist in this world. In the imaginal world, although imaginal 
entities are detached from matter, they still display certain effects of matter, such as colors and 
shapes, while entities in the intellectual world are free from such modifications. Therefore, the 
multiplicity that exists in virtue of different colors, shapes, and times cannot be found in 
inhabitants of the intellectual world.154 In fact, there is no potentiality or disposition in the 
intellectual world that might be actualized—whatever there is in this world is pure actuality.155 
It should be noted that the intellectual world has within itself a variety of degrees, just like the 
imaginal and material worlds. The more actualized the human peculiar intellectual faculty 
becomes, the higher degrees of the intellectual world it can have access to. 
3.5.4. Kinds of Intellect in terms of its Functions in Various Sciences 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s classification of intellect with regard to its functions in different sciences 
is scattered hither and thither in his work. The best summary of this classification is provided 
by one of his prominent students, Ayatullah Javādī Āmulī, who is greatly influenced by 
‘Allāma in his mystical, philosophical, and exegetical positions. In his book, Manzilat-i ‘Aql 
dar Hindisi-yi Ma‘rifat-i Dīnī [The Status of Intellect in the Geometry of Religious 
Knowledge], 156  he enumerates four types of intellect in this regard based on ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view of intellect’s functions in different sciences: 
1. Pure abstractive (tajrīdī) intellect: one that is deployed in theoretical arguments in 
philosophy and theology. 
 
154 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1994, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘ah al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, p. 
281. 
155 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn, 1994, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at 
al-Mudarrisīn Publishers, p. 142. 




2. Empirical intellect: one that is deployed in empirical and human sciences. 
3. Semi-abstractive intellect: one that is deployed in mathematics. 
4. Pure intellect: one that is deployed in theoretical mysticism. 
These types of intellectual knowledge that are deployed in various sciences are matters of 
assent (taṣdīq), rather than conceptions (taṣawwur), because philosophy undertakes the rational 
proof of the existence of subject-matters of these sciences. Now in order to provide a 
comprehensive classification of intellect in ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view, we need to reflect upon 
the first category of intellect in Ayatullah Javādī’s classification above—abstractive intellect—
and divide it in turn to its own subcategories—as pointed out before. Moreover, as Ayatullah 
Javādī makes it explicit in his book, the classification is concerned with certainty-conferring 
sciences—those that provide us with epistemic confidence—rather than probabilistic sciences. 
These are not objections to Ayatullah Javādī Āmulī’s classification, because for one thing, he 
notes these limitations in his classification, and for another, the purpose of this classification is 
different from that of other classifications—for example, it is not ontological. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Following a number of Islamic philosophers such as Mullā Ṣadrā, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes 
reason to be immaterial and to be the highest degree of the human existence, which perceives 
the human existence as well as entities external to the human existence. In conformity with 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical school, he classifies knowledge into knowledge by presence and 
knowledge by acquisition, believing that all knowledge goes back to knowledge by presence 
in the sense that in order for human reason to know something is for it to be unified with the 
imaginal reality of the material thing in one way or another, and it is in virtue of this unification 
that it finds the imaginal reality within itself, and this is what he refers to as knowledge by 
presence. Having considered the types of knowledge gained by human beings, ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī shows that there are worlds other than the material world, which are known in the 
language of Islamic philosophy as imaginal and intellectual worlds. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
believes that human reason or intellect has various degrees which might be actualized, goes 
beyond the imaginal world, and then be identified with the realities of the intellectual world. 
Furthermore, in some of his works such as “The essay on monotheism”, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
admits that the human intellect can arrive at, and become unified with, the stage of divine 
names and attributes (which, in Islamic mysticism, corresponds to the highest degree of reason 
in Islamic philosophy). In the next chapter we shall address the question of how the human 
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being (human reason) and different degrees of divine manifestation are related—a question 




4. Intuition157 (Shuhūd) and Revelation (waḥy) 
This chapter has two sections: intuition (shuhụd) and revelation (waḥy). I begin with an 
overview and consideration of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s theory of intuition, and then his definition 
and characterization of revelation. 
4.1. Intuition 
In this section, I address ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s elaborate discussion of intuition, its domain, and 
its features. The problem of intuition falls within the scope of mysticism. For this reason, before 
embarking upon a definition and characterization of intuition, a few remarks about ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s practical mysticism are in order. 
 
4.1.1. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Practical Mysticism 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was an author and expert in theoretical as well as practical mysticism. 
According to his students, he was engaged in mystical practices and journeys. As to theoretical 
mysticism, he wrote two essays under “Risāla Muḥākamāt” and “Risālat al-Wilāya.” In the 
latter essay, he presents some of his particular views. And as to practical mysticism, he was a 
student of Ḥājj Sayyid ‘Alī Āqā Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabā’ī (1869-1974)—an outstanding Shiite mystic 
who displayed many supernatural acts—keeping his company in Najaf for ten years.158 ‘Allāma 
says the following about his relations with Ḥājj Sayyid ‘Alī Āqā Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabā’ī: 
In 1304 SH (1925) when I was honored to move to Najaf for education, on the first days 
of my visit and before attending any lectures, I was sitting at home, thinking about my 
future. Suddenly, there was a knock on the door. I opened the door and I saw a great 
scholar who greeted me and entered the house. He sat in the room and welcomed me. 
This scholar had an attractive, bright face. He began to talk to me and got acquainted 
with me, and in his talks, he told me: “people who come to Najaf to study had better 
think of their own refinement and perfection along with their education; they should 
not be oblivious to their souls.” He said this and left the house. His words infatuated 
 
157 The word “shuhūd” in Arabic comes from the root “sh-h-d,” which means witnessing, seeing, and directly 
experiencing something. In mystical terminology, the word has found a specific albeit relevant use, referring to 
direct mystical knowledge of hidden realms. In English, a variety of terms were used as equivalents of the mystical 
sense of “shuhūd”: apprehension, witnessing, vision, and intuition. I have refused to use “apprehension” for 
shuhūd, because it implies knowledge by acquisition (understanding), rather than knowledge by presence 
associated with shuhūd. Moreover, I set aside “witnessing” and “vision” because, although they imply immediate 
experience, they cannot be easily inflected as adjectives and/or verbs. In English, “intuition” means direct 
experience of something, and it can be inflected as an adjective (“intuitive”) as well as a verb (“intuit”). Moreover, 
in English, the term “mystical intuition” is already used to refer to an experience closely related with what Muslim 
intellectuals mean by shuhūd. Taken together, these considerations led me to use “intuition” for shuhūd. 
158 See Shaykh Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī, Ṭabaqāt A‘lām al-Shī‘a, Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, pp. 87-88. 
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me, and eventually, he let me know his curricula. As long as I was in Najaf, I kept his 
company.159 
Ayatullah Subḥānī quotes Ayatullah Muṭahharī about ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s mysticism: “His 
Excellency Mr. Ṭabāṭabā’ī is at the degree of intermediary immateriality [or detachment] as 
far as his spiritualperfections are concerned. He can see hidden forms which cannot be seen by 
ordinary people.”160 There are anecdotes about ‘Allāma’s mystical intuitions. For example, 
Ayatullah Subḥānī says: “when he trusted people around him, he recounted certain stories, 
‘unveiling’ (mukāshafāt) so to speak, in a vague fashion and with his characteristic reticence. 
Thus, one day he said, ‘when I was in Najaf, one day after performing my Morning Prayer on 
my house’s roof, Prophet Idris appeared before me, talking with my late brother Mr. Ḥājj 
Sayyid Ḥasan Ilāhī, and I understood his words through my brother’s talk.’ He recounted many 
such stories in proper assemblies.”161 Ayatullah Javādī Āmulī, a close student of ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, says in a book about ‘Allāma and his practices called Shams al-Waḥy-i Tabrīzī that, 
just like some prominent mystics, ‘Allāma divided the travelers of God’s path into four groups: 
“perfectly attracted,” “pure traveler (Sālik),” “traveling attracted,” and “attracted traveler.” 
Ayatullah Javādī believes that, based on his autobiography, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was an 
attracted traveler: those who begin by going on a mystical journey, traveling the path with toil 
and struggle, and during their journey, they are suddenly endowed with the spark of Divine 
love, which enlightens their souls. They travel the rest of the path with the divine attraction 
(jadhba).162 
4.1.2. Intuition (Shuḥūd) from the viewpoint of ‘Allāma 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī considers intuition, along with intellect and the revelation, as instruments 
for knowledge acquisition, specifically deployed in Islamic mysticism.163 In his view, intuition 
is in fact knowledge by presence, which is defined as the “presence of an immaterial entity—
one detached from matter—to an immaterial entity.”164 A careful consideration of ‘Allāma’s 
 
159 A group of writers, 1984, Duvvumīn Yādnāmi-yi ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Tehran: Anjuman-i Islamī Ḥikmat wa 
Falsafiye Iran, pp. 295-296. 
160 A group of writers, 1982, Yādnāmi-yi Mufassir-i Kabīr, Qum: Shafaq, p 59-62. 
161 Ibid. 
162  ‘Abd Allāh Javādī Āmulī, Shams al-Waḥy-i Tabrīzī, Sīri-yi ‘Ilmī-yi ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Qum: ’Isrā’ 
Publishers, p. 301. 
163 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2008, Risālat-i Tashayyu‘ dar dunyā-yi Imrūz, Qum: Bustan-i Kitab, 
p. 101. 
164 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī 
Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 6, p. 171. Also see Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1941, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: 
Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 25. 
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words reveals that although he regards knowledge of, say, love or hatred inside us as cases of 
knowledge by presence, he uses the term, “shuhūd” (intuition), in a particular sense. In some 
of his writings, he refers to two types of intuitions: intuition of the exterior and intuition of the 
interior.165 Intuition of the exterior has the hidden world as its object. The hidden world is a 
religious term frequently used in the Qur’an,166 referring to truths that are normally hidden from 
humans—in normal conditions, that is, they do not observe such truths.167 Moreover, ‘Allāma 
divides the hidden into two categories: absolute and relative. Drawing on Qur’anic verses and 
philosophical exegeses, he suggests that all events of the material world—which are confined 
to time and place—exist in the divine treasure in a vague and undetermined way. To this kind 
of the hidden, which is not present in the realm of the intuition, ‘Allāma refers as the absolute 
hidden, and what lies outside this treasure of knowledge is called the “relative hidden” as long 
as it is not intuited by someone, because it is not visible and apparent to that person or other 
individuals.168 
In his philosophical textbooks, that is Bidāyat al-Ḥikma and Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, as well as his 
Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī does not draw on what is known via 
intuition in the proper sense as materials or presuppositions of his discussions. More 
interestingly, he has never used the term, “intuition,” in his philosophical textbooks. This is 
because he is strongly committed to the demarcation of sciences and disciplines, and since, in 
Islamic philosophy, intellect is deployed as the only instrument for knowledge acquisition, 
discoveries of interior intuitions are never deployed in philosophy as premises of arguments. It 
should be noted, however, that Islamic wisdom—also known as Transcendent Wisdom (al-
Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya)—involves considerations and comparisons of what is discovered by 
intellect, intuition, and the revelation. The philosophical school of Transcendental Wisdom, 
founded by Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, has done its utmost to reconcile intellect, intuition, and the 
revelation by deploying philosophical arguments. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī counts as a follower of 
this philosophical school.169 
 
165 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vo. 7, p. 126. 
166 For instance, see: 2:3; 3:179; 6:50; 6:73; 7:188. 
167 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 7, p. 125. 
168 Ibid, pp. 125-126. 
169 It should be noted that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s discussions in his commentaries on al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliya fi-l-
Asfār al-Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya were based on Islamic wisdom, rather than Peripatetic philosophy. This is why, they 
involve a great deal of reference to intuition and intuitive knowledge. 
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Since ‘Allāma identifies the reality of intuition as a kind of knowledge by presence, what I said 
about knowledge by presence applies to intuition as well. And since ‘Allāma has considered 
the nature of knowledge, and in particular knowledge by presence, with a philosophical method 
and largely under issues of intellect, I followed suit and discussed issues of the nature of 
knowledge by presence and intuition under my discussion of intellect. This section of the 
dissertation is a supplement to the discussion of intuition, focusing on the scope of intuition, 
its quality, divine and human intuitions, and the object of intuition in ‘Allāma’s view. It should 
be noted that this dissertation aims to consider the relation between intellect, intuition, and the 
revelation, and discussions of each of these are just preliminaries to ‘Allāma’s account of how 
the three are related. A full-blown discussion of these phenomena that do justice to them 
requires an independent research which will certainly go beyond three volumes. 
4.1.3. The Scope of Intuition 
Sometimes in his al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma refers to another faculty, in addition to intellect, by means 
of which exterior and interior intuitions take place: fu’ād. The word, “fu’ād” (literally, heart), 
has occurred five times in the Qur’an, and in at least three of these cases, it is used to refer to 
what perceives the truths.  ‘Allāma delineates the difference between knowledge by acquisition 
and knowledge by presence (intuitive knowledge)—obtained by heart—through vision. In his 
view, what we acquire via vision (seeing with our eyes) as well as imaginative forms and 
thoughts we entertain based on our vision are different from vision. The difference between 
intuition170 and knowledge by acquisition can be discerned from that of “our knowledge of our 
visual ability” and “what we see with our eyes”—the former is acquired through our heart and 
our knowledge by presence of our soul and the latter is acquired with the mediation of our 
eyes.171 
 
170  The word shuhūd literally means to see or observe something, and in philosophical jargons as used by ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī it is defined as the presence of an immaterial entity before another immaterial entity, as explained 
before. To rule out the idea that by shuhūd mystics might mean observation with physical eyes, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī 
writes in his “Risālat al-wilāya”: “Those believing in vision and intuition do not mean vision with eyes and sensory 
intuition. Instead, they believe in another type of intuition, which consists in a contingent being intuiting its 
poverty, need, and the dependence of its essence, and the pure richness of its creator and inventor with all its 
contingent existence, rather than with its sensory eyes, or at the stage of its mind and thought. This has been 
established by rational arguments and evidenced by appearances of the Book [i.e. the Qur’an] and the Tradition. 
In fact, rational arguments imply that it is impossible for a contingent being to lack such an intuition, and what is 
desired is knowledge of the intuition, rather than the necessary intuition itself, which is knowledge by presence.” 
(Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 25) 
171 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 6, p. 171. Also see: ibid, vol. 19, pp. 29-30. 
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According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, intuition is first developed in humans since childhood when 
they gain knowledge by presence of their own existence as well as the existence of their 
faculties. Moreover, he maintains that humans can intuit the truths of imaginal and intellectual 
worlds, as pointed out in philosophical and Transcendental discussions in the chapter on 
intellect. When ‘Allāma provides mystical discussions of mystical issues, he also talks about 
the possibility of acquiring knowledge of another world (other than imaginal and intellectual 
worlds), known as the world of divine names and attributes. In none of his work does he explain 
why he does not discuss knowledge of the truths in this world under issues of intellect. However, 
the reason seems to be that, unlike Mullā Ṣadrā, ‘Allāma does not see knowledge by presence 
of intelligibles in imaginal and intellectual worlds as contingent upon existential expansion and 
the obtaining of existential degrees of these two worlds. Instead, he believes that, depending 
on their spiritual power, people can gain knowledge of certain respects of these truths, via an 
illuminational unification with these truths—such knowledge can, indeed, be gained by 
humans. In other words, the origin of ‘Allāma’s discussion of these issues was the fact that 
humans typically have three kinds of knowledge; that is, material and imaginal forms as well 
as intellectual concepts. From the existence of these three kinds of knowledge, ‘Allāma argues 
for the existence of three worlds: material, imaginal, and intellectual. Notwithstanding this, he 
does not deploy this argument in order to prove the world of divine names and attributes. 
Instead, he begins by a proof of God’s existence, whereby he demonstratively argues for the 
existence of the world of divine names and attributes.172 Taken together, these points lead us to 
the conclusion that knowledge by presence of this world is taken by ‘Allāma as restricted to 
those who have reached the world in the course of their spiritual development and have had a 
particular relation—that of “annihilation”—with the names and attributes. This particular way 
of relatedness will be elaborated in the next section. 
4.1.4. Intuition of one’s own self and God 
In this section, I provide answers to two questions: (1) what is the relation between the soul 
and the world of divine names and attributes, and how does it differ from Mullā Ṣadrā’s relation 
of unification (or identity) concerning our knowledge of entities in the intellectual world and 
the illuminational relation maintained by ‘Allāma? And (2) is any knowledge of God’s 
attributes contingent upon having this particular relation? 
 
172 For more on how he proves the world of divine names and attributes, see his essays, “al-Tawḥīd” and “Asmā’ 
Allāh” in his al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya. Note that the world of divine names and attributes involves various 
degrees, in turn. 
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As pointed out before, ‘Allāma believes that any knowledge by acquisition (encompassing all 
our mental ideas and concepts) is originated and derived from some knowledge by presence—
in fact, without knowledge by presence, no knowledge by acquisition can be obtained of any 
truth in the world.173 ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī claims that his answer to these two questions in his 
“Risālat al-Wilāya” is innovative and not found in other works of his.174 
For a more lucid portrait of these answers, I will address ‘Allāma’s answer to the second 
question first. The answer rests upon the concepts of “absolute truth” and “nonexistential 
constraints (al-quyūd al-‘adamiyya) or quiddities (māhiyyāt).” I will elaborate this within the 
following premises: 
1. Following Mullā Ṣadrā, ‘Allāma believes in the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd),175 
unlike Mullā Ṣadrā, he sees quiddities as nonexistential and abstract things that can be imagined 
contingently upon the existence of an existent.176 According to the primacy of existence, what 
exists is just “existence.” Alternatively put, what is real is existence. 
2. God is a self-contained and absolute existent, from Whom other existents derive their 
existence. This is to say that other existents do have reality.177 When we have a glance at the 
whole world of existence, we see the reality. Existence exists or any existent is existence, so to 
speak.178 
3. The reality spreads throughout the world, but when restricted by nonexistential constraints, 
it becomes specified, and the specification is the same as individuation, which individuates 
every human being and discriminates them from one another. In fact, these nonexistential 
constraints are limits that specify the extent of reality possessed by every existent. 
 
173 See: ‘Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jami‘at al-Mudarrisin Publishers, 
p. 237. Also see Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: Shirkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), vol. 1, pp. 189-
191. 
174 What is cited here is part of arguments presented by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī on pages 31-34 of his “Risālat al-
Wilāya.” Since his own articulation is highly succinct and based on other arguments he has offered in other works, 
I have sought to provide clarifications and implicit grounds of his argument. For the original argument see: Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 31-34. 
175 , Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’assisat al-Nu‘man, p. 6. 
Also see: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn, p. 9. 
176 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘at al-Mudarrisīn, p. 9. 
177 The proposition that God’s creatures have existence is a philosophical proposition. In Islamic mysticism, only 
God exists and the rest is just God’s manifestations. 
178 According to the principle of Islamic mysticism that existence is exclusive to God, the proposition that any 
existent is existence is true, where “existence” refers to God, and the proposition amounts to saying that what 
exists is God. From an Islamic philosophical perspective, particularly the Transcendental Wisdom, which sees 
everything other than God as relational (rābiṭ) existences, the proposition that existence exists is true and is 
tantamount to saying that God exists, remaining silent on other existents. 
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4. Since these constraints (quiddities) are nonexistential, hence nonexistent, every existent sees 
only the reality when it looks at itself, which is to say that every existent sees in it God’s 
attributes and perfection.179 
5. Depending on how much one’s nonexistential constraints are, the observation of (God’s) 
reality will be close to, or far from, the absolute perfection; that is, God. In ‘Allāma’s own 
words, “the Exalted God is the ultimate reality of every perfection. For He has all pure and 
unsullied perfection and beauty, and any existent’s proximity or closeness to Him is to the 
extent of its nonexistential constraints and limits.”180 
6. From these five premises, we can conclude that one’s knowledge by presence of one’s own 
self is one’s knowledge by presence of God’s attributes to the extent that one’s soul partakes 
existence (or reality). From this item of knowledge by presence, the human mind constructs 
knowledge by acquisition, conceiving divine attributes to the extent of its knowledge by 
presence. Therefore, given their knowledge by presence of existential perfections of their own 
souls, human beings can perceive divine attributes. In his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, 
‘Allāma suggests that we retain concepts of divine names and attributes in negative forms, 
which is how we can perceive these infinite and unlimited attributes. Thus, we say God is great, 
where the greatness is not of a type we know. In other words, He is great and His greatness has 
no limits or boundaries.181 
To recapitulate ‘Allāma’s view in “Risālat al-Wilāya” and Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm: 
of any perfective attribute we see in ourselves, we can say that God has the attribute. For every 
perfection is existence, and God is mere existence, and since our existence is bound with 
nonexistential limits, our perception of the reality of a perfection will be restricted by the 
attribute’s limits in our own selves. This is why we need to entertain attributes in a negative 
form, negating its nonexistential limits, before we can conceive it in an infinite way that is 
worthy of God’s status. 
 
179 ‘Allāma does not regard the intuition of a specified entity (a soul that is specified, individuated, and limited in 
virtue of its nonexistential limits) as different from that of the absolute. This means that when a person observes 
its limited existence, they see God’s existence which is pure and absolute, and therefore, they can observe their 
portion of existential reality in their own selves, because the existence they see has reality, and only existence has 
reality or primacy and it is impossible to see nonexistence (nonexistential limits). The reason for this is a 
philosophical argument to the effect that every specified (or constrained) entity is derived from an absolute entity. 
See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’assisat al-Nu‘mān, p. 
17. 
180 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, Risālat a-Wilāya, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 33. 
181 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Qum: Tehran: Shirkat-i 
Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), pp. 103-108. 
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Now in his answer to the first question, ‘Allāma says that every person has a specific perfection 
they move toward. The perfection is the degree from which the person was emanated during 
creation, and to which it shall return. The reality of every perfection is God in that He has all 
perfections and is exalted from any flaw and nonexistence.182 ‘Allāma notes that some people 
obtain such degree of spiritual development in virtue of their struggles toward God’s 
servitude—they reach and become related to the world of divine names and attributes. To such 
relation ‘Allāma refers as “annihilation” (fanā’). 183  ‘Allāma expounds the notion of 
annihilation as emancipation from the nonexistential constraints that grounded one’s 
individuation: the less individuation, the more annihilation and the greater manifestation of the 
absolute truth. The annihilation takes place without one’s immanence (ḥulūl) in, and unification 
(itīḥād) with, God as well as His names and attributes. While one is annihilated in God, they 
intuit their own conditions, seeing their own annihilation. There are three kinds of annihilation: 
annihilation in essence, annihilation in attributes, and annihilation in acts. Annihilation in 
essence means the intuition of the stage of Unicity; annihilation in attributes means the intuition 
of God's stage of Oneness; and annihilation in acts means the intuition of God's attributes of 
acts (or conative attributes), in the sense that the mystic observes that any action that is done 
only has God as its subject. ‘Allāma says the following about annihilation: “this position [i.e. 
annihilation] consists in the fact that one finds with his intuition that there is no essence, 
attribute, or act except by the Exalted God in a way that is worthy of the sanctity of His 
 
182 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 33. 
183  The term fanā’ (annihilation) was already used in Islamic mysticism, and ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī was by no means 
the first to use the term to explain the relation of close servants with God. His contribution here—which he says 
is novel—is his account of the relation between self-knowledge and annihilation in God. This is a complicated 
issue, falling outside of the scope of this dissertation, and I have just outlined the premise of his argument 
concerning the relation between self-knowledge and knowledge of God. Here is a summary of the argument: the 
reality is absolute. What we consider as determining factors with which we are discriminated from other beings 
are nonexistential quiddities (note that Mullā Ṣadrā does not believe that quiddities are nonexistential), and the 
more we are free from the nonexistential and figurative constraints we are entangled in, the more we find in 
ourselves the absolute reality and the unity of existence, and this existential expansion can reach a point which 
includes divine names and attributes as well. This is what mystics refer to as annihilation. Alternatively put, 
annihilation is to see God and to turn a blind eye to one’s nonexistential constraints by which we are individuated 
by using the word ‘I’ to refer to ourselves. In the final part of this discussion in his “Risālat al-wilāya”, ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī writes: “Thus, the genuine perfection of man is his attainment of his genuine perfection with respect 
to the essential and to essential accidents, or attainment of his final perfection with respect to ‘essence,’ ‘attribute,’ 
and ‘act,’ where the end is ‘essential,’ ‘attributive,’ and ‘conative’ annihilation in the exalted God, which is 
referred to as essential, nominal, and active monotheism. This is the stage at which one finds through intuition 
that there is no essence or attribute or act except for the exalted God in such a way that is deserved by His sacred 
realm, may His greatness be esteemed, and this occurs without leading to ‘immanence and unification,’ from both 
of which God is exalted. And this argument is a divine endowment exclusive to this essay. And thanks to God.” 




presence—may His greatness be glorified—without it leading to immanence (ḥulūl) and 
unification (itīḥād) from both of which God is exalted.” 
Therefore, knowledge of those who have reached the world of divine names and attributes and 
are annihilated therein, so to speak, is different from knowledge of other people, not in the 
strength or weakness of the knowledge or perception, but in the way they know.184 
4.1.5. The Object of Intuition (The Intuited) 
According to ‘Allāma, God has three stages: that of the essence and that of the names and 
attributes, to which I have been referring as the world of divine names and attributes, and that 
of the attributes of acts. The divine stage of names and attributes has two levels:185 the stage of 
Unicity and the stage of Oneness. The former is the first divine manifestation, and the latter is 
the manifestation of the stage of Unicity. Both are sometimes referred to as the stage of divine 
names and attributes, but in the language of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī the stage of Unicity is often 
called the stage of divine names and attributes. The stage of the essence has no token and 
conceptual specification (it has no limits and boundaries) and is pure from any relation with 
others. Any specification or relation should be considered as restricted to stages lower than the 
stage of the essence.186 Therefore, God’s essence cannot be intuited by any entity other than 
God Himself. Based on certain philosophical arguments as well as his exegesis of certain 
Qur’anic verses,187 ‘Allāma believes that God intuits His own essence, where such intuition is 
impossible for entities other than God. In his view, God is a pure existence having all existential 
perfections, and things other than God that are intuited are relational existences 188  which 
depend on God, or in mystical terms, are His manifestations. ‘Allāma refers to these relational 
existences sometimes as God’s lights.189 Since what exists is God or His manifestation, what is 
intuited by human beings is indeed God’s lights and manifestations diffused in different entities 
all of which depend on God for their existence. From this it follows that the object of intuition 
 
184 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1981, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 20. 
185 Although the stage of Attributes of Acts is also about the attributes of God, but because of its respective lower 
degree, is not usually included in the stage of Divine Names and Attributes in the writings of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 
rather he mentions it after the stage of Divine Names and Attributes.  
186 For more, see Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’assisat al-
Nu‘man, pp. 40-43. 
187 Such as verse 18 of Sura Al-i-‘Imran. 
188 For more about “relational existences (al-wujūdāt al-rābiṭa), see Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, 
Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, Qum: Jāmi‘ah al-Mudarrisīn, pp. 28-30. 
189 The Qur’an also characterizes God as the light of the skies and the earth (the Qur’an 24:35). 
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consists in divine perfections manifested in different entities, including humans.190 There are 
three points that should be noted here: 
First: When ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī engages in mystical issues and talks about intuitive findings 
of mystics as well as Quranic verses, he talks about four kinds of monotheism:191 (1) the stage 
of essence (essentialist monotheism): God’s absolute and limitless essence cannot be grasped 
by reason, and He is even exalted from the description that He is absolute. This is the stage 
referred to as lāhūt, which ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī characterizes as the stage of essence by citing 
evidence from certain hadiths and Quranic verses. His words in Risālat al-tawḥīd imply that 
although this is originally a mystical issue, he has managed to present a rational argument for 
it, claiming that a rational argument for this stage of monotheism is an exclusive characteristic 
of his theoretical mysticism. As to what has been done by philosophers before him, he says: 
“God, may His name be esteemed, is the essence involving all perfections and exalted from all 
imperfections, and all of His attributes are identical to His essence, and this is the heritage of 
earlier religions to which earlier prophets have called. This is what can be obtained from the 
teachings of divine philosophers of ancient Egypt, Greece, Iran, and other areas, and it is what 
has been elaborated by prominent Islamic philosophers, such as the Second Teacher Abū Naṣr 
Fārābī, and the head of intellectuals Bū ‘Alī Sīnā [Avicenna], and what Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn 
[Mullā Ṣadrā] sought in his work”.192 This stage of monotheism, as in the words of prominent 
thinkers such as Mullā Ṣadrā, is inferior to the stage of monotheism explained by ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī and referred to as the stage of essence; (2) the stage of Unicity (aḥadiyya): this is 
posterior to, and is in fact a manifestation of, the stage of essence. At this stage, all divine 
names and attributes have a dense manifestation. For instance, there is a power at this stage 
which is knowledge in that it is power, and there is knowledge which is life in that it is 
knowledge. All names and attributes are, at this stage, true of one another;193 (3) the stage of 
 
190 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’assisat al-Nu‘man, 
p. 29. 
191 ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī sees mysticism and philosophy along, rather than besides, each other in the sense that what 
is proved by arguments can be in line with mystical findings and account for them in philosophical terms, in which 
case there will be no contradiction between them. This is not to say, however, that whatever is intuited by a mystic 
can be argued for in philosophy. Instead, there are issues for which no philosophical argument can be adduced, 
including the problem of manifestation (tajallī) and connective or relational existence, where philosophers see 
everything but God as relational existences that only have a trace of existence, whereas mystics believe in the 
personal unity of existence, claiming that talk of existence of anything other than God is merely figurative in that 
things other than God are His manifestations. And manifestation is not a feature of existence, and so, it falls 
outside of the scope of philosophy. 
192 See Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1999, al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, Beirut: Mu’assisat al-Nu‘man, 
pp. 6-14. 
193 Ibid., p. 15. 
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Oneness (wāḥidiyya): this is posterior to the stage of Unicity. At this stage, divine names and 
attributes have independent manifestations. Here is a philosophical articulation of the 
difference between stages of Unicity and Oneness: “the stage of Oneness is the stage of God’s 
possession of perfections in the manner of token identity and conceptual plurality. This is 
contrasted to the stage of Unicity which is the stage of dense manifestation of perfections, 
without involving any conceptual plurality”;194 and (4) conative monotheism: it says that no 
action is done in the world which is not an act of God.195 
Second: What ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and others say about different stages of God’s existence 
does not mean that God has a number of stages within His essence. Rather, all this talk is 
relevant to God’s manifestations and appearances. On this account, when we talk about, say, 
the stage of Unicity, we mean the first and the highest stage of God’s manifestation. It should 
be noted that talk of God’s stages is a purely mystical issue, because talk of God’s 
manifestations and appearances is outside of the scope of philosophy. Philosophy is, indeed, 
concerned with existence and its general features, and when it comes to consideration of the 
relation between creatures and God’s essence, it treats the former as connective or relational 
existence (according, of course, to the Transcendent philosophy). That being the case, although 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī presents a rational argument for the stage of essential monotheism, it does 
not render the issue philosophical. His statement that philosophers from the Second Teacher to 
Mullā Ṣadrā have failed to adduce an argument for essential monotheism implies that 
mysticism is superior to philosophy in that it can provide an argument for the highest stage of 
monotheism. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī has gleaned the argument from Quranic verses and hadiths, 
or alternatively put, he cites supports for this from the Qur’an and hadiths in his al-Rasā’il al-
tawḥīdiyya. 
Third: What philosophers say about different realms of existence—which I have explained in 
the chapter on ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view of reason—has to do with the world of creatures, and 
all this counts as philosophical, rather than mystical, discussion. It has also been pointed out 
that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī raises a discursive (philosophical) argument for the existence of these 
realms by way of analysing mental concepts. On this account, different realms of the world of 
creatures and God’s stages in mystical issues should not be conflated. For instance, Platonic 
forms,196 which have been accepted by Mullā Ṣadrā in parts of his book al-Asfār and rejected 
 
194 Ibid., p. 29. 
195 Ibid., p. 58. 
196 Although the word muthul is used in Arabic to refer to Platonoc forms, and muthul is cognate with mithāl, one 
should not confuse Platonic forms (muthul) and the imaginal (mithāl) world, and say that all Muslim philosophers 
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by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī in his Nihāyat al-ḥikma, have to do with latitudinal intellects (al-‘uqūl 
al-‘arḍiyya) which lie at the lowest stage of the world of intellects, where the world of intellects 
is a created world. 
4.1.6. ‘Allāma’s contributions to theoretical mysticism 
A question tackled by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī in his “Risālat al-Wilāya” is the following: is the 
position of wilāya exclusive to certain people, such as the prophets, or can it be attained by 
others as well? In response, ‘Allāma says that the position is not exclusive—it can be achieved 
by everyone. To substantiate the claim, he offers a philosophical argument which counts as his 
own contribution. The argument was partly expounded above. Put in a nutshell, the argument 
says that the relation between this realm and the realm beyond it is that of effect and cause or 
imperfection and perfection, dubbed by ‘Allāma as the relation between the interior and the 
exterior. Since the exterior is necessarily intuited, and since the intuited involves an intuition 
of the interior, it follows that the interior is intuited, since the existence of the exterior is a 
degree of the existence of the interior. In fact, the existence of the exterior with respect to that 
of the interior is a relational existence. This argument by ‘Allāma is very helpful in discussion 
of knowledge of one’s soul and questions of self-knowledge and knowledge of God. It accounts 
for how one’s knowledge of his or her own restricted existence is indeed knowledge of God 
(the absolute being) to the extent to which they partake of existence. Moreover, this is a 
 
attributed the belief in the imaginal world to Plato. For the attributes ascribed to Platonic forms by Plato match 
entities existing in the world of intellects, and Mullā Ṣadrā and many other Islamic philosophers have rightly 
counted these forms as entities of the world of intellects. In fact, no Islamic philosopher before Shahāb al-Dīn 
Suhrawardī (1154-1191) could prove the existence of the imaginal world, and thus, they used to divide the created 
world into two parts: the material world and the world of intellects (see Sayyid Ḥasan Aḥmadī, Sayyid Muḥammad 
Riḍā Ḥusaynī Khāmina, ‘Jāygāh-i ‘ālam-i mithāl dar falsafih-yi Suhrawardī’ [The place of the imaginal world in 
Suhrawardī’s philosophy], Khiradnāmih-yi Ṣadrā, no. 56). There are serious disagreements among Islamic 
philosophers as to Plato’s work and opinions, and these extend to his account of Platonic forms as well. Different 
interpretations of Platonic forms can be classified into three general groups with respect to the existential stage of 
Platonic forms: (1) Forms are abstract quiddities of things subsisting by God as His imprinted images and elaborate 
knowledge of the creatures. In his Al-jam‘ bayn al-ra’yayn (The reconciliation of the two opinions), Fārābī rejects 
certain interpretations of forms attributed to Aristotle, and then espouses this exegesis (pp. 106-10). In his 
Shawāriq, ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhījī defends Fārābī in his reduction of forms to imprinted images, but Mullā Ṣadrā 
rejects Fārābī’s account of God’s elaborate knowledge; (2) forms are latitudinal intellects in the world of intellects. 
This interpretation has been advocated by people such as Mīr Dāmād, Mullā Ṣadrā, Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī, and 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. What they all agree on is that Platonic forms are intellects, but their versions of this view 
remarkably vary. The first three philosophers formulate their versions of Platonic forms and attribute it to Plato, 
but ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī elaborates Platonic forms and then rejects them. Suhrawardī and Avicenna have also 
interpreted Platonic forms as intellects or belonging to the world of intellects. Platonic forms are rejected by 
Avicenna and other Islamic Peripatetic philosophers. Suhrawardī agreed with Avicenna at first, but he says that 
he later intuited Platonic forms as a result of his mystical asceticism and then provided a rational argument for 
them; (3) forms are imaginal images in the imaginal world. This interpretation was offered by Dawānī and was 
criticized by Mullā Ṣadrā. (The discussion is wide-ranging, and it is not possible to consider all accounts of 
Platonic forms in this dissertation. For more on this see pp. 268-314 of chapter nine of volume two of Raḥīq 
makhtūm—‘Abd Allāh Jawādī Āmulī’s exposition of al-Asfār.) 
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philosophical argument that can be drawn on to justify what some mystics said to the effect 
that they only saw God in whatever they saw. 
Conclusion 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī takes intuition to be the presence of an immaterial entity to another 
immaterial entity, believing that objects of intuition are immaterial entities existing in the 
imaginal world and the world of intellects. In his mystical discussions, following the lead of 
mystics, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī talks about God's manifestations and the possibility of their 
intuition. In the religious language, revelation is a kind of relation with God. In the next section, 
I will provide a definition and characterization of revelation according to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. 
4.2. Revelation 
In his al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī defines and explains various types of revelation (waḥy) in 
terms of difference senses in which the word, waḥy, is used in the Qur’an.197 One type of 
revelation, dealt with in this dissertation, is concerned with meanings revealed or inspired by 
God to particular individuals, i.e. prophets, who have particular characteristics, in the form of 
words and meanings. Taking all words and philosophical principles of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī into 
account, it might be concluded that he takes the reality of revelation to consist in a graded 
(mushakkak) entity, having different existential degrees—one end of which lies in God’s 
essence and the other in the lowest degrees of the soul in a verbal form.198 In my discussion of 
 
197 In the Qur’an, the word, waḥy, has been used in five senses: (1) revelation to prophets, to which a major part 
of this dissertation is devoted, (2) guidance revelation (waḥy al-tasdīd): according to verse 73 of Sura al-Anbiya’: 
“And We revealed to them the doing of good deeds.” In his delineation of this type of revelation, ‘Allāma says 
that this is different from legislative revelation, which precedes the action. Guidance revelation is simultaneous 
or concurrent with the action, consisting in a divine interior guidance to the righteous action. To the contrary, 
legislative revelation precedes the action, and the Prophet acts upon its commands and doctrines, asking people 
to do the same (al-Mīzān, vol. 14, p. 305), (3) waḥy in the sense of general existential guidance: according to the 
Qur’an, “And your Lord revealed to the bee, ‘Take for yourself among the mountains, houses, and among the 
trees and [in] that which they construct’” (16: 68). Given the literal meaning of waḥy (to stealthily communicate 
something to someone), ‘Allāma says about the revelation to the bee that to inspire something to an animal so that 
it can instinctively learn it is a revelation of some kind (al-Mīzān, vol. 12, p. 292), (4) waḥy in the sense of inspiring 
something to someone in their dreams: of Moses’s mother the Qur’an says in verse 7 of Sura al-Qisas: “And We 
revealed to the mother of Moses, ‘Suckle him’.” This type of revelation is different from legislative revelation to 
prophets and is a matter of inspiring a meaning to one’s heart in a nonverbal form. ‘Allāma refers to a person who 
receives this type of revelation as muḥaddath (one to whom God talks) (al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 220), and (5) waḥy as 
devilish temptation: of Satan’s temptation to his followers, the Qur’an says: “And indeed do the devils reveal their 
allies [among men] to dispute with you” (6: 121). This revelation is not from God and it might be verbal or 
nonverbal. 
198 ‘Allāma believes that to say that revelation is purely a matter of meaning is to contradict Qur’anic verses, 
suggesting that if we espouse such esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an and identify revelation with perceptibles 
imparted to the individual by human intellectual faculties that lead to the good, then we need to adopt the same 
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the gradation of existence, I pointed out that the truth of material beings exists in the imaginal 
world, and the truth of imaginal beings exists at the stage of the intellectual world, and the 
chain continues until it ends in God’s essence, which is comprehensive of all existential 
perfections. The revelatory truth, imparted to the prophet in its lowest degree (in the minor 
imaginal world; that is, the human soul) in a verbal form,199 exists at the highest stage of the 
existential chain; that is, the stage of the divine essence, in a more perfect way, and God inspires 
it to the prophet’s heart. On this account, the reality of revelation consists in particular 
immaterial meanings, of an epistemic character, although at the lowest degrees of existence 
they appear in verbal forms. No one, including the receiver of revelation, has an agential role 
with respect to any stage of revelation,200 and no one can make any changes in its meaning or 
words.201 Therefore, ‘Allāma would disagree with those who say that prophets received only 
the meanings from God, and then articulated them in their own words. 
‘Allāma takes the reality of revelation to be a matter of meaning202 (although the meaning is 
inspired to the prophet via God’s words), maintaining that God is the origin of revelation—
sometimes He directly talked to prophets; sometimes He talked to them with the mediation of 
 
position in the case of all supernatural entities, which is contrary to prima facie meanings of the Qur’an. In his 
discussion of miracles and extraordinary acts in his al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma responds to such interpretations (al-Mīzān, 
vol. 2, p. 314). It should be noted, however, that, as shall be elaborated later in this section, the words received by 
prophets are not material sounds—in order for them to be communicated, God and revelation-carrying angels do 
not need to have larynxes or move a lip or mouth. Moreover, the receiver—the prophet—does not need to have 
material ears. Prophets absorb the words just as we hear words in our dreams. 
199 In his al-Mīzān, ‘Allāma cites a hadith transmitted by Zurāra from Imam al-Ṣādiq about the difference between 
rasūl (messenger) and nabiyy (prophet) and muḥaddath (one to whom God talks). The Imam explains: “rasūl is 
the one who sees the angel who brings the message from his Lord and says: ‘your Lord has commanded such and 
such. A rasūl is also a nabiyy. A nabiyy, on the other hand, does not see the angel who comes to him. The angel 
just inspires the divine message to his heart. At the time of receiving the message, the nabiyy goes unconscious 
or sees things in his dreams.” It should be noted that, either case (seeing the angel or receiving the message in the 
dream), words are imparted to the prophet and the messenger (al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 219). The reason why this is 
the case should be sought in ‘Allāma’s philosophical principles. Revelation involves a great plurality of words, 
just as any other verbal phenomenon, and such plurality is only compatible with the material world as well as the 
minor imaginal world (that is, the imaginal world of the human soul insofar as it is related with the material world), 
and dreams are, indeed, instances of this imaginal dimension of the human soul. In higher worlds such as the 
intellectual world and the divine essence, however, there is no such accidental plurality—indeed, plurality gives 
way to unity. Therefore, the reality of revelation in God’s essence is simple (noncomplex), and in the world of 
essential names, it comes to have conceptual (rather than token) plurality. 
200 In his interpretation of verse 97 of Sura al-Baqara, ‘Allāma says: “Just as Gabriel has no autonomous role in 
bringing the Qur’an down, and is but a compliant messenger, he does not have such role in receiving and delivering 
the Qur’an to the Messenger of God. To the contrary, the Messenger’s heart is a container of divine revelation, 
without it being manipulated by Gabriel. To sum, Gabriel was just charged with the task of delivering the message, 
period” (al-Mīzān, vol. 1, p. 230). This point is not restricted to the Qur’an; it extends to all revelation in general. 
201 See: Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2009, Qur’an dar Islam, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, p. 92. 
202 Ibid., 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 2, p. 316. 
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an angel, and sometimes “from behind a veil.”203 Since ‘Allāma regards the human perceptive 
faculty as immaterial, the reality of revelation and its origin as well as its possible 
intermediaries and its receiver (the prophet’s soul) are also immaterial.204 In the section on 
intellect, I pointed out that ‘Allāma believes that all knowledge acquired by people in virtue of 
their relation with immaterial worlds is knowledge by presence, taking the presence of an 
immaterial entity to another immaterial entity as a matter of intuition. From these premises, as 
well as certain remarks by ‘Allāma in his work, to some of which I shall return soon, it follows 
that knowledge of revelation is a matter of knowledge by presence—it is a specific type of 
intuition acquired by certain human souls. What follows is restricted to a definition of 
revelation, its properties, and ways of receiving it. I will only discuss what helps us to identify 
the relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation from ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s perspective. 
4.2.1. Definition of Revelation and Its Properties 
‘Allāma provides a number of similar definitions of revelation in his works, the most elaborate 
of which is the following: “revelation is a kind of heavenly (immaterial) speech not perceived 
via senses and intellectual thinking, but via another sentience and cognition found in certain 
individuals with the grace of God, whereby they receive hidden commands—concealed from 
senses and intellect—from revelation and divine teaching. Prophethood (nubuwwa) is to 
undertake such a task.”205 Given the preliminaries above as well as ‘Allāma’s explicit words to 
the effect that revelation comes in a verbal form as well, paradigmatically exemplified by the 
Qur’an, it becomes obvious that when ‘Allāma says that revelation is not perceived by intellect, 
he talks about the reality of revelation pointed out above; he does not intend to say that 
revelation is a just a matter of meaning, and the prophet can perceive the words of revelation 
without deploying intellectual faculties. 
A crucial issue concerning divine speech—which we should take into account in order to be 
able to understand ‘Allāma’s view of revelations articulated here and there in his various 
works—is that, according to ‘Allāma, the Qur’an endorses God’s verbal speech. He provides 
an elaborate discussion of kalām (word), qawl (statement), waḥy (revelation), and other similar 
Qur’anic words.206 What concerns us in this dissertation is that kalām literally means the 
communication of meaning to the addressee, where the communication is verbal, although it 
 
203 Ibid., vol. 18, p. 107. 
204 Ibid., 2009, Qur’an dar Islam, Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, p. 103. 
205 Ibid., p. 102-103. 
206 See: Ibid., 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 2, pp. 314-327. 
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can also be used in nonverbal communications. ‘Allāma suggests that humans have invented 
words in order to obviate their needs; otherwise, they would not do so. Uttered words are 
material entities, generated by body parts, such as larynxes and tongues, and their receiver 
should also be equipped with material ears. God is exalted from having a material body, and 
so are angels who undertake to carry and deliver divine messages. Therefore, divine and angelic 
speech should not be conceived as requiring material bodies and material words generated 
therefrom. But not all words are material—there may be immaterial words, which still count 
as words in a literal, rather than metaphorical, sense of the term. This is the case when we hear 
words and find meaning in them in our dreams, whereas these words are not material, having 
material forms only. In his exegesis of verse 17 of Sura Maryam, ‘Allāma comments on the 
word, tamaththul (representation), as follows: “how is it possibly conceivable that an angel 
appears as a human being and then returns to its original form given that humans and angels 
have distinct identities, without there being a relation between the two with respect to their 
essences or effects? When we say ‘something has represented itself to something else in such 
and such a way,’ it is tantamount to saying that the former has appeared in such and such a 
form to the latter; that is, the latter has conceived the former in such and such a way, rather 
than being transformed into something else. Therefore, an angel’s representation as a human is 
its appearance to an observer in a human form, without it really turning into a human being; 
otherwise, it would follow that something is transformed into something else, instead of 
appearing in a different form.”207 The same is the case with the appearance of Gabriel (the 
carrier of revelation) to the prophet. Thus, Gabriel comes to have a human form, without having 
a material body, and consequently, the angel does not turn into a human being, and without a 
body, there will be no sounds or material utterances. The communication of such words to the 
prophet is analogous to what one undergoes during a dream: one hears the words from someone 
without their physical ears being engaged in the audition. ‘Allāma provides no further 
illumination of what these words really are and how they are communicated. He just says that 
this is hidden from us—we do not know anything more about the reality of revelation. 
In a key essay on revelation, as well as his al-Mīzān, 208  ‘Allāma elucidates the peculiar 
sentience or sense possessed by the prophets, by means of which they have received revelations. 
In his view, revelation is a special type of speech, which requires its receiver to be equipped 
 
207Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 14, p. 36. 
208 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 152-158. 
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with a peculiar sense not possessed by ordinary people. To this peculiar power of the prophets 
‘Allāma refers as the “mysterious sense,” which is the ground of their ability to receive 
revelations. He says: “prophethood is a mysterious non-intellectual sense, and revelation 
consists in truths received through this sense.”209 By “non-intellectual” ‘Allāma does not intend 
to say that the message of revelation is irrational; what he means is that people do not come to 
have the ability to receive revelation merely in virtue of having intellect or an intellectual 
faculty. To receive God’s words, one needs to be equipped with a peculiar mysterious sense 
outside the scope of the human intellect. There should, therefore, be a homogeneity among 
revelation, its sender, and its receiver, without which it would be impossible for a prophet to 
receive revelations. 
In his essays, “al-Tawḥīd” (monotheism), and “al-Asmā’ wa-l-Ṣifāt” (the names and the 
attributes), ‘Allāma refers to three divine stages: the essence, essential names, and names of 
actions. From ‘Allāma’s words it is implied that the first revelation received by all prophets 
was unmediated; 210  that is, they partake in the stage of essence (or essential names) as 
annihilated in divine essence (or essential names). Thereafter, the prophets need not reach the 
threshold of annihilation; they can stay at the stage of union with God’s names of actions. In 
any event, regardless of whether or not they reach the stage of annihilation in the essence or 
essential names, they never doubt whether the meanings communicated to them are from God, 
since they intuit God’s essence or His essential names or His names of actions.211 With respect 
to unmediated revelation being known by certainty, ‘Allāma suggests that the divine origin of 
revelation is as evident to the prophet212 as ordinary pieces of self-evident knowledge (such as 
knowledge of the proposition that two is half of four).213 In his exegesis of verse 14 of Sura 
Taha, ‘Allāma makes it explicit that revelation can be received when intuiting the stage of 
divine essence. In his account of the first revelation sent down to Moses and why God 
 
209 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2008, Majmū‘a Rasā’il (‘Allāma-ye Ṭabāṭabā’ī), “Risālat al-Wasa’iṭ,” 
Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, vol. 1, p. 150. 
210 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 14, p. 138. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Here is how ‘Allāma supports his claim: “this condition [unmediated reception of revelation] is shared by all 
prophets in their initial revelation in which their prophethood or messengership was announced to them. Here, 
they have no doubts that the revelation is from the Exalted God, and in order to see this, they need no reflections, 
reasons, or proofs. For if they needed any of these, they would still not have certainty that they became a prophet, 
indeed, because the confidence they would thus develop might be resulted from reasons deployed by their 
intellectual faculty, rather than an unmediated reception from the hidden” (al-Mīzān, vol. 4, p. 138). 
213 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li 
al-Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 3, p. 220. 
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introduced Himself to him as “Indeed, I am Allah. There is no deity except Me” (20:14), 
‘Allāma writes: “when He says ‘Indeed, I am Allah. There is no deity except Me,’ He 
introduces Himself with His name and says ‘Indeed, I am Allah,’ rather than ‘Allah is Me.’ For 
acquaintance implies that one is introduced to attributes of the essence through observation of 
the essence, and not the other way round.” It should be noted that, as I pointed out in the section 
on intuition, according to ‘Allāma’s suggestion on page 16 of his “Risālat al-Wilāya,” one can 
reach the stage of essential annihilation in the sense that “one becomes annihilated in God’s 
transcendental essence and then becomes hidden in virtue of God’s hiddenness—being 
annihilated in virtue of the essence’s annihilation and surviving in virtue of the survival of the 
Exalted God Who is pure from any flaws and imperfections.” 
4.2.2. Ways in which Revelation is Received 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī cites Qur’anic verses, including verse 51 of Sura al-Shura to show that 
there are three ways in which revelation is inspired to the prophets. First: the prophet directly 
receives revelation from God without a mediation or without a veil between him and God.214 
According to ‘Allāma, initial revelations received by all prophets were of this type, and their 
subsequent revelations were sometimes in this way as well. Second: by the mediation of 
specific angels, including Gabriel. And third: reception of revelation from behind a veil 
between God and the prophet. 
‘Allāma maintains that God’s speech is one of His attributes of actions, rather than an essential 
attribute, and since God performs His actions via intermediaries, God’s speech takes place in 
mediated ways.215 This supports my construal of ‘Allāma’s account early in this section: that 
he takes revelation to be a graded reality. To illustrate, on the one hand, ‘Allāma suggests that 
all divine actions, including revelation, are performed in mediated ways, but, on the other, he 
says that there is an unmediated type of revelation. To reconcile the two propositions, we can 
say that when ‘Allāma talks about unmediated or direct ways of receiving revelations, he talks 
about the strongest and the highest degree of the reality of revelation, and when he talks about 
mediated revelation, he talks indeed about lower degrees of the same revelation, that is, the 
words of revelation. 
 
214Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Beirut: Mu’assisa al- ’Alamī Li al-
Maṭbū‘āt, vol. 18, pp. 72-73. 
215 Ibid., vol. 14, p. 139. 
94 
 
Later in this discussion, ‘Allāma suggests that even when a mediating angel delivers the 
message, unmediated revelation might still take place, depending on whether the receiver of 
revelation is fixated on God or the revelation-carrying angel.216 In other words, if the prophet 
is fully attentive of the carrier of revelation, he will receive the revelation in a mediated way 
and from behind the veil (where the angel serves as a veil between him and God), but if he 
turns his attention away from the carrier of revelation to God Himself, he would receive an 
unmediated revelation. This is to say that if the prophet reaches a stage at which he can intuit 
the divine essence or God’s essential names—that is, the stage of annihilation—then he will 
receive the higher reality of revelation from God, while, at a lower stage, his soul is still 
engaged in receiving the words of revelation from the revelation angel. In its higher stage, 
therefore, revelation is proportionate to the existential degree (that of God’s essence) where it 
exists, and at its lowest stage, it is proportionate to the existential degree (the minor imaginal 
world) where it exists. Now depending on which of these degrees the prophet’s soul is attentive 
of, he receives revelation in that degree, in addition to the lowest degree of his soul also 
receiving the lowest degree of revelation (its words). Such a graded picture of revelation is 
well-matched with the word, inzāl (sending down), used about revelation in the Qur’an, 
because inzāl involves, for example, the holding of one end of a rope at a higher floor and then 
sending the rest of the rope down to lower floors. This is contrary to nuzūl (descending), which 
is a case where something goes down through and through. Thus, the Qur’an—as an instance 
of revelation—extends from the stage of divine essence all the way down to that of the minor 
imaginal world, existing at each stage of the longitudinal chain of existence as proportionate to 






5. The Relation between Intellect, Intuition, and Revelation 
After our consideration of the definition and properties of intellect, intuition, and revelation, 
we are now in a position to deal with the main question of the dissertation: what is ‘Allāma 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view of the relation among the three? To elucidate ‘Allāma’s view of the matter, 
we need to consider five epistemological preliminaries. 
5.1. The preliminaries 
1. The human cognitive faculty consists of five distinct faculties, each of which has the ability 
and function to perceive a given category of the knowable. The five faculties are: sense, 
imagination, estimation (wahm), intellect, and peculiar intellectual faculty. I have already 
introduced some of these faculties. The peculiar intellectual faculty is the one whose 
actualization is tantamount to one’s admission to the intellectual world. Moreover, I have 
pointed out that, for ‘Allāma, the difference between humans and other animals boils down to 
the latter’s deprivation of this type of intellectual faculty. According to ‘Allāma, the faculty in 
charge of perceiving universal concepts in animals is the estimative (wāhima) faculty. The 
estimative faculty is, indeed, at the lowest intellectual degree 217 —where intellect is 
characterized by perception of universals—and if the peculiar intellectual faculty is actualized, 
it will constitute the highest intellectual degree. Between estimative and peculiar intellectual 
faculties, there lies the intellective (or intellectual) faculty, in virtue of which one perceives 
complicated theoretical objects of knowledge, which cannot be perceived by animals. 
Moreover, it is on account of this faculty (the practical intellect) that one can discern the good 
and the evil. This is the faculty owing to which the human species is superior to other animal 
species—indeed, it counts as the distinguishing feature of humans and other animals.218 It 
should be noted, however, that the difference between intellective and peculiar intellectual 
faculties lies in the fact that the former never partakes of the intellectual world even upon its 
full-scale actualization, whereas the latter begins to be actualized only when the human soul is 
admitted to the intellectual world, or more precisely speaking, its actualization is tantamount 
to one’s entry in this world. Just as the estimative faculty is at lowest degree of intellect, senses 
constitute the lowest degree of perceptive faculties. On this account, (1) the sensory faculty is 
 
217 For more about ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view of animal knowledge and animal cognitive faculties, see the 
following (his words on the matter in the following references should be placed side by side to yield the desired 
conclusion): Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2007, Majmū‘a Rasā’il al-‘Allāmat al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, p. 345, 
fn. and p. 346; also see Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, Tehran: 
Shirkat-i Ufsit (Sahāmīy-i ʿĀm), pp. 489-493, and Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1970, al-Mīzān fī 




the weakest human cognitive faculty, (2) the estimative faculty is the weakest human 
intellectual faculty; that is, the faculty that perceives the universals, (3) the intellective faculty 
is the strongest faculty that is actualized in all human beings, and (4) the strongest human 
intellectual faculty that is actualized only in some people, such as the prophets, is the peculiar 
human intellectual faculty. Each of the five human senses (that is, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, 
auditory, and visual) are impinged on by different things when exposed to them in one way or 
another. Thus, a hot cup of coffee impinging on one’s fingers is perceived by one’s tactile 
faculty, where the perception occurs in virtue of the cup’s contact with one’s hand. The 
resulting sensible form exists as long as the impingement persists, it is renewed with 
modifications in the impingement, and it disappears as soon as the impingement ceases. The 
imaginative faculty creates an imaginative form out of this sensible form, where the former is 
a particular form just like the latter (that is, it cannot apply to a plurality of objects), but they 
differ in that the former lacks certain constraints, such as time and place. Thus, when you watch 
the Eiffel Tower, the light emanating from the tower toward your eyes impinges on parts of 
your visual system, as a result of which you come to have a form—viz. a sensible form—based 
on the impingement. When you close your eyes, you can still imagine the Eiffel Tower while 
you are in London, since your imaginative faculty has constructed an imaginative form from 
the tower’s sensible form, which cannot apply to all towers in the world (that is, it is particular), 
although you have imagined the tower without temporal, spatial, and other constraints, which 
is the reason why you can still imagine it in London or in your local park. 
2. As pointed out before, in ‘Allāma’s view, there are two existential dimensions in a human 
being: material (the body) and imaginal. Now if the human soul develops existential expansion 
and is admitted to the intellectual world, it will also have a third dimension—that of intellect. 
None of the cognitive faculties exists in the material dimension of human bodies, because 
knowledge is immaterial, and the faculty that perceives knowledge should, on account of 
homogeneity between the perceiver and the perceived, be immaterial. The sensible faculty has 
the strongest tie to the body, and it is through this that other faculties are related to the material 
world. All of the five cognitive faculties, referred to in (1), exist in the imaginal world (that is, 
the imaginal dimension of the human existence) and are in contact with imaginal inhabitants 
of the world. The only exception is the peculiar human faculty that will exist in the intellectual 
world upon its actualization. 
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3. ‘Allāma believes that219 the generation of universal concepts (such as that of the human 
which applies to different human individuals) depends on the realization of a corresponding 
imaginative form, which depends in turn on the realization of a corresponding sensible form, 
and there is a constant relation among these. He offers this account in Article Four of his Uṣūl-
i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm to show that no error occurs in any of these sensible, imaginative, 
and intellectual (universal) forms—indeed, errors take place at the level of judgement. He 
provides a lengthy discussion of the issue, which I shall not tackle here. I just wish to illustrate 
his claim with an example. Consider the sentence, “a burglar broke into my house,” and 
suppose that it is false. The sentence consists of three parts: a subject, a predicate, and a 
judgment. The judgment is not a matter of knowledge by acquisition—one that is acquired by 
the soul as a result of a contact with the external (or extra-mental) world—but is an item of 
knowledge created by the human soul, which is a matter of knowledge by presence. Since 
judgment is an action (an existing entity) created by the human soul, it cannot possibly be 
characterized as false, because actions cannot by nature be false. Accordingly, the error lies in 
the subject or the predicate or both. Now if the error lies in the subject, then it might have arisen 
from similarities between features I generally attribute to burglars and to those I identify my 
brother with. Thus, if I identify burglars with tallness, thick hair, and black clothes, and as it 
happens, these are the very features with which I identify my brother with, then I might be 
susceptible to errors about the person who has entered my house. Two cognitive faculties are 
involved in this scenario neither of which is erroneous: (i) the sensory faculty: it sensibly 
perceives whatever is reflected in the eye, according to which the human soul judges that a tall, 
thick-haired person in black has entered the house. No error occurs at this stage, and (ii) the 
imaginative faculty: it judges that these attributes are identical to my brother’s, and therefore, 
my brother and burglars are identical in these features. This is also an accurate judgement. 
Moreover, the imaginative faculty which can identify something with something similar makes 
an identity judgment between a burglar and my brother (the one who has actually entered the 
house). This judgment is also accurate in the domain of our imaginative faculty, because the 
correspondence domain of imaginative forms created by the soul is the imaginal world, rather 
the external world. This is like imagining that Ali is an instance of lion (in that he is brave) and 
say that the lion has come (where you mean that Ali has come). To put it the other way round, 
the error occurs when I compare the imaginative judgment that “my brother (the tall, thick-
 
219 The ideas in preliminaries (3) and (4) were discussed by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī in Article Four of his Uṣūl-i 
Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm and elaborated by Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari in his commentaries on the book. 
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haired man in black) and the burglar (the tall, thick-hair man in black) are identical” to the 
sensory judgment, because “the burglar (the tall, thick-hair man in black) who has entered the 
house” does not correspond to the judgment that “the burglar and my brother are identical” 
because the tall, thick-hair man in black might be my brother or a burglar or a neighbor or any 
other person with these features. Therefore, it is erroneous to judge that a sensory judgment 
(which is always true) corresponds to an imaginary judgment (which is always true in the 
imaginative domain). 
4. The same error that might occur in comparing a sensory judgment to an imaginative 
judgment might also occur when comparing an imaginative judgement to an intellectual 
judgment or judgements by other cognitive faculties. As pointed out before, all concepts and 
assents take place in the imaginal dimension of the human existence, which is to say that all 
empirical, human, and other sciences are acquired in this dimension. Now errors that take place 
in these sciences do not lie in what is perceived by these faculties. They occur as a result of an 
error in comparing a judgment issued by one faculty, say the imaginative faculty, with that of 
another faculty, say the intellectual faculty. The error might even take place in comparing the 
perceptibles of the peculiar intellectual faculty and those of intellective, imaginative, estimative, 
or sensory faculties. Thus, a mystic who is admitted to the intellectual world might make errors 
if he wishes to compare his mystical intuitions from the intellectual world to the rest of his 
perceptibles—perceived by other faculties such as the intellectual faculty.  
From the four premises above, we can imply that, in ‘Allāma’s view, judgments of our 
cognitive faculties are never susceptible to errors, since they are always true in their respective 
domains (e.g. in imaginative or intellectual domains). In fact, errors occur when comparing the 
judgment of a faculty to that of another. 
5. ‘Allāma discusses errors in knowledge in his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm. Since his 
primary addressees in this book were idealist220 materialists, he did not engage in how such 
knowledge is acquired by human beings. Instead, he does his utmost to support realism. As 
pointed out before, ‘Allāma believes that since the human soul is immaterial and since 
immaterial entities have a higher degree of existence than material entities, matter cannot create 
anything in the soul; that is to say, contacts with material beings and their impingements on the 
 
220 In ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s jargons, ‘idealism’ is the denial of reality or denial of the possibility of obtaining 
knowledge of the reality. In twentieth-century Iran, it was common to refer to these views under the label of 
‘idealism.’ It is evidently distinct from ‘idealism’ as in Western philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy. What 
‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī calls ‘idealism’ is in fact what is known as ‘skepticism’ in Western philosophy. 
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human soul, transmitted by nerve cells to the brain, cannot produce knowledge in the soul. 
They just play a preparatory role in the sense that when one makes a contact with something 
via the five senses, their soul will be directed at the imaginal truth of the thing in the imaginal 
world, and will come to have a relation with it. It will then obtain knowledge by presence 
through this illuminational relation, and subsequently, the human soul (or mind) will abstract 
knowledge by acquisition—viz. the form of the thing—from this item of knowledge by 
presence. 
5.2. The Relation among Intellect, Intuition, and Revelation in terms of Knowledge by 
Presence 
As I have explained at length, the intellect has different existential degrees, each of which is in 
charge of acquiring different kinds of knowledge. These kinds of knowledge are acquired by 
humans through some relation of unification with different entities in different worlds of 
existence. To establish a relation of unification, also known as illuminational relation, is to 
have knowledge by presence, which is defined as the presence of an immaterial entity (the 
known) to an immaterial entity (the soul). The presence amounts to an intuition of different 
entities in different worlds, acquired by the soul through its relation of unification with other 
entities such that the soul finds and intuits them in its own existence. When the five cognitive 
faculties of humans have a relation of unification with entities in imaginal or intellectual worlds, 
the human soul finds them in its own existence to the extent of its relation with them, and this 
finding is indeed knowledge by presence. For ‘Allāma, to intuit is to find other entities in one’s 
soul, which is a matter of knowledge by presence. The only conceivable difference between 
intuitions and intellectual perceptions (that is, all perceptions via the five faculties) is the 
intuition of the stage of Oneness (waḥidiyya), as well as the intuition of the stage of Unicity 
(aḥadiyya), where the soul reaches the stage of annihilation in divine attributes. As delineated 
before, these two stages are the highest degrees of intuition where the human being intuits itself 
without the nonexistential constraints with which the soul is individuated in other worlds of 
existence (viz. intellectual and imaginal worlds) and sees only God and His attributes, “without 
leading to immanence (ḥulūl) and unification (itiḥād), from both of which God is exalted.”221 
On this account, the reality of intuition is knowledge by presence of one’s own self even at its 
highest degrees. The highest degree of knowledge by presence is that of the soul’s self-intuition 
at the stage of Unicity (aḥadiyya) and the stage of Oneness (waḥidiyya), and it is at the next 
stages that the soul intuits other beings through the unification of intellect, the intellector, and 
 
221 Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn, Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1941, “Risālat al-Wilāya”, Qum: Mu’assisa Ahl al-Bayt, p. 34. 
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the intellected. To put it in a nutshell, the relation between intuition and intellect with respect 
to their perceptibles is that of absolute general-specific relation (al-‘umūm wa-l-khuṣūṣ al-
muṭlaq)—that is, intellectual perceptibles include knowledge of all entities in material, 
imaginal, and intellectual worlds, and intuitive perceptibles share these intellectual perceptibles 
with the difference that the latter include the intuition of the stage of Unicity (aḥadiyya) and 
Oneness (waḥidiyya) as well.222 It should be noted that, even at the stage of divine essence and 
attributes, it is the intellect that perceives, but since the perfection of intellect is, at this stage, 
to be annihilated in the divine essence and attributes, it no longer has an identity to be known 
with. This is the reason why it is said that the intellect cannot find a way in this world, because 
whatever exists and is observed in this world is God. Notwithstanding this, since intellect is 
the highest degree of the human soul, the human annihilation occurs in intellect as its utmost 
perfection. 
In the section on revelation, I pointed out that revelation is a matter of knowledge (meaning), 
and one who receives the revelation intuits it in virtue of his mysterious peculiar sense. 
Moreover, revelation has different existential degrees: its origin is God, and then the prophet 
intuits different degrees of revelation. In fact, in his initial reception of revelation, the prophet 
 
222  This is because ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī says in his Risālat al-tawḥīd and “Risālat al-wilāya” that the intuition of 
different stages of God (namely, stages of Unity or Aḥadiyya and Oneness or Wāḥidiyya) consists in annihilation 
in these stages, where annihilation is a mystical notion, which does not appear in philosophy except as a mystical 
issue. That being so, the intuition of the stages of Unicity and Oneness falls outside of the scope of philosophy, 
and philosophical discussion of the kinds of knowledge—knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition—
does not pertain to these two stages (that is, Unicity and Oneness), since philosophy is not concerned with divine 
manifestations. Instead, in philosophy creatures are considered as connective or relational beings with respect to 
God. According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, as pointed out before, the ultimate degree of monotheism proved by 
philosophers so far was that God has all perfective attributes and is exalted from all imperfections. It is noteworthy 
that arguments presented by philosophers are very close to what is referred to in mysticism as the stage of 
Oneness—the stage in which all attributes exist independently and objectively. The main difference between 
philosophy and mysticism lies in the fact that philosophers see God as a necessary being that has all perfective 
attributes and is exalted from all imperfections, where they derive all these attributes through a rational analysis 
of divine existence; otherwise, God’s existence is simple and free from any composition. Mystics, on the other 
hand, are concerned with four stages of essence, Unicity, Oneness, and conative attributes (or attributes of action), 
as discussed before, without rejecting what philosophers say on the matter (e.g. without suggesting that God is 
composite or imperfect). Although what philosophers say is remarkably similar to what Islamic mystics say about 
the stage of Oneness, philosophers talk only about one essence that has effects, where these effects enjoy existence 
and are wholly dependent on their causes in their existence. However, mystics believe that things other than God 
are God’s manifestations, considering divine stages as His manifestations and appearances. Thus, when it comes 
to intuition and annihilation, mystics talk about annihilation in God’s manifestations, while philosophers talk 
about an effect’s knowledge by presence of its cause, taking the world of intellect (with its various degrees and 
stages) and its denizens as the closest world to God. On this picture, annihilation in the mystical literature has to 
do with the intuition of various stages of divine manifestations, and in philosophy (although it is not referred to 
as ‘annihilation’ and is instead characterized as knowledge by presence) it has to do with knowledge by presence 
of different stages of the world of intellect. (It should be noted, however, that the knowledge by presence is not 
limited to inhabitants of the world of intellect and indeed it includes inhabitants of the imaginal world as well, but 
if we want to find a counterpart for the mystical divine manifestations and various degrees of existence in 




intuits it at the stage of the divine names and attributes. This is the point of ‘Allāma’s idea that, 
in their first revelation, all prophets receive it in an unmediated way, and elsewhere, he suggests 
that mediators of revelation include angels of revelation who are intellectual immaterial entities 
whose home is the intellectual world. After the first revelation, the prophet might perceive the 
revelation in a mediated way or from behind a veil or again in an unmediated way. According 
to our definition of intuition, the intuition of revelation amounts to saying that the prophet finds 
the revelation inside himself in virtue of the unification of his peculiar sense with different 
degrees of revelation. The intuition of revelation is, therefore, a matter of knowledge by 
presence. 
To sum up, ‘Allāma’s view of the relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation is as 
follows: all of these are perceived by way of knowledge by presence, although intuitive 
perceptibles include knowledge by presence of the stage of divine names and attributes, 
whereas intellect can at best have knowledge by presence of all entities in the intellectual world. 
Prophets are able to have knowledge by presence of different degrees of revelation and to 
introspect revelatory truths inside their souls in virtue of their mysterious sense. 
 
5.3. The Relation among Intellectual Perceptibles, Intuitive Objects of Knowledge, and 
Transmitted Knowledge in terms of Knowledge by Acquisition 
As discussed before, there are two kinds of knowledge: knowledge by presence and knowledge 
by acquisition, and in ‘Allāma’s view, the latter goes back to the former. By “intellectual 
perceptibles” (in the title of this section) I mean the kind of theoretical knowledge (concepts 
and assents) that is derived from knowledge by presence, and by “intuitive objects of 
knowledge” I mean the kind of knowledge by acquisition acquired by the intuitive subject after 
having knowledge by presence of hidden knowledge; in other words, the knowledge by 
acquisition is derived from knowledge by presence of the hidden world (the intuition). The 
reason why I used the term, “transmitted knowledge,” instead of “revelation” is that, on 
‘Allāma’s account, intellectual and revelatory knowledge is acquired by humans by way of 
knowledge by presence, and objects of intellectual and revelatory knowledge are both 
immaterial and both have different degrees, and no error occurs at any stage of knowledge by 
presence, because such knowledge is nothing but finding the object of knowledge in one’s soul, 
and finding can never be mistaken (otherwise, it would not be finding). This is unlike the 
relation between intellectual theoretical knowledge and transmitted knowledge in which error 
102 
 
is possible, as pointed out before. Thus, irrespective of whether one can find about God’s 
existence via intuition or rational argument, it is taken as granted in religious texts such as the 
Qur’an that “God exists.” According to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, when a materialist says “God does 
not exist,” he makes a false statement, but in the domain of their own imagination, the sentence 
is true, because the speaker either construes “God” in such a way (e.g. as an entity which serves 
as a placeholder for unknown material causes and the like) that is different from the god whose 
existence is proved by purely rational arguments or perceived by intuition,, or alternatively 
construes “exist” in such a way that is incompatible with the reality of God, such as “matter = 
existence” or “existence = matter plus time and space.” Upon analysis, it will turn out the 
speaker of the above statement makes an error in comparing their own true imaginative 
meaning (acquired by their imaginative faculty) to the external reality that is believed in by 
theists on the basis of purely rational arguments (without drawing on empirical premises) or 
intuitions. That is to say, they make an error in comparing two judgments which are issued by 
two different faculties—imagination and intellect—and are true in their own domain—i.e. 
imaginative and intellectual domains. In fact, a materialist says that “a god with such and such 
attributes does not exist,” which is a true statement: even a theist does not believe in a god with 
those attributes—in their imaginations, theists also acknowledge that “a god with such and such 
attributes does not exist.” The theist has another faculty, however, which issues the following 
judgment: “a god exalted from imperfections and matter exists,” which is true in the domain 
of their cognition, namely the intellectual faculty, as well as the domain of existence, namely 
the extra-mental world. The mind is deceived by the similarity between the god that serves as 
a subject in the proposition, God does not exist and the god that serves as a subject in the 
proposition, God exists, and consequently, extends the “does not exist” judgement, which truly 
applies to the god in the materialist’s imaginative faculty, to the god of theists, saying that “God 
does not exist.” 
In addition to the possibility of errors when comparing the judgment of a faculty to that of 
another, there are two more difficulties in the case of transmitted knowledge: (i) the chain of 
the transmission might not be known by certainty; that is, what is ascribed to the prophet and 
revelation might not be genuine, and (ii) the researcher might not be able to home in on the 
right meaning of the transmitted knowledge, in which case errors might occur when comparing 
the judgment of a faculty to that of another.223 
 
223 In his al-Mīzān, particularly in its introduction, ‘Allāma provides a detailed account of how revelation in 
general, and the Qur’an in particular, should be understand. 
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The final point concerning the relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation with which I 
deal in this dissertation is that the human intellect draws on arguments to discover and prove 
general laws in the realm of knowledge by acquisition. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes that 
discursive (burhānī) arguments yield certainty: 
Once it has been discovered, through a scholarly argument, that human faculties are 
veridical, and it has been proved that indubitable human perceptions represent the 
outside reality, there will be no difference between a certainty-yielding argument and a 
decisive intuition, and truths acquired via decisive revelation and intuition are like the 
truths gained via syllogistic thinking. Moreover, once a certainty-yielding argument 
confirms the accuracy and reality of revelation, there will be no difference between 
genuine religious materials that describe the truths of the origin and the resurrection, on 
the one hand, and what is demonstrated by arguments and discoveries, on the other 
hand.224 
‘Allāma says the following about Mullā Ṣadrā who has drawn on the three apparatuses of 
intellect (discursive argument), intuition, and revelation to discover the truths in a variety of 
his books, including al-Asfār al-‘Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya: 
As a result of this mental awareness and recognition [of the point appearing in the above 
quote from ‘Allāma], Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn established his scholarly and philosophical 
inquiries on the reconciliation among intellect, revelation, and divine legislation 
[Shari‘a], and in order to discover the truths of theology, he drew on discursive premises, 
revelatory materials, and indubitable religious materials. Although origins of this 
approach can be found in the words of the Second Teacher, Abū Naṣr Fārābī, Avicenna, 
Shaykh al-Ishrāq, Shams al-Dīn Turka, and Khwāja Naṣīr al-Ṭūsī, it was Ṣadr al-
Muta’allihīn who succeed to accomplish the enterprise.225 
  
 




6. The Conclusion 
‘Allāma Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī was a prominent Shiite scholar in the twentieth 
century who wrote many books and essays and trained many students. He was influential in 
the Seminary of Qum and indeed in all seminaries throughout Iran to such a great extent that 
his immigration from Najaf to Qum should count as a landmark in the history of the Seminary 
of Qum. A glimpse of the educational system of the Seminary of Qum as well as its regular 
courses and scholarly disciplines and branches since its foundation in 1922 until today reveals 
the remarkable difference between the period before and the period after ‘Allāma’s 
immigration to Qum. Undeterred by vigorous opposition to his lectures and writings on part of 
more traditional scholars in the seminary who typically harbored suspicions about philosophy 
and rationalism (as was advocated by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Mullā Ṣadrā 
Shīrāzī before him, which was drawn upon to understand religious texts and defend Islamic 
beliefs), ‘Allāma managed to turn Islamic philosophy into an inextricable discipline in 
seminary studies and establish the deployment of intellect and rational arguments as means of 
understanding religious texts in a large section of the Seminary of Qum.  
Another factor which contributed to this success was the turbulent political and social context 
in the years leading up to the Revolution and a few years afterwards—the turmoil, concerns, 
and the new challenges had affected the seminary and had, to some extent, taken the edge off 
critical attitudes to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. ‘Allāma exploited the opportunity and vehemently 
concerned himself with propagating his views and training his students. It should be noted, 
however, that the trouble faced by ‘Allāma in his encounters with traditional scholars and the 
predominant atmosphere of the seminary, which was dedicated to research in Shiite 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and related disciplines, was to such a great extent that these intervals of 
peace pale in comparison to them. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I pointed out that 
there were points at which ‘Allāma had to temporarily or permanently terminate his lectures or 
leave some of his writings, such as his commentaries on Biḥār al-Anwār, unfinished. In the 
face of all these problems, however, we see that his textbooks for Islamic philosophy are now 
official textbooks of the seminary and rational studies have found a prominent place in 
seminary research. Today, there are seminary institutes, such as Imam Khomeini Education 
and Research Institute in Qum, in which Islamic philosophy and other rational disciplines are 
taught and researched. Moreover, these institutes adopt a rational and philosophical approach 
to carry out research about Islamic texts so as to expand the boundaries of knowledge in a 
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variety of disciplines such as sociology, psychology, management, political sciences, ethics, 
and so on. 
Indeed, ‘Allāma picked up the threads of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī’s enterprise of reconciling 
intellect, intuition, and revelation. One might say that the relation among the three as conceived 
by ‘Allāma was the main principle predominating all writings by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, although 
in his teachings he was extremely careful not collapse the boundaries of philosophy, mysticism, 
and theology (kalām). The main question of this dissertation was ‘Allāma’s account of the 
nature of the relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation—I began with a short 
introduction to ‘Allāma and his work, and then considered, defined, and analyzed each of the 
three sources within three chapters. Finally, I considered the relation among the three in 
‘Allāma’s view. 
Following Mullā Ṣadrā, ‘Allāma believes in the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and its 
gradation (tashkīk). Drawing on these two principles, he believes in homogeneity of the 
existential degree of knowledge with that of the knower. That is to say, knowledge has 
existential degrees obtained by the knower in virtue of the unity of knowledge, the knower, and 
the known, where this obtaining of knowledge amounts to the presence of the known to the 
knower. For ‘Allāma, the human mind abstracts knowledge by acquisition from knowledge by 
presence acquired in virtue of the illuminational union of the knower’s soul with different truths 
of existential worlds. These items of knowledge are sometimes sensory (particular and bounded 
to time and space); that is, representations of material entities, where this feature—the ability 
to represent and veridically present the facts—is essential to, and shared by all types of, 
knowledge. Sometimes they are imaginative (particular, though unbounded to time and space 
and the like). And sometimes they are rational (universal). Since these items of knowledge by 
acquisition are homogeneous with knowledge by presence from which they are derived, 
‘Allāma provides philosophical arguments, mainly presented in his al-Rasā’il al-Tawḥīdiyya, 
to the effect that corresponding to these items of knowledge by acquisition (abstracted from 
knowledge by presence) there must be different existential worlds in relation to which the soul 
has acquired the relevant items of knowledge. One argument he briefly puts forward in favor 
of this claim in his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm is that, on the whole, we know that the 
reality exists, and we have some knowledge of it. Since it is impossible to have direct 
knowledge of the extra-mental material world, and we are certain that some of our beliefs are 
true and correspond to the external reality, material entities must have other immaterial realities 
in other worlds, in virtue of the relation to which the human soul can have knowledge of 
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material entities. He presents this argument after he has proved, through a number of rational 
arguments, that knowledge cannot be of a piece with matter. As I have briefly outlined in the 
chapter on intellect, knowledge is indeed an immaterial entity. 
As is obvious from this short outline, knowledge by presence is pivotal to the main issues of 
intellect. Moreover, knowledge by presence is key to definitions of intuition and revelation. 
Indeed, it plays a crucial role in the answer given in this dissertation to the question of the 
nature of intellect, intuition, and revelation. ‘Allāma takes intuition to consist in the presence 
of an immaterial entity to another immaterial entity (which is his definition of knowledge by 
presence). In his view, intuition has different degrees discriminated in virtue of existential 
degrees of the intuited. He believes that all realities in material, imaginal, and intellectual 
worlds are intuited in this way. As to the stage of divine attributes and names, ‘Allāma draws 
on an alternative method in accounting for its intuition: he explains the relevant intuition in 
terms of annihilation; that is, the emancipation of the human soul from all nonexistential 
constraints with which it is individuated from other entities—it is annihilated in the reality, 
seeing nothing but God and His attributes. ‘Allāma provides a similar account for revelation, 
suggesting that revelation is a matter of meaning (immateriality and knowledge), having 
different degrees extending from God’s essence all the way down to the imaginal world. The 
prophets are capable of receiving and grasping these meanings in virtue of their peculiar, and 
in ‘Allāma’s word, mysterious sense. 
To sum, ‘Allāma identifies an existential relation among intellect, intuition, and revelation. All 
knowledge acquired via these sources are primarily and essentially a matter of knowledge by 
presence, from which the human soul can abstract knowledge by acquisition. It should be noted, 
however, that revelation is from God even at the degree in which it is manifested as words 
communicated to the prophet in the imaginal world—it is by no means abstracted by the 
prophet’s mind from his knowledge by presence of the higher degrees of revelation. According 
to ‘Allāma’s principles that I briefly introduced based on Article Four of his Uṣūl-i Falsafih va 
Ravish-i Ri’ālīsm, errors are impossible both in knowledge by presence and knowledge by 
acquisition, and errors in the latter emerge only when the human mind compares a judgment 
issued by a particular cognitive faculty, such as the imaginative faculty, which is true in its own 
domain, to a judgment issued by another faculty, such as the intellective faculty, which is also 
true in its own domain—the possibility of errors lies in such comparisons, since it is impossible 
for the human cognitive faculties to make errors. This is the version of realism to which 
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